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1 A curse over the Andes? 
The resource curse approach 
and institutional change in the 
Andean region 
Bettina Schorr and Gerardo Damonte 
Introduction 
Endowed with vast and precious reserves, the countries located along the 
Andean arch have built their economies around the extraction and exportation 
of natural resources, mostly hydrocarbons and minerals. In many countries, the 
signifcance of the extractive sector has always been high. It increased to histori-
cally unique levels with the latest global commodity boom in the years 2003 to 
2013 that was fueled by Chinese demand and drove prices sky-high for Andean 
natural resources of the global markets (Hanni et al., 2018; Bebbington, 2012). 
This latest boom has profoundly changed the socio-economic landscape of 
the region. Given the extraordinary infux of rents and capital, all countries 
achieved notable improvements regarding the reduction of poverty (Cord et 
al., 2015; Gasparini & Cruces, 2013; Stampini et al., 2016). Income inequal-
ity, which until then had ranked amongst the highest in the world, decreased 
sharply (López-Calva & Lustig, 2010; CEPAL, 2019), motivating scholars to 
speak of a historical moment of equality for Latin America (Fritz & Lavinas, 2015). 
Notwithstanding these notable improvements, scholarship concerned with 
the resource curse calls for caution when assessing socio-economic and politi-
cal dynamics in so-called resource economies that depend on the extraction and 
export of natural resources. In particular, research has shown that in absence 
of a robust regulatory framework, resource-rich economies will sufer from a 
series of political and economic pathologies that can erode short-term improve-
ments stemming from windfalls during booms. The expressions of the resource 
curse may include economic instability and poverty, infation, authoritarian rule, 
corruption, and civil strife, among others. 
In fact, various studies have found the curse to be raging in the Andean 
region by causing fnancial mismanagement, poverty, and social inequalities 
(Carrillo Hoyos, 2019; Amézquita Zárate, 2014; Hinojosa, 2011; Perry & 
Olivera, 2009; Viale et al., 2017) as well as problems arising from the lack of 
economic diversifcation (Ducoing et al., 2018; Tello, 2013; Caria, 2017; Viale, 
2019; Barja Daza & Zavaleta Castellón, 2016), even inside the extractive sec-
tor (Cisneros, this volume). In addition, several studies show environmental 







4 Bettina Schorr and Gerardo Damonte 
models promoted in the region (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011; Bebbington & Bury, 
2013; Delamaza et al., 2017; Andrade & Morales, 2007; Ponce & McClintock, 
2014). As a matter of fact, the environmental consequences and social conficts 
provoked by resource extraction have been one of the main focal points of 
scholarship on the Andean countries during the latest boom. 
On the other side of the coin, the recent boom also constituted a period 
of signifcant institutional change. In particular, positive trends regarding the 
decrease in poverty and inequality have been attributed partly to the imple-
mentation of new redistributive and social policies (Sánchez-Ancochea, 2019). 
Other institutional changes in the region include the implementation of power-
sharing institutions like political decentralization and new participatory institu-
tions, new political transparency rules, and novel environmental legislation. All 
of these changes share the potential to jump-start important social and distribu-
tional consequences that are considered capable of leading the societies of the 
Andean countries towards more stable and peaceful livelihoods in a healthier 
natural environment. In other words, they hold the potential of avoiding or 
mitigating the resource curse. 
Yet, research has concentrated on the diferent expressions of the curse and is 
largely silent on questions of institutional change and performance in resource-
dependent states. For the Andean region, only a few studies have explored 
institutional dynamics during the latest boom period (Dargent, Orihuela, et al.,
2017; Damonte et al., 2021; Bebbington, 2012; Orihuela, 2013; Haslam, 
2016; Haslam & Heidrich, 2018). These are single-country studies (Dargent, 
Orihuela, et al., 2017; Damonte et al., 2021), which concentrate on specifc 
types of institutions (Haslam & Heidrich, 2018), or focus on empirical develop-
ments in isolation without placing them in the context of broader conceptual 
or theoretical debates regarding institutional dynamics in resource economies 
(Damonte et al., 2021; Bebbington, 2012; but see Orihuela, 2013; Haslam, 2016;
Haslam & Heidrich, 2018). As a consequence, we still have only a limited 
understanding of precisely how institutional change capable of avoiding or miti-
gating the curse takes place, or the factors that afect the efective performance 
of such institutions. 
This book steps into this gap. By drawing on the fertile grounds of the recent 
institutional developments in the Andes, it addresses the subject of institutional 
change and performance under the potentially adverse conditions of resource 
economies and weak public capacities. Studying several countries of the Andean
region, the chapters in this book focus on the causes and actors of institutional 
change and assess the performance of a variety of new institutions adopted to 
mitigate the pathologies associated with the resource curse. Taken together, the 
chapters paint a complex scenario in which institutional change was promoted 
by a variety of actors following diferent incentives and using diferent meth-
ods. Likewise, they reveal that institutional performance depends on an entire 
array of factors, both related and unrelated to the specifc dynamics of resource 
economies. 
 5 A curse over the Andes?
In the remainder of this introduction, we briefy review the resource curse 
literature by putting emphasis on the ways in which resource dependency 
afects institutions in particular. Building on the limited previous scholarship 
(Orihuela, 2013; Haslam, 2016; Haslam & Heidrich, 2018), we criticize this 
perspective for forecasting doom for a wide range of (otherwise dissimilar) 
countries, namely those that lack a robust institutional framework when the 
extractive sector starts to boom. We then discuss the literature concerned with 
institutional analysis, which has only rarely been connected to the discussion 
on the resource curse (but see Dargent, Orihuela, et al., 2017). In order to 
build up a comprehensive perspective on the agents that can promote change 
and the instruments they use, we add to the literature of institutional analysis 
insights from policy studies and the contentious politics/social movements lit-
erature. On this basis, we elaborate a four-feld matrix of agents of institutional 
change. Each feld will be discussed briefy with empirical evidence stemming 
from an external literature review and the new contributions of the chapters 
of this book. In the subsequent section, we explore institutional performance 
in the region stressing those factors that constrain the new institutions from 
reaching their full efect. We fnish by clarifying our central concepts—resource 
curse, institutions, institutional change, and performance—by presenting the 
objectives of the book, its organization, as well as short summaries of each of 
its chapters. 
The resource curse: maladies and remedies 
What has become to be known as the resource curse rests on the paradoxical 
observation that resource-rich countries face a very high risk of sufering a 
whole series of economic and political pathologies: They tend to be cursed 
by their riches, which seals their fate as chronic economic and political under-
performers (Auty, 1993; Sachs & Warner, 1999). The maladies coming along 
with the curse can be manifold and include macro-economic efects such as the 
deterioration of the terms of trade, the balance of payment crises (also known as 
the Dutch disease), or the erosion of economic sectors others than the extractive 
one. Resource wealth tends to be associated with unpopular growth, endur-
ing poverty, and social inequalities (Orihuela, 2013). It has also been shown 
to motivate corruption and patronage (Mahdavy, 1970; Crystal, 1990; Ross, 
2001; Caselli & Michaels, 2013; Andersen & Aslaksen, 2013; Zhu & Wu, 2014) 
as well as confict and crime, to perpetuate unqualifed or autocratic rulers in 
power (Cuaresma et al., 2010; Andersen & Aslaksen, 2013; Brunnschweiler & 
Bulte, 2008; Brollo et al., 2013) and to reduce democratic quality (Paler, 2013; 
Luong & Weinthal, 2009). Recent scholarship has stressed the environmental 
and health damages resulting from the extensive extraction of natural resources 
in the territories where it takes place (Gilberthorpe & Papyrakis, 2015). In a 
similar manner, coining the concept of a subnational resource curse, scholars have 









6 Bettina Schorr and Gerardo Damonte 
particularly those subnational units where the resources are found (Paler, 2011; 
Manzano & Gutiérrez, 2019). 
The resource curse is believed to be rooted in specifc state-society relations 
that lack a robust fscal pact (Moore, 2004; Karl, 2007): Since rulers do not have 
to rely on tax payers among the general public in order to obtain money, they 
have no incentive to act in a transparent and accountable way. Two mechanisms 
mediate between resource wealth and the diferent manifestations of the curse: 
rent-seeking and political myopia. Rent-seeking is motivated by the extensive 
gains the extractive sector generates. It denotes a behavior of public ofcials 
who engage in politics or work in the public sector because it ensures them 
access to these rents. As a consequence, wealth stemming from the resource 
sector ends up concentrated in the hands of a few corporate and political actors, 
with the latter using rents as patronage to stay in power (Robinson et al., 2006). 
Political myopia in the context of resource-based economies refers to an 
observed short-term bias towards the political support of the extractive sector. 
Governments and decision-makers focus on the sector while simultaneously 
ignoring its risks, such as the world markets’ inherent volatility or the environ-
mental costs it entails (Brollo et al., 2013; Karl, 1997; Kolstad & Wiig, 2009; 
Stevens & Dietsche, 2008). Political myopia prevents economic diversifcation 
by impeding investments in other areas that would guarantee a lesser depen-
dence on the resource sector (Karl, 1997; Shafer, 1994). Also, it restricts regu-
lation, which would imply a reduction of the profts of the sector or limit its 
activities. Rent-seeking and political myopia can be reinforced by private actors 
as well as by the state. Business has been found to lobby for the perpetuation of 
the political focus on the sector or bribe politicians into supporting it because 
it serves their own particular interests (Karl, 2007; Kaup, 2010). 
The curse is not an inevitable fate, though, as can be seen in countries like 
Norway, Canada, or Australia. It rather depends upon the institutional setting 
in place and its ability to constrain politicians’ behavior (Boschini et al., 2007; 
Karl, 1997; Kolstad & Wiig, 2009; Lederman & Maloney, 2009; Mehlum et al., 
2006; Robinson et al., 2006; Ross, 1999, 2015; Sarmidi et al., 2014; Tornell & 
Lane, 1999). Therefore, some authors argue it should rather be interpreted as 
an institutions curse (Menaldo, 2016). 
As a policy implication of this observation, the literature has established a
frm institutions matter argument that underscores the importance of high-quality
institutions to avoid the curse (Mehlum et al., 2006). While generally accepted,
at least two aspects of this argument remain unresolved: First, there is no con-
sensus as to which institutions matter when, how, and where (Orihuela, 2018).
Research has initially focused on economic institutions (such as stabilization
funds and other countercyclical measures) able to counter the negative efects
of the inherent volatility of the sector and institutions promoting economic
diversifcation (Kurtz & Brooks, 2011; Gylfason, 2011; Torvik, 2011; Suga-
wara, 2014). 
More recently, the perspective broadened beyond the economic realm 
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Bebbington et al., 2018). While good governance is often used in an unspecifc 
way, it generally refers to sectoral regulation, fscal and administrative regula-
tion, distributive and redistributive instruments, transparency and accountability
rules, as well as social and environmental provisions (e.g. Cameron & Stanley, 
2017). Systematizing the various streams in this literature, Orihuela (2018) 
identifes six governance challenges resource-dependent states are facing: mac-
roeconomic management, the local and sectoral economy, the sustainability of 
economic growth, democracy, environmental justice and community inclusion,
and peace. Each of these comes with specifc development problems such as 
the balance of payment crisis, environmental burdens, political anomia, and 
the growth of an anti-politics machine. In order to tame the curse, a compre-
hensive institutional framework must address these six government challenges 
simultaneously. 
The second unresolved problem is related. It raises the question as to how 
these institutions that matter and are good can come into being and perform 
efectively. This question is of particular importance for those resource-rich 
non-western, non-industrialized countries lacking robust statehood and demo-
cratic quality and featuring high levels of poverty and social inequality—a group 
that includes the majority of countries labeled as developing. Under these adverse 
conditions that foster all sorts of defciencies, the prospects for avoiding the 
curse are discouraging. Will these countries ever be able to escape it? 
While the resource curse theory understands institutions as a remedy for the 
curse, it is surprisingly silent on how these institutions can be built or changed 
(but see Haslam, 2016; Orihuela, 2013, 2018; Dietsche, 2007). As Haslam 
(2016, p. 1146) states, the resource curse theory is “principally a theory of 
decline and has paid relatively little attention to how countries may turn back 
from the rentier to the developmental state”. The principal policy implication 
of the literature is almost tantamount to a conviction: If states have good institu-
tions, they will be able to turn their “rents into riches” (Barma et al., 2012). If 
not, they will succumb to the curse (Menaldo, 2016). 
What the resource curse perspective has failed to consider is that institutional 
change under conditions of resource dependence is occurring, as discussed 
earlier for the latest commodity boom in the Andean region. In fact, if the 
curse is a function of the behavior of decision-makers, it cannot be excluded 
a priori that they can make good choices, even under potentially bad condi-
tions (Dietsche, 2007; see also Grindle, 2004). Once the possibility of agency 
is granted, the important question is under which conditions decision-makers 
may decide to build institutions for good governance and under which condi-
tions these may work towards mitigating or avoiding the curse and generating 
inclusive and sustainable development. Moreover, in the context of formal 
democratic rule and a globalized world, other actors may also be able to pro-
mote institutional change. Yet, given the resource curse theory’s focus on the 
maladies and not the remedies, our understanding of how institutions emerge 
and function under the adverse conditions of poverty, inequality, limited state 
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Institutions and institutional change 
The subject of institutional emergence and change is treated primarily in an 
academic feld referred to as institutional analysis, which is composed of three 
major schools: New Institutionalism Economics, Sociological Institutionalism, 
and Historical Institutionalism (Campbell, 2004; Hall & Taylor, 1996). While 
these schools difer regarding their analytical foci and epistemological assump-
tions, institutions are generally understood, in the classical words of Douglass 
North (1990, p. 3), as the “rules of the game in a society. More formally, as 
the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”. They consist 
of “formal and informal rules and the monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms 
that cause actors to comply with these rules” (Ibid.). As the defnition indi-
cates, institutions can be diferentiated into formal and informal ones (Helmke &
Levitsky, 2006; Tsai, 2016; Fligstein, 1996). The former are understood in 
terms of written rules that are made, transmitted, and reproduced through chan-
nels widely thought to be ofcial. In contrast, informal institutions represent 
“socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and 
enforced outside of ofcially sanctioned channels” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, 
p. 727). The legitimacy of these informal institutions is based on references to 
socially acceptable ways of doing things, claims to tradition, identity, rights, or 
existing or previous authority relations (Hall et al., 2014). Informal institutions 
exist everywhere, also in the context of formal organizations (such as state agen-
cies, corporations, or social organizations). In some cases, actors may combine 
formal and informal institutional practices, developing hybrid institutional regimes
(Sindzingre, 2006; Damonte, 2018, 2021). 
Scholars across the diferent institutional schools understand institutions as 
products of specifc power relations with—at least in the case of most economic 
and political institutions—signifcant distributional efects (Streeck & Thelen, 
2005b; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Institutions are viewed as being sustained 
and imposed by those holding sufcient power to do so (Hall, 1986; Knight, 
1992; Mahoney, 2010; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). A similar perspective is 
ofered by the political settlement approach within development studies, which 
focuses on how the informal constellation of power in any given polity afects 
the opportunities for institutional change (Khan, 2018; Di John & Putzel, 
2009). Conceiving of institutions as results of power relations has implications 
for their lifespan: They persist as long as those in power approve of them or are 
able to sustain them. 
Treating power as a constitutive element of institutional emergence implies
no judgment about their quality: they still can be good or bad. To grasp the
efects of institutions on collective well-being, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)
diferentiate between extractive and inclusive political and economic institutions.
Extractive institutions are rules that allow a small group of individuals to exploit
the resources (including human resources) of the polity in which they are act-
ing. They can be found in many former colonies (Ibid.). Inclusive institutions
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process of governing, attenuating, or preventing the exploitation of resources
or people (or, for that matter, the resource curse). In a similar manner, the afore-
mentioned settlement approach distinguishes between inclusive settlements will-
ing to widely distribute development benefts and exclusive settlements where
only elites capture the benefts (rents, money from donor corporation, etc.;
see also Moore, 2004). 
The literature discusses two pathways of institutional change: revolutionary 
or sudden change versus evolutionary or incremental change. The frst pre-
supposes a punctuated equilibrium model, in which large phases of institutional 
stability (thought of as an equilibrium) sustained by a specifc coalition give 
way to comparatively shorter phases of sudden change (Mahoney, 2000). Such 
change happens in the context of critical junctures, understood as periods of con-
tingency during which the usual constraints on action are lifted or eased. As a 
consequence, old institutions can be unmade and new ones emerge (Capoccia 
& Kelemen, 2007). 
Institutional change can also be endogenous, slow and, often not so visible 
(Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Streeck & Thelen, 2005a; Campbell, 2004). It has 
been argued that the very nature of institutions as products of power relations 
renders them prone to slow and gradual change from within, not just dur-
ing extraordinary critical junctures. For instance, coalitions sustaining specifc 
institutions may change their interest due to developments in the external 
context and, consequently, change the rules. Also, ruling coalitions are often 
composed of diferent groups with heterogeneous goals (Palier, 2005; Schick-
ler, 2001). Changes in the balance of power within these groups may lead to 
institutional change. In addition, institutions are generally open to ambiguity 
and interpretation (Sheingate, 2010; Thelen, 2004). One and the same rule 
may be interpreted and enforced in very diferent ways depending on the 
interests and resources of the sustaining coalition or the organization in charge 
of enforcement. Finally, compliance with institutions is itself always variable. In 
principle, all institutions can be politically contested or driven to exhaustion by
non-compliance or gradual defection. 
While in some instances institutional change can be driven by competition 
(Campbell, 2010), institutional models may also difuse and reproduce from 
one organizational setting to another (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1989). Referred to as institutional isomorphism, this latter mechanism 
takes place not only on the national level but also globally. Isomorphism can take
the form of mimicry (when one party imitates institutions seen in other places 
that are perceived as attractive). Particularly in cases of global norm difusion, 
coercion (when one party is able to force the other party to accept change) or 
norm-abidance (when diferent parties across the globe abide by international 
conventions and their institutional consequences) are driving forces. Indeed, 
many lower- and middle-income countries have adopted institutional reforms 
in response to pressures (or incentives) set by international organizations (e.g. 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, or OECD; see Dobbin et al., 2007) 
or by complying with international conventions (such as UN conventions, see 
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later). The theory of change implied is that these powerful international actors 
are able to set economic or status incentives which can pressure national elites 
or governments into institutional change. Furthermore, not responding to such 
international pressure could also generate undesired domestic situations such 
as social protests or electoral losses, which can motivate institutional change. 
While gradual change is promoted by power holders or enforcers (politi-
cal and administrative), the idea of sudden institutional change within critical 
junctures recognizes that actors outside of ruling coalitions may challenge the 
institutional status quo. As a matter of fact, especially in countries character-
ized by closed political systems, weak state structures, and large power asym-
metries, pressures by non-elite challengers on those in power may be essential 
for changing the balance of power sustaining specifc institutions or institutional 
arrangements (Lipsky, 1968; Piven & Cloward, 1979). In this line, the Advo-
cacy Coalition Framework (ACF) focuses on how policy change is produced 
in interactions among diferent advocacy coalitions (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). 
Policies understood as the formal or informal guidelines for decision-making 
are not necessarily the same as institutions. However, the two may overlap 
when policies stipulate rules for specifc actors and are enforced or publicly or 
by means of social pressure (Streeck & Thelen, 2005b). Advocacy coalitions 
include generally a wide spectrum of diferent private and public actors, form 
on the basis of shared beliefs, and are characterized by a non-trivial degree of 
coordinated activity over time. Connecting to institutional analysis, it has been 
argued that coalitions are most likely to achieve policy change during critical 
junctures when the distribution of resources (money, public opinion, informa-
tion, leadership, etc.) shifts so that coalitions are empowered to impose their 
demands for change (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). 
Policy or institutional change may also be promoted outside of established 
formal channels, in the streets, by means of social mobilization. For such a 
contentious challenge to emerge, political entrepreneurs have to accumulate 
resources, mobilize people with convincing interpretative frames, and seize on 
opportunities when they open up (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). Political outcomes 
caused by such mobilized actors vary from agenda setting to actual institutional 
reform (Kolb, 2007). Regarding the latter, research has stressed that mobilizers 
must win allies from within the system (Andrews, 2001) or else force decision-
makers into change. In this way, massive social mobilizations may create the 
critical junctures during which institutional change becomes possible (Kurzman,
1996). 
Social activism to promote institutional or policy change is not limited to 
national boundaries. Globalization has set the conditions for transnational activ-
ism in which groups or individuals from diferent countries join to promote a 
common cause on a global level (Olesen, 2010; Tarrow, 2005; Della Porta & Tar-
row, 2004). These transnational movements or advocacy coalitions may address 
governments, international organizations, or private actors such as companies. 
Often, international conventions are promoted by international organizations 
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matter for domestic institutional change as they provide material resources, 
knowledge and information, legitimacy, and network contacts to domestic 
challengers (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). They may also trigger a boomerang-efect
by convincing a powerful outsider (another government or an international 
organization) to pressure governments to give in to domestic demands (Ibid.). 
Institutional change in the Andean resource economies 
As explained in the previous section, institutional emergence and change can 
be gradual through diferent mechanisms or sudden in the context of criti-
cal junctures. Diferent actors may promote institutional change who can be 
classifed according to two dimensions: the political level where they operate 
(domestic—international/global) and according to their power position, i.e. 
if they form part of the ruling coalition or if they are powerful international 
organizations or if they are external challengers to the institutional status quo. 
This classifcation can be translated into a matrix (Figure 2.1a) that diferenti-
ates into four types of agents of institutional change: domestic power holders/ 
ruling coalitions, domestic challengers, global powerful organizations, and 
transnational challengers. 
These four types must be understood as ideal-types. In real life, it is often 
precisely the interaction of these actors that ultimately produces (or hinders) 
institutional change. In the following, we use this matrix as an organization 
principle for the review of research on dynamics of institutional change (includ-
ing the chapters of this book) in the Andean resource economies. We focus on 
inclusive institutions intended to mitigate or avoid the diferent manifestations of 
the resource curse both during the latest resource boom as well as during previ-
ous episodes. The review is not meant to be exhaustive, but it aims at providing 
an overview of what empirical research has found so far. 
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Ruling coalitions as agents of institutional change: 
governments, elites, business 
Institutional change, promoted by domestic powerholders and ruling coali-
tions, may be the most obvious type since these agents hold the power to 
impose change. As mentioned earlier, these coalitions may integrate diferent 
groups with diferent power diferentials, and institutional change may refect 
a reconfguration within an existing elite settlement. Historically, such new 
elite settlements or reconfgurations within these have profoundly shaped the 
governance of the extractive industries and the distribution of its rents (for the 
case of Bolivia and Peru, see Bebbington et al., 2018). Also during the latest 
commodity boom, governments have implemented institutional reforms to 
regulate the extractive sector and improve the distribution of its gains (rents) as 
well as its costs (particularly environmental costs). For instance, fscal reforms 
have been implemented across the region to enhance the public share of rents 
produced by the natural resource sector (Jiménez, this volume). In many 
countries, the rents of the sector were decentralized, beneftting in the frst 
place the producing regions (Jiménez, this volume; Arellano-Yanguas, 2011; 
Arellano-Yanguas & Acosta, 2014). Likewise, innovative social policies such as 
conditional cash transfer programs fueled by the rents of the economic boom 
have been introduced all over the region (Evia, this volume; Osorio, 2020; 
Borges, 2018; Hunter, 2021). Governments have also adopted new environ-
mental legislation to reduce the ecological damages caused by the extractive 
sector (Bornschlegl and Paredes & Figueroa, this volume; see also Orihuela & 
Paredes, 2017; Madariaga, 2018; Orihuela et al., 2021; Bravo, 2021; Orihuela 
& Granados, 2021). 
Diverse incentives that drove governors or ruling coalitions to adopt insti-
tutional change included domestic social pressure and conficts (see later; 
Bebbington, 2012; Arellano-Yanguas, 2011; Humphreys Bebbington & Beb-
bington, 2010) or the desire to prevent them (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011), the 
existence of high profts that motivated governments to capture a greater share 
of the rents and distribute them more widely (Haslam & Heidrich, 2018), and 
ideological convictions (Ibid.; Kaup, 2010). 
Policy difusion took place through external coercion by international actors 
and by norm-abidance to international conventions (see later). Likewise, dif-
fusion by mimicry has been identifed as a driving force behind change. For 
instance, beginning in the early 2000s the already-mentioned conditional cash 
transfer programs difused throughout the region because governments imitated 
the successful Brazilian example (Borges, 2018; Osorio, 2020). More generi-
cally and sustained by a mix of difusion mechanisms, the difusion of the green 
state in Latin America, i.e. the establishment of state institutions in charge of 
environmental protection, has been explored by Orihuela (2014). However, as 
the author makes clear, such processes of difusion never suppose the establish-
ment of global institutional blueprints. They are always subjected to processes 
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Institutional change towards mitigating the resource curse has also been the 
result of mutual learning processes among elites. In Chile, learning processes 
among the national elites led to the establishment of Sovereign Wealth Funds
that allowed for a more cautious macro-economic management of the Chilean 
resource economy (Orihuela, 2013). In fact, cooperation and learning among 
elites has always been a factor in taming the resource curse in Chile, at least in 
some of its expressions. Already in the 19th century, Chilean elites agreed to 
invest the rents from the resource sector into building a strong and capable state 
apparatus that formed the fundament for subsequent institutional change aiming
at mitigating the curse (Kurtz, 2013). 
Although not necessarily a direct part of the government or ruling coalition, 
business actors generally also command power. In fact, the resource curse lit-
erature attributes business a causal role in the production of the curse by proft-
ing from rent-seeking activities and resisting change (Karl, 1997; Kaup, 2010; 
Durand, 2019). Business elites are without any doubt powerful political players 
in Latin America (Clark & North, 2018). However, despite the assumptions of 
the resource curse literature, Haslam (2016) stresses the role of strong business 
actors in driving institutional change to tame the resource curse. Comparing 
Chile and Argentina, he found that in Chile a strong business community was 
able to pressure the state into a shift from a rent-seeking strategy to an entre-
preneurial strategy. As a consequence, several expressions of the curse could 
be mitigated by promoting productive investments, joint ventures, and entre-
preneurial learning. The author also shows that the support for institutional 
change was selective. In other cases, business remained passive vis-à-vis the 
rent-seeking activities of the state (e.g. within the Chilean National Mining 
Company ENAMI), which constrained institutional change in these sectors. 
In Argentina, quite to the contrary, weak business associations at the federal 
and provincial levels were unable to counter politicians’ rent-seeking, thereby 
perpetuating the resource curse. A similar argument on the positive relationship 
between cohesive business networks and elites’ willingness to support a fairer 
distribution of national resources is made by Cárdenas (2020). Saylor (2014), 
on the other hand, theorizes that the rents of the resource sector tend to be 
used in a productive way and to strengthen the state when exporter interests are 
represented in the respective ruling coalition (which he found to be the case in 
Chile and Argentina). 
Last but not least, during the latest boom period in the Andes, companies 
have gradually intensifed their community relations with the communities liv-
ing near their projects, mostly in order to prevent or mitigate social resistance 
(Frederiksen, 2018). Scholars have begun to analyze these new practices and 
rules introduced by companies in the localities where they operate as part of 
their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs (Himley, 2012; Leiva, 
2019; Haslam, 2021; Bebbington, 2010). They have focused on the conse-
quences of these programs in terms of local development, social cohesion, and 
state-society relations. The fndings of these studies are mixed: While some 
practices such as providing housing or public infrastructure or producing social 
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capital may qualify as inclusive and able to counter the (local) curse (Cesar & 
Jhony, 2020), others have been found to exacerbate local inequalities, legitimate 
ecological destruction, and promote tensions among community members 
(Gamu & Dauvergne, 2018). 
International actors as agents of institutional change 
Powerful international actors, in particular bi- and multilateral donor coopera-
tion, have also promoted institutional change in the Andean resource econo-
mies. Using diferent leverages, particularly fnancial ones and the assignment 
of symbolic capital for internationally approved good behavior (Larsen, 2016), inter-
national agents have achieved a lasting impact on the institutional arrangements 
capable of mitigating the resource curse in the Andean countries. 
The infuence of multilateral actors comprises a wide array of sectors and 
institutions. For instance, the United Nations have shaped many domestic 
environmental systems in the region on the basis of the UN Rio Convention 
adopted in 1992 during the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro (see Godfrid 
for Argentina and Rabi and Campos for Chile, this volume). Also, the UN 
declarations of Human Rights and Indigenous Rights were translated into the 
domestic law of several Andean countries. Likewise, the European Union has 
shaped institutional developments in the region, promoting amongst others 
environmental and labor regulation, especially as part of their free trade agree-
ments (for instance with Colombia, Peru, and Chile). 
International organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF ever since 
had an enormous impact on economic and fscal reforms in the region, start-
ing with the austerity measures applied in the 1980s. While in the past often 
criticized for promoting extractive institutions, during the recent boom period 
these organizations have also promoted institutional change with the potential 
to mitigate the resource curse, as several chapters in this volume show. For 
example, the World Bank conditioned a considerable credit to bolster the min-
ing sector to the establishment of an environmental ministry in Peru (Paredes 
and Figueroa, this volume; Orihuela & Paredes, 2017). Chile and Colombia (as 
actual members) and Peru (as an aspiring member) have set up new regulatory 
institutions in order to meet the membership requirements of the OECD. In 
Chile, the OECD required a public environmental system as a condition for the 
country to obtain full OECD membership (Maillet and Carrasco and Rabi and 
Campos, this volume). Also, several specifc regulations, such as the carbon tax 
and measures against air pollution, were a direct result of OECD recommen-
dations (Madariaga, 2018). Previous to that, anti-corruption and transparency 
legislation was adopted to fulfl OECD requirements. Peru and Colombia have 
to diferent degrees responded to OECD requirements: Colombia introduced 
major reforms in the labor sector and justice system, as well as regarding trans-
parency and anti-corruption. Similarly, Peru has translated OECD standards 
regarding transparency in the public administration, anti-corruption, and
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donor, Godfrid (this volume) shows that in the Argentinian province of San 
Juan, Japanese cooperation was deeply involved in the establishment of new 
environmental rules. 
Regarding transparency in the extractive sector, the transnational EITI 
framework has made some inroads in the region (Bebbington et al., 2016). As 
an initiative bringing together corporate, civil, and governmental actors, the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was launched in 2007 on 
initiative of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair to promote standards for 
transparency and accountability in the management of revenues from natural 
resources. Countries commit to the EITI standard on a voluntary basis and 
become full members only following an independent certifcation of accounts 
that reconcile the fgures that companies report having paid and government 
says it has received. Peru and Colombia are full EITI members and have adapted 
to the organizational standards. Ecuador and Argentina have solicited member-
ship and are being evaluated against the EITI standards. 
Often, several international actors have promoted the same institutions in the 
region. For instance, political and fscal decentralization was a core subject of 
bi- and multilateral donors’ infuence during the 1990s and early 2000s (OECD, 
2004). The difusion of the green state as studied by Orihuela (2013) has been 
supported by diferent international actors. Several important concepts applied 
in the regulation of natural resources were promoted by bi- and multilateral 
donor cooperation. To name just a view out of many: The concept of Integrated 
Water Resources Management was promoted as particularly important for regions 
afected by mineral extraction and has been adopted in several national water 
sectors in the Andean region (Biswas et al., 2009). Concepts for land use plan-
ning aiming at the sustainable use of natural resources have been difused by 
international organizations and NGOs throughout the region (Gustafsson et al., 
2020). Finally, during years of new formats of citizen participation—in general 
to enhance the legitimacy and transparency of political decisions (Peruzzotti, 
2012; McNulty, 2012; Leal, 2007) and in particular to improve resource gov-
ernance and environment protection—have ranked high on the international 
agendas for the Andean countries and were introduced as new domestic rules 
in several target countries (Paredes & Schorr, 2021). 
Domestic and transnational challengers as agents of change 
Domestic and transnational challengers promoting institutional change from the
outside of the political establishment can take the form of advocacy coalitions or
social movements and protest groups. During the last decade, academic interest 
in the dynamics of social conficts motivated by extractive projects and politics 
has grown exponentially, although with a minor focus on the outcomes and 
legacies of these conficts. In the frst place, activism has been found to achieve 
the suspension of projects or to impose signifcant changes to their original 
design (Delamaza et al., 2017 for the case of Chile). In a few cases, researchers 
showed that social conficts provoked institutional changes (Bebbington, 2012): 
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In Peru (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011) and in Bolivia (Humphreys Bebbington & 
Bebbington, 2010), social contention led to new laws regarding the distribution 
of revenues stemming from mining and hydrocarbons. Protest reclaimed new 
forms of citizen participation (for the case of Peru, see Paredes & Schorr, 2021), 
including the legal regulation of consultation processes with indigenous com-
munities (Flemmer, this volume). In Ecuador, social pressure managed to shape 
the new mining legislation that introduced inter alia the concept of no-go zones
in forest reserves and near rivers (Moore & Velásquez, 2011). In 2021, a popu-
lar referendum growing out of years of social activism vetoed mining activities 
in the Ecuadorian province of Azuay, one of Ecuador’s new mining hotspots 
(Wingfeld et al., 2021). The confict in the Argentinean region of Esquel 
spurred seven out of 23 provinces to ratify a mining ban prohibiting open-pit 
mining activities in their territories (Walter & Martinez-Alier, 2010). Further-
more, the adoption/refnement of a new environmental regulation in San Juan, 
Argentina can be attributed partly to social protests (Godfrid, this volume). In 
Chile and in Peru, advocacy coalitions managed to pressure legislators to adopt 
new regulations for political transparency (Schorr, this volume) and imposed 
environmental regulation with regard to the mining sector in the Ecuadorian 
Intag valley (Flora et al., 2006) and in Chile (Madariaga & Allain, 2018). 
As mentioned previously, institutions can be diferentiated into formal and 
informal ones. Agents external to ruling coalitions have also infuenced the 
establishment of informal institutions, both as organized and non-organized 
actors. For instance, mobilized groups introduced new forms of informal politi-
cal institutions such as the popular referendums conducted in Argentina, Peru, 
and Colombia (Dietz, 2019; Walter & Urkidi, 2017). Moreno (this volume) 
establishes a connection between the increasing perception of political corrup-
tion during the post-boom phase and the ways citizens in the Andean coun-
tries view democracy and participate in politics. He fnds that the signifcantly 
increased perception of corruption correlates strongly with informal ways of 
engaging in politics, such as street mobilizations and activism in neighborhood 
associations. In contrast, formal participation, for instance in elections, is declin-
ing throughout the region, as is trust in democracy in general. Finally, local-
level actors can also achieve institutional change regarding the ways resources 
are governed, in case they are strong enough to negotiate with the state for 
the recognition of local informal rules. This can be observed in the informal 
mining sectors in Bolivia, where the mining cooperatives were important allies 
of the Morales government (Amengual & Dargent, 2020), and in Peru, where 
informal miners mustered sufcient political strength (by means of social mobi-
lizations as well as by forming coalitions) to prevent the state from imposing its 
institutional agenda in local resource governance (Damonte, 2018, this volume). 
Traditionally, transnational advocacy has played a signifcant role in promot-
ing environmental standards and human rights in Latin America (Keck & Sik-
kink, 1998). Generally, the role of transnational advocacy is supportive, and, in 
fact, several of the domestic challenges mentioned earlier have beneftted from 
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transnational advocacy in the promotion of prior consultation in particular and 
indigenous rights in general. During the latest boom, transnational advocacy 
was more involved in particular campaigns against certain projects or corpora-
tions. For instance, the social conficts over the mining projects in Pascua Lama 
in Chile (Schorr, 2018; Urkidi, 2010), Tambogrande (Haarstad & Fløysand, 
2007) and Espinar (Paredes, 2016) in Peru, and Cotacachi in Ecuador (Kuecker, 
2007) have involved global advocacy groups bringing together diverse national 
and global watchdog groups, NGOs, and international organizations to support 
local actors in their struggles against extractive projects promoted by states and 
corporations. 
From institutional adoption to institutional performance 
As laid out previously, institutional change promoted by diferent actors has 
been widespread in the Andean region during the latest boom period and 
before. However, as a large political science literature reminds us, the adop-
tion of new rules does not automatically translate into the intended behavioral 
change (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984; Sabatier, 2005; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 
1983). It has been stated that particularly in Latin America the adoption of new 
or the transformation of existing formal rules is rather frequent (Brinks et al., 
2019, 2020). The problem is that for several reasons these institutions remain 
inefective, which would translate in our case into them losing their potential 
to mitigate the resource curse. In this section, we discuss a series of factors that 
research has found to constrain the efectiveness of institutions. Our aim is to 
give an overview over those forces and dynamics critical for scholarly assess-
ment of the performance of institutions intended to tame the curse in resource-
dependent contexts, using examples from this volume. 
One of the main causes constraining institutions’ potential efect is the lack 
of political will to enforce efectively, which can reduce institutional change 
to an act of window dressing by governments (Ibid.). The literature argues that 
governments create such window dressing institutions as an answer to external 
pressures (social protests or international organizations) to demonstrate com-
mitment, while de facto they have no intention to implement them. In some 
cases, lobbyism by business elites may further reduce the political will to enforce 
or contribute to keep it low (Durand, 2016). 
Non-enforcement can be achieved in diferent ways. Governments may 
choose to simply ignore a rule while leaving it on the books. More sophistically, 
non-enforcement can be ensured by shaping enforcement agencies in a way that
they are unable to implement the rules of the institution of which they are of-
cially in charge. This can include denying the allocation of sufcient resources, 
professional staf, or authority necessary to act. Research on Latin America in 
general and the Andean region in particular has identifed weak enforcers as 
a cause of institutional inefectiveness in a wide array of cases, including new 
indigenous autonomies introduced in Bolivia (Tockman & Cameron, 2014), 
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Paredes, 2017; Orihuela & Granados, 2021; Orihuela et al., 2021), and political 
decentralization (Dickovick & Eaton, 2013). In fact, in postulating politicians’ 
tendency to rent-seeking and political myopia, the resource curse literature 
would lead us to expect that in cases where agents managed to impose regula-
tory institutions against the adverse dynamics triggered by resource dependence,
the political will to enforce them efectively would be thin. This should be par-
ticularly true for those institutional changes promoted by international agents 
or by social pressure, a point indeed made by various chapters in this book (see 
the chapters by Flemmer, Godfrid, Paredes and Figueroa, Maillet and Carrasco). 
On the other hand, states may enforce selectively following diferent logics, a 
phenomenon which has been shown to be particularly pronounced in unequal 
societies such as the Andean ones certainly are (Amengual & Dargent, 2020). 
States may bring the rule of law to bear on poor people while desisting from 
enforcement in wealthier segments (Brinks, 2008; Méndez et al., 1999), they 
may ramp up enforcement in some regions and not in others (O’Donnell, 1993; 
Soifer, 2015), or they may enforce rules against political enemies while being 
forbearing with political allies or electoral constituencies (Holland, 2017). The 
latter has been found in the case of enforcement of diferent types of regulation 
in the small-scale mining sector in Bolivia: Given that the mining cooperatives 
were close allies of the Morales government, regulation was not enforced against
them (Amengual & Dargent, 2020). Likewise, companies have been shown to 
avoid the rigid enforcement of regulatory legislation in the environmental sec-
tor or regarding the transparency of their fnancial transactions because of their 
close relations with governments and politicians (Bull & Aguilar-Støen, 2016). 
The lack of efective implementation is not always a direct refection of a lack 
of political will. Non-enforcement or selective enforcement may result from 
an actual lack of resources. This factor is of particular importance for resource 
economies. Given the inherent volatility of the global markets, resource econo-
mies tend to alternate between phases of growth (booms) and phases of bust in 
which the rents of the resource sector diminish. In times of decreasing global 
demand, public accounts shrink and with them the ability of states to enforce. 
In the Andes, the most recent bust cycle has led to a signifcant reduction in 
public budgets. As a consequence, public investments including social spend-
ing have dropped signifcantly (Jiménez and Evia, this volume). A particular 
harsh example for this dynamic is Bolivia, where social programs are directly 
tied to the existence of resource rents. The lack of resources provoked by the 
economic downturn has also afected enforcement in the environmental sector, 
as Bornschlegl and Godfrid (this volume) show for the cases of Ecuador and 
Argentina respectively. 
Even if political will exists and a stable access to resources is guaranteed, 
efective implementation of institutions may still be hampered by a lack of 
professional capacity and the absence of skilled enforcers (Peters, 2018). In 
addition, organizations are not only a mere consequence of the institutions they 
are supposed to enforce; they also lead a life of their own (Dargent, Orihuela 
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autonomy over the rules they are in charge of, which can afect the way imple-
mentation is carried out and hence the efectiveness of institutions (Mahoney &
Thelen, 2010). In Latin America in general and in the Andean countries in 
particular, bureaucratic capacity is low, which reduces the degree and quality 
of implementation (Polga-Hecimovich, 2019). This has also been shown for 
institutions capable of mitigating the resource curse. For instance, Orihuela et al.
(2021) attribute the lack of enforcement in the Peruvian environmental sector 
to the absence of a professional bureaucracy. Likewise, Paredes and Figueroa 
(this volume) call attention to the fact that the lack of skilled and motivated staf 
is limiting the operation of the new Peruvian Environmental Ministry. They 
argue that notwithstanding formal institutional change, the actual practices of 
bureaucrats within the new organization have not changed. For this reason, 
the regulatory capacity of the ministry and its executive organs remains weak. 
Another factor potentially reducing the efectiveness of institutions is their 
design. Design can, on purpose, produce insignifcance and establish window 
dressing institutions (Brinks et al., 2020). In this volume, Rabi and Campos argue 
that the Environmental Courts in Chile correspond to such a pre-emptive 
design. They argue that the courts have been set up intentionally in a way 
that would not put too many constraints on the extractive sector. Maillet and 
Carrasco (this volume) state the same for the whole Chilean environmental 
system, to which the courts studied by Rabi and Campos belong. They argue 
that the Chilean environmental subsector is nested in a powerful extractivist 
economic system and too weak to actually constrain it efectively. As a conse-
quence, both the number of the projects as well as the conficts surrounding 
them have increased. Also, Paredes and Figueroa (this volume) mention the rela-
tive powerlessness of the Peruvian environmental ministry vis-à-vis the power-
ful economic ministry MEM. The institution of prior consultation of indigenous 
peoples can also be interpreted as fawed by design. It is non-binding, neither 
actor must stick to the agreements, monitoring mechanisms are absent, and 
communities do not have the possibility to reject the realization of the project 
in their territory (Flemmer, this volume; see also Torres Wong, 2018; Schilling-
Vacafor & Flemmer, 2015; Falleti & Riofrancos, 2018). Thus, the efects that 
prior consultation actually produces are insignifcant or outright counterpro-
ductive because they often increase social confict, both within communities 
as well as between communities, corporations, and the state (Schilling-Vacafor &
Eichler, 2017). 
As with inefective enforcement, default by design is not always the product
of a strategic political calculus. Specifc design features may generate unan-
ticipated efects that may distort the actual objective of an institution when
it operates. Such unintended efects can be observed in the fscal reforms
implemented during the latest resource boom in the Andes. While holding the
potential of a more equal distribution of the extractive sectors’ rents, in almost
all countries of the region the reformed fscal systems have produced or rein-
forced territorial inequalities (Jiménez, this volume). Unintended efects may












20 Bettina Schorr and Gerardo Damonte 
import institutional models developed and applied in other contexts. This has
been studied by Weyland (2006) who showed that neighboring governments
borrowed the model of private contribution-based pension system implemented
in Chile because they perceived it as successful. However, these utterly failed
under the entirely diferent conditions of Bolivia and Peru. Imported institu-
tions may also fail to generate social commitment, as Paredes and Figueroa
(this volume) claim for the case of the Peruvian environmental agency OEFA.
Because this agency was perceived as alien by local actors, it ended up being
unable to articulate political or social support to defend the rules it is supposed
to enforce. 
Finally, the chances for efective implementation also depend on how—by 
design—infraction is charged. If sanctions are so minimal that they do not cause 
deterrence, actors may be willing to accept the costs the sanctions imply which 
ends up hollowing the efect of the institution (Brinks et al., 2020). Such non-
punitive sanctions are applied to supposedly halter deforestation in Argentina 
(Fernández & Garay, 2020, Amengual & Dargent, 2020). They also can be 
found in the case of the Peruvian mining sector, where fees for environmental 
misconduct are so low that companies tend to pay them instead of changing 
their behavior and protecting the environment. Likewise, companies in the 
Ecuadorian oil sector prefer to pay administrative fnes instead of maintaining 
their pipelines and avoiding oil spillings (Bornschlegl, this volume). 
The efective implementation of institutions does not only depend on state 
capacity and the political will to enforce them. It is also a function of the 
willingness of citizens to accept and comply with institutions (Amengual & 
Dargent, 2020). As stated before, states may lack the resources and capacity to 
enforce. In the Andean countries even, their territorial outreach is constrained. 
In many parts of the vast territories in the Amazon lowlands and the Andean 
highlands, the state is not present at all and other actors impose social order (e.g. 
indigenous communities or criminal groups). 
In light of the role of such powerful non-state actors, it has been argued 
that state capacity has to be understood as relational (Dargent, Feldmann et al., 
2017). States may be too weak to enforce specifc institutions against the will 
of strong social groups or populations. In this volume, Damonte analyzes how 
both informal miners in the Peruvian Amazon as well as agroexporters in the 
region of Ica have managed to resist the institutional agendas of the central state 
and imposed their own informal practices in the sectoral governance. 
Resisting the implementation of state institutions may be reinforced by a 
lack of trust in the state or its enforcers. Social acceptability of an institution is 
highly dependent on citizens’ trust in public institutions and the state in gen-
eral. The opposite, mistrust in the state and its enforcers, impedes the efective 
enforcement of institutions. It can be assumed that this factor has a particular 
weight in the Andean countries, where social trust in the state ranges among the
lowest in the region (Moreno, this volume). Confrming this point, Bornschlegl
fnds in her case study, on the implementation of the program of environmental 
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and in the programs’ ofcials signifcantly complicated the implementation of 
the new environmental institutions. 
Organization of the book 
This book is concerned with institutional change that could mitigate or avoid 
the diferent expressions of the resource curse in the context of resource depen-
dence, poverty, and weak state capacities. We understand institutions as those 
formal and informal rules structuring human behavior and the monitoring and 
sanctioning mechanisms that cause actors to comply with these rules. Institu-
tional change refers to the emergence of new rules or the qualitative transfor-
mation of existing ones so that their efect is enhanced. 
Empirically, we focus on institutional developments in the Andean countries 
during the latest resource boom and the frst post-boom years (2004–2014). 
Economically, these countries rely heavily on their extractive sectors, while state
capacity in the region tends to be low (with the exception of Chile; see Soifer, 
2015) and poverty, as well as social inequality, is high. 
The chapters of this book focus on inclusive regulatory institutions in those 
governance sectors where the resource curse can unfold. They identify the 
agents and forces driving institutional change and explore the performance of 
these new institutions. In particular, the chapters study redistributive institu-
tions, rules that ensure political transparency, participation and democratic 
governance in general, and environmental protection rules. We move beyond 
the economic institutions in our discussion because these have long been the 
focus of resource curse scholarship. 
The book pursues two objectives: First, it delivers sound empirical evidence 
on institutional change and performance in the Andean countries before and 
during the latest boom period as well as the frst post-boom years. Since the 
chapters are written from diferent disciplinary perspectives, they provide an 
abundant panorama of cases and approaches by using diferent qualitative and 
quantitative methods. Extending the period under analysis into the post-boom 
years further allows us to explore whether economic cycles afect the dynamics 
of institutional change and performance. 
Second, the volume contributes to the theoretical development of the widely
discussed resource curse approach by adding insights into the conditions that
support or hinder institutional development in settings potentially afected by
the curse. The chapters discuss diferent factors promoting change and afecting
institutional performance. Moreover, in the concluding section, we elaborate an
interdisciplinary research agenda on institutional change in resource-dependent
contexts. This agenda is based on the analytical insights provided by the diferent
chapters and binds them together in order to orient future research on the subject. 
The book is organized into three sections: After this introduction, the second 
section contains 12 empirical studies that explore institutional change and per-
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The second section is opened by Jiménez’s analysis of the fscal reforms intro-
duced in several Andean countries during the latest boom period. In particular, 
he examines the impact these reforms had on the public accounts, on the fscal 
space, and on regional inequality. The chapter reveals that signifcant reforms 
have been undertaken in almost all countries of the region. As one efect, public 
accounts registered important increases that, amongst others, allowed for the 
implementation of new redistributive policies. However, the author also identi-
fes two shortcomings of these reforms: First, fscal resources stemming from the
natural resource sector depend on the extreme volatility of the global markets. 
Once the boom period had receded, the sector’s rents decreased dramatically, 
and with them the public accounts. Second, the new spending rules reinforced 
territorial inequalities in a region already hit by some of the highest regional 
disparities in the world. 
Focusing on Bolivia as a single case study, Evia explores the social policy 
innovations adopted between 2003−2014. He states that these innovations were 
possible due to the reorganization of the hydrocarbons sector in the 1990s that 
paved the way for the unprecedented infux of rents during the latest economic 
boom period. These rents then allowed the government of Evo Morales to set 
up a social protection foor based on a series of conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
programs, an institutional model that had difused throughout the region 
motivated by the Brazilian example. These new CCT are widely considered to 
have contributed to the impressive reduction of poverty experienced in Bolivia 
during the last decade. However, Evia also fnds that these new institutions are 
fnancially unsustainable: Since the CCT were designed to depend directly on 
the infux of rents and hence on global demand, the economic downturn of 
the post-boom has led to important adjustments in volume and coverage. As 
Jiménez before, the author shows that institutional change towards inclusive 
institutions was possible but fawed by design. 
The next chapter by Cisneros observes institutional dynamics within the 
wider extractivist sector in Ecuador. Against the prediction of the extractivist 
imperative debate, which holds that the extractive sector, once established, will 
continuously expand, Cisneros shows that in Ecuador the political intention 
to establish a mining industry along the lines of the traditional oil sector has 
failed. While some authors point to social resistance as the driver behind this 
failure, Cisneros ofers another explanation. He argues that social protest was 
an important force for keeping mining at bay, but equally important for the 
expansion of the sector to fail were the institutional path dependencies created 
by the long tradition of oil extraction in Ecuador. These ultimately prevented, 
what the author calls, an extractive diversifcation in Ecuador. 
Damonte calls attention to dynamics of institution-building in extractiv-
ist countries on the subnational level. He explores two cases of institutional 
emergence within the governing regulation of the Peruvian extractive sector: 
water extraction in Ica, mostly by large companies, and gold mining in Madre 
de Dios, mostly by informal small-scale miners. The author fnds that locally a 
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institutions. The cases show that institution-building initiated by the state in 
order to govern extractive activities in territories of weak state control is a 
function of the agency and political leverage of the state but also of other social 
actors involved. 
Flemmer studies the introduction of the framework for prior consultation of 
indigenous people, as stipulated in the ILO Convention No. 169, as a means 
of reducing the social and environmental impacts of extractive projects. The 
chapter explains the adoption of this framework by all Andean countries as 
a case of global norm difusion promoted by international organizations and 
transnational advocacy. Drawing on the case of Peru, Flemmer analyzes the 
implementation of prior consultation and identifes a series of pitfalls, amongst 
which the limitations of the legal texts and processes imposed by the state in 
cooperation with corporate actors are the most important ones. As in the case 
of social and fscal policies, the Peruvian law of prior consultation is fawed by 
design. Contrarily to the case of social and fscal policies studied by Jiménez 
and Evia, Flemmer argues that the framework was intentionally downsized to 
avoid indigenous communities having a real say over the realization of extractive
projects in their territories. 
Using public opinion data for several Andean countries, Moreno traces in 
his chapter the evolution of the perception of corruption and explores the 
efects of citizens’ perception of corruption on the quality of democracy. The 
author fnds that the perception of corruption increased sharply as resources 
started to run short, i.e. when the boom subsided. In line with the resource 
curse literature, he confrms with statistical data that the perception of corrup-
tion indeed seems to have a detrimental efect on the support for democracy, 
afecting both trust in elections and satisfaction with how the political system 
is working in the country. Likewise, individual experience with corruption in 
the Andean countries shapes new informal institutions by increasing the chances
that a person participates in extra-institutional political activities, such as street 
manifestations, and autonomous community-based activities. Like Damonte, 
Moreno calls attention to the efects that dynamics related to the resource sector 
can have on local informal practices. 
In the next chapter, Schorr explores the contentious political processes to 
impose more efective political transparency rules in Chile and Peru. She argues 
that in both countries the same mechanism of change was at play, involving a 
combination of pressure from the inside of governmental institutions as well as 
from the outside: A strategic coalition among presidents and civil society actors 
was able to build circumstances in which delegates could not aford to vote 
against the reform proposals. However, the comparison between the political 
processes in Chile and Peru also leads the author to qualify the institutions matter
argument of the resource curse literature. The analysis identifes the importance 
of the quality of the institutional fundament in place. In other words, resource 
economies can only be governed in a good way when the very political funda-
ment of the polity in question—the grounds on which those institutions that 
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Maillet and Carrasco analyze Chile’s environmental system, which was estab-
lished in response to requirements formulated by the OECD as a condition to 
obtain full membership. Chile’s environmental system thus constitutes a type 
of global isomorphism and an example of the difusion of the green state in the 
region. The authors argue that the environmental legislation adopted in 2010 
is only apparent change. Factually, it does little to prevent environmental dam-
age caused by the extractive industries because the institutional changes in the 
environmental subsystem are nested in a largely unchanged extractive regime. 
As a consequence, the overall regulatory impact of the new environmental 
institutions is low as documented in the increase of investments in the extrac-
tive sector as well as the growth of social conficts around extractive projects. 
The next chapter by Rabi and Campos connects to the previous chapter by 
exploring in detail the Environmental Courts (EC) in Chile established in 2012 
as part of the new environmental system. The authors argue that policy-makers 
designed the EC with very limited authority in order to prevent them from 
inhibiting the activities of the extractive sector. Institutional barriers include the 
exclusion of individuals as claimants and limiting its authority to revising deci-
sions issued by other state institutions. Moreover, analyzing the cases, claimants, 
and judgments the courts had issued until 2017, the chapter fnds that envi-
ronmental courts are used mainly by companies who contest decisions made 
by other state agencies against their projects, such as sanctions imposed by the 
Superintendence of the Environment. In contrast, communities not only are 
underrepresented as claimants, but also lose their cases in a greater proportion 
than the companies running the projects. The analysis of the actual operation of 
the EC, thus, shows that not only design matters and the behavior of ofcials, 
but also how social actors make use of institutions. 
Paredes and Figueroa discuss the establishment of the Environmental Ministry
in Peru. As the environmental framework in Chile, this new public institution 
was established in a top-down fashion based on international models promoted 
by the World Bank. It constitutes thus a case of institutional isomorphism. 
Moreover, the World Bank pressured the Peruvian governments to adopt the 
new institution by tying it to a considerable credit. Specifcally, Paredes and 
Figueroa argue that the new environmental institution was imposed without 
dismantling old and inefective institutional practices and established identities 
related to the bureaucratic culture in Peru. Thus, despite the new formal insti-
tutional setup, actual bureaucratic operating practices did not change, which 
signifcantly weakened the regulatory capacities of the new institution from the 
very beginning. Furthermore, perceived as something alien and imposed from 
external actors, the new environmental agency was unable to articulate political 
or social support to defend the new rules. 
Bornschlegl examines the institutionalization of the concept of integral repara-
tions, included in 2008 in the new Ecuadorian constitution, and institutionalized
as a proper state program: the program of Social and Environmental Reparation 
(PRAS) at the Ecuadorian Ministry of Environment. The author identifes 
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the reparación integral was severely constrained by three lacking elements: a lack 
of funding, a lack of executive power, and a lack of trust on part of the local 
communities. As a consequence of these shortcomings, the new legislation was 
unable to reach its stated aims. 
Godfrid addresses changes to the environmental monitoring institutions
for the mining sector in the province of San Juan, Argentina during the
period 1993 to 2020. She argues that the main factors that have motivated
the institutional transformation of environmental monitoring of mining
were coercion by international agencies (1993–2002), socio-environmental
conficts (2003–2014), and mining accidents (2015–2019). These external
factors prompted the creation of regulations and bureaucratic departments
for the environmental oversight of mining that did not previously exist at the
subnational level. However, the political decision by the authorities in San
Juan to prioritize mining led to a reactive institutional change that limited
the capacity for environmental oversight as well as the means to respond to
public demands for transparency and participation. The analysis shows that the
political dimension is key to understanding the reactive institutional change
process and in particular the weakness of the environmental oversight institu-
tions for mining in San Juan. 
The book closes with the third section that contains the concluding chapter. 
In this conclusion, we summarize the main contributions of the volume and 
sketch a research agenda for future investigations into institutional dynamics in 
contexts characterized by resource dependence and weak state capacities. As 
the book in general, this research agenda is thought of as a frst step. We hope 
that it will contribute to advance research in the important questions the book 
is raising in order to enhance our knowledge on how actors may master adverse 
situations by building and implementing efective regulatory and inclusive 
institutions. 
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2 Fiscal reforms and institutional 
changes in the Andean region 
Revenues volatility and unequal 
distribution of regional income 
Juan Pablo Jiménez1 
Introduction 
During the latest commodity boom (2003–2008), the fscal authorities of the 
Andean countries introduced a series of reforms. These followed two objec-
tives: to raise revenues by capturing the extraordinary rents of the sector that 
had increased signifcantly in that period due to the high prices of regional 
commodities on the world markets; and to distribute these revenues among the 
diferent levels of government, fnancing the recent decentralization initiatives 
in the region (Brosio & Jiménez, 2012; Gómez Sabaíni et al., 2018). For the 
former, governments implemented diferent measures: new taxes were intro-
duced, royalty schemes were strengthened, and taxes on extraordinary revenues 
were established. To distribute the revenues originating from the extractive 
industries, governments introduced schemes allowing most of the tax revenues 
to fow back into the producing regions, and also facilitating the process of 
decentralization of public expenditure responsibilities in these countries imple-
mented in those years (Brosio & Jiménez, 2012). 
Starting in 2012, global prices for mineral and hydrocarbon products dropped
dramatically. This new scenario not only meant a decline in the fscal relevance 
of these revenues, but also reoriented government’s objectives and led to a 
reprioritization of more sustainable investment and production levels in the 
sector. The fall of the fscal revenues also had an important impact on budgets 
of subnational governments, reducing the capacity of the public sector to inter-
vene in the economy. 
The specialization on nonrenewable natural resources is the origin of the high
territorial inequality of income in the region, both among and within coun-
tries. In the Andean region, the ratio between the regions with the highest and 
lowest per capita GDP generally exceeds 6:1, while in developed countries it is 
rarely more than 3:1 (Brosio et al., 2018; CEPAL, 2017; Muñoz et al., 2016). 
This structural high regional inequality of income is produced by several factors,
but mostly by the geographic concentration of the production of nonrenewable 
natural resources. 
The signifcantly unequal regional distribution of income translates into 
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concentrated such as the taxation on consumption (ingresos brutos in Argentina, 
selective taxes in Colombia); but is still more signifcant when the tax base is 
nonrenewable natural resources because their deposits are regionally very con-
centrated (Brosio et al., 2018; Muñoz et al., 2016). 
In consequence, when fscal resources are not allocated and distributed
adequately, they tend to exacerbate the structural high regional inequality and
other imbalances among jurisdictions in the same country. This emphasizes the
importance of tax power and spending responsibility assignments, jointly with
the design of equalization systems of the distribution of fscal revenues from
nonrenewable natural resources among the diferent levels of government (Brosio
& Jiménez, 2015). 
In a context of the increasing decentralization of responsibilities from the 
central to subnational governments (Brosio & Jiménez, 2012), the volatility 
of these fscal revenues has also a signifcant impact on the fscal capacities and 
causes territorial disparities. 
The goal of this article is to review the fscal reforms on the extractive sec-
tor carried out during the last boom phase and their impact on the public 
accounts, fscal space, and regional inequality. It focuses on several countries of 
the Andean region (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) 
for the period 1990–2016. 
The chapter discusses the reforms on the taxation of natural resources and
mechanisms for the allocation and distribution of these revenues as cases of
institutional change in the Andean countries accomplished in recent years. It
assesses their potential and limitations to improve some of the chronic curses
of the region’s fscal policy: the inability to promote sustainable economic
growth; the weakness to address the very unequal distribution of income, both
personal and regional; the difculties in implementing sustainable reforms that
strengthen the public sector by increasing fscal revenues and improving its
distribution. 
This article proceeds as follows: First, it describes the fscal reforms and 
the instruments these use related to the exploitation of nonrenewable natural 
resources, for the appropriation, allocation, and distribution of tax revenues 
obtained. Second, it assesses the performance of these reforms in terms of their 
impact in tax revenues and fscal accounts, at the level of the central govern-
ments and the subnational governments. At the subnational level, the institu-
tions and their dynamics will be analyzed, with a focus on their relationship 
with the diferent tax capacities of the territories and the concentration of tax 
revenues from the exploitation of nonrenewable natural resources. In the fnal 
section, the chapter analyzes the characteristics resulting from the combination 
of productive specialization, legal framework and price cycle, the main chal-
lenges in the post-bonanza context, and some possible alternatives to confront 
them. It argues that in order to confront the challenges arising from the price 
decline of the post-boom period, the reforms need to pursue diferent objec-
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the sustainability of the sector, in terms of production and investment, as well as 
compensate for the decrease in tax revenues, at diferent levels of government, 
and its territorial impact. 
Evolution of fscal instruments, revenue collection, allocation, 
and distribution of nonrenewable natural resources 
Revenue collection instruments and recent fscal reforms in the region 
In the period under analysis, tax revenues from the exploitation of nonrenew-
able natural resources were an important source of public resources in the 
Andean countries, both for central and subnational governments, although they 
have recorded strong fuctuations. 
Given the magnitude and persistence of the upward trend in the price cycle 
that began in 2003 and increased signifcantly the rents of the extractive sector, 
the producing and exporting countries in the region found sufcient space to 
introduce substantial reforms in tax regimes applied to the production of hydro-
carbons and minerals. These reforms were adopted in all countries regardless of 
the political orientation of the government (Hanni et al., 2018). 
During the commodity boom 
In Latin American countries, the most direct way of appropriation of com-
modity rents and their subsequent transformation in fscal resources has been,
historically, by participation in exploitation, whether through state-owned
enterprises or shareholding (Hanni et al., 2018). These companies are often
subject to a special tax regime, which may consist of rent payments or fees,
additional taxes for public companies, or indirect selective (excise) taxes on oil
production. 
During the commodity boom, the reforms accentuated the specialization of tax
systems, especially in hydrocarbons and minerals in the region’s producing coun-
tries. They increased state control over available resources, introduced new taxes,
strengthened royalty schemes, and established taxes on extraordinary revenues.2 
Between 2005 and 2012, the most important legal reforms to ensure public
control of nonrenewable natural resources focused on the hydrocarbon sector
(CEPAL, 2013). These measures among the selected countries included the
nationalization of the sector through joint ventures in Venezuela (between
2005 and 2007); in Bolivia, the renegotiation of hydrocarbon contracts, the
renationalization of the Huanuni tin mine (2006), and the nationalization
of the Colquiri mine in Oruro (2012); the renegotiation of oil contracts in
Ecuador (2010), where production-sharing contracts were changed to service
contracts in which the state is the owner of all the crude oil extracted with
the stipulation that the government would absorb 100% of possible increases
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Additionally, other governments strengthened state ownership mechanisms
such as royalties, usually based on production, and specifc taxes. This was espe-
cially important in the mining sector, where revenue generation through state
participation in enterprises was relatively low in the past. Royalties and taxes have
ensured a minimum payment for resources to national and subnational govern-
ments as a growing number of countries with a variety of political orientations
introduced reforms in the systems of royalties. These include Bolivia (2005),
Ecuador (2010), Colombia (2011), and Peru (2011). In addition, in Ecuador, the
hydrocarbon law reform established the margin of sovereignty designed to guarantee
the state minimum revenues of 25% of the gross production value in case of pos-
sible price decreases.3 
Traditional income taxes with multiple tax rates and other special charges
have been applied, often with progressive rates on public or private companies
exploiting nonrenewable resources. This has been reinforced with the introduc-
tion of new collection instruments (as in the case of Bolivia and Chile) during
the period between 2005 and 2012. For instance, in 2005 Bolivia introduced the
direct tax on hydrocarbons (Impuesto Directo a los Hidrocarburos, IDH) which, in
addition to royalties and shares of the treasury led to a 50% direct participation
of the state in extractive revenues. Meanwhile, in 2006 Chile introduced the
specifc tax on mining activity, which was applied to a type of net income that
included the fnancial costs of depreciation of capital goods and interest. This
aimed at strengthening taxation on mining (complementing the corporate tax
and the tax over remittances of profts abroad) while procuring not to discour-
age private investment. In Venezuela, tax rates on income from oil (50%) were
increased in 2006, and three new taxes were created: the oil extraction tax, the
export registration tax, and the Special Contribution on Extraordinary Prices and
Exorbitant Prices in the International Hydrocarbons Market. In 2011, Peru updated
its mining laws and introduced proft-based rather than revenue-based royalties,
introducing three proft-based taxes: a mining royalty (Law 29788), a special
mining tax (Law 29790), and a special mining contribution (Law 29789), the
latter being paid in addition to the mining royalty. This was designed with
the objective to collect more taxes from the most proftable operations and to
minimize the risks to the government’s revenue stream through the commodity
supercycle. 
Moreover, given the high volatility of international prices of nonrenewable 
resources, several countries like Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela 
have also considered the implementation of taxes, duties, participations, or 
contributions linked to prices or extraordinary profts (windfall taxes). Although 
there is a wide heterogeneity in this area, all countries that introduced these 
types of fscal instruments did it during the period of the price boom (2003– 
2008), clearly as a reaction to the enormous increase in profts associated with 
hydrocarbon and mineral sectors among the countries of the region. 
As noted by Acquatella et al. (2013), in Latin America the advances in tax 
progressivity have been clearer and concrete in the oil sector than in the min-
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service contracts are very common. They anticipate an increasing scale of state 
participation in the profts as the project reaches increasing rates of return. In 
contrast, the incorporation of such a concept in the tax treatment of the mining 
sector in the countries of the region remains in its infancy, since mining coun-
tries, as shown in Table 2.2, rely heavily on royalties and corporate income tax 
for revenue generation. Chile is to some extent the only exception. 
After the boom 
Since 2013, the prices of mining and hydrocarbon products have decreased 
strongly, as a result of a slowdown in growth and investment in China and 
structural changes in the supply of these products (such as the rise in hydrocar-
bon production driven by the application of fracking technology in the United 
States, see Hanni et al., 2018). This decrease has an important fscal impact: it 
reduces fscal revenues (Gómez Sabaíni et al., 2018). 
The sharp drop in prices of these products in recent years meant not only a 
fall in the fscal relevance of these revenues but also a reformulation of the objec-
tives to be followed and the tools to be used. In this new context, governments 
started to prioritize not only the level of tax revenues but also their impact on 
the sustainability of investments and production in the sector (Hanni et al., 
2018). In the post-boom, the reforms in the sector show a growing concern for 
stimulating investment and production and for private sector participation, in 
addition to the need to maintain the tax contribution of nonrenewable natural 
resources. Indeed, several countries in the region have enacted policy measures 
in recent years aimed at stimulating activity in the extractive sector while creat-
ing sectoral long-term investment and savings funds. 
The latest changes in the extractive sector prioritize objectives such as the 
promotion of production and investment and the degree of fexibility through 
structural reforms. They aim at ensuring the participation of the private sector 
and the creation of programs and incentive schemes for production (for instance 
in Argentina and Bolivia). 
In 2015, Bolivia approved the law for investment promotion in explora-
tion and exploitation to promote investment in the sector. The production
incentives included in the law are fnanced mainly through a new fund cre-
ated by the same law, the promotion fund for investment in exploration and
exploitation in hydrocarbons (Fondo de Promoción a la Inversión en Exploración
y Explotación Hidrocarburífera, FPIEEH), fed with 12% of the direct tax levy
on hydrocarbons. 
In the mining sector, the objectives of the reforms during this period
refect the concern to promote mining activity, especially in order to ensure
a continuous fow of investment into the sector. In Ecuador, for example, a
package of measures to promote the development of the mining sector was
promulgated in 2013, which reformulated the application of the extraordinary
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Volatility of the tax collection coming from the nonrenewable 
natural resources 
The institutional reforms and innovations in the fscal and tax framework
previously analyzed, in addition to the evolution of international prices,
meant a strong increase in tax revenues in the period 2003–2008, a sub-
sequent deceleration, and a signifcant fall in recent years (2012–2016, see
Figure 2.1b). 
The inherent volatility of these revenues complicates fscal policy manage-
ment in nonrenewable natural resource–producing countries. This is especially 
true in countries where these revenues have had a high share of total revenue 
during the price-cycle boom period. As illustrated in Figure 2.2, the revenues 
from hydrocarbons and mining accounted for 30% or more of the total public 
revenues during 2010–2011 in Bolivia and Ecuador, and more than 40% in the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. 
Assignment and distribution of tax revenues from 
the exploitation of nonrenewable natural resources 
The increase in tax revenues from the exploitation of nonrenewable natural 
resources was an important source of public revenues, not only for the central 
governments, as noted in the previous section, but also for the subnational 
Figure 2.1a Latin America and the Caribbean: tax revenues from nonrenewable natural 
resources, by product, and related international price indicators, 1990−2016 
(Index 100 = 2010) A. Hydrocarbons 
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Figure 2.1b Latin America and the Caribbean: tax revenues from nonrenewable natural 
resources, by product, and related international price indicators, 1990−2016 
(Index 100 = 2010) B. Mining Products 
Source: Hanni et al., 2018 
Figure 2.2 Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): participation of tax rev-
enues from nonrenewable natural resources in total public revenues, 2000−2016 
(Percentages) 
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ones (Brosio & Jiménez, 2012). The use of this peculiar taxable base meant an 
improvement in the fscal position of several subnational governments, espe-
cially in the regions where these products are produced. 
Latin American countries in general, and the Andean region in particular, 
show a variety of diferent institutions for sharing rents from natural resources 
due to the diferent intergovernmental arrangements, ranging from classical 
federations, such as Argentina, to typical unitary states, such as Chile. 
Contrary to old constitutions which remained silent on this issue, recent con-
stitutions frequently, though not always directly, address it, because the sharing of
rents from natural resources has become an inevitable component of the consti-
tutional pact. Only in Argentina does the constitution assign ownership explicitly
to the provinces. In all the other countries, ownership is assigned to the central
government or is left unsettled by assigning ownership to the people (Bolivia), or
to the nation (Peru). However, congruent with the international practice, rent
sharing is not determined by the assignment of ownership, but rather by the shar-
ing of tax bases, as in Argentina, and by the sharing of tax revenue. 
With only two exceptions, Chile and Venezuela, all countries recognize the
sharing of rent in favor of subnational governments. It is worthwhile noting that
despite the fact that the frst has always been a unitary and centralized country
and the second has always been a federation, rent centralization prevailed in both
countries. 
The Andean countries represent an interesting example regarding the
sharing issue. Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru are all unitary states
that have embarked since the 1990s on a decentralization process leading to
the creation of regional systems. The same countries allocate a substantial
share of their revenues from natural resources to their subnational govern-
ments. These countries provide evidence to the argument that the combina-
tion of political decentralization processes and large endowments of natural
resources is a factor that renders centralization of natural resource rents
politically impossible. 
The degree of sharing of the fscal revenues stemming from natural resources 
among subnational governments is also increasing over time, due not only to the
discovery of the resources, but also to the relative youth of most Latin American 
constitutions (Ibid.). 
Excluding Argentina and Ecuador, in the remaining countries, subnational 
governments situated in the non-producing areas have direct access to a portion 
of the rents stemming from natural resources. This is a notable feature of Latin 
America that has clear merits, once the principle of sharing rents with subna-
tional governments is accepted. In classical federal systems across the world, 
only the subnational governments situated in the producing areas have direct 
access to the rents, while the inequalities deriving from the system of allocation 
are corrected by general equalization systems. In the Latin American coun-
tries, general equalization systems do not exist and the inequalities—created 
by the allocations of rents from natural resources to the producing areas—are, 
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natural resource or a commodity-specifc tax sharing systems. This is the case 
of Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru. 
Consequently, the impact produced by the use of the origin principle for 
allocation is compensated by the concomitant use of the derivation principle. In 
Colombia, a specifc equalization transfer system, the Sistema General de Regalías, 
where only royalties contribute to its pool, is used to provide non-producing 
areas access to revenues. 
While natural resource rent sharing expands the revenue sources of subna-
tional governments, it also makes them subject to the volatility of price and 
production fuctuations, for which they are not particularly well equipped. 
When shared only or predominantly with the producing areas, natural 
resources contribute to increasing horizontal imbalances. This is clearly the 
case of the Bolivian departments, although the government has recently taken a 
number of steps to spread the allocation also to non-producing areas, by increas-
ing the rent share going to all municipalities. 
The huge interdepartmental inequalities of Bolivia (Brosio et al., 2018) are 
to be attributed to the unique characteristics of the country, where royalties 
on natural resources are the only source of revenue for departments. Non-
producing departments are, as a consequence, completely dependent on central 
government redistribution. Since no general equalization transfer system exists 
in Bolivia and since the non-producing departments have only access to a share 
of the rents on oil and gas, the distribution of departmental revenues is highly 
unequal (Brosio & Jiménez, 2012). 
The case of Bolivia shows the negative impact on regional equality deriv-
ing from making subnational government revenues only dependent on natural 
resource rents. Argentina provides evidence for a diferent practice. As men-
tioned before, in Argentina only the producing provinces have direct access 
to the rents through their royalties. However, provinces have access to their 
own taxes and to a share of a pool of national taxes. Consequently, while oil-
producing provinces have extremely high per capita revenue, no province is left 
with an unbearably low revenue level (Ibid.). 
It is difcult to fnd research that addresses the question of the impact on 
regional equality deriving from giving municipalities access to the rents from 
natural resources. There is no easily manageable information at this local gov-
ernment level. However, there is scanty evidence showing, as expected, that the 
concentration and randomness of the allocation of royalties is much higher for 
municipalities. In some cases, royalties can reach astronomically high per capita 
amounts, increasing regional inequality. 
In spite of this heterogeneity, linked to the historical trajectories and social
and political processes specifc to each country, some general trends can be
identifed with regard to the regional distribution of these resources. We
observe a high asymmetric assignment of tax responsibilities and the distribu-
tion of the fscal revenues from extractive activities to the producer regions
(Brosio & Jiménez, 2015), with a lack of compensation mechanisms to non-
producer regions. 
 
   
48 Juan Pablo Jiménez 
Some countries in the Andean region share their revenues from nonrenew-
able natural resources asymmetrically with their local governments. Asym-
metrical sharing consists in assigning a fscal instrument only to the subnational 
governments of the producing areas, such as the right of levying royalties on oil 
and gas assigned to the provinces of Argentina. Alternatively, it may consist in 
assigning a share of the revenue collected by the central government only to the 
producing areas, as in the case of royalties and income tax in the case of Peru 
or the hydrocarbon tax (IDH) in Bolivia. 
Asymmetrical sharing is a non-necessary consequence of the spatial concen-
tration on natural resources within countries. As a matter of fact, many coun-
tries do not use it, preferring to share the revenue with all local governments. 
Asymmetrical sharing can create huge horizontal imbalances among local 
governments compromising regional equality, efciency, and national cohesion. 
The fscal revenues that are more concentrated are those coming from 
the nonrenewable natural resources sector (Table 2.1). This is a result of the 
Table 2.1 Evolution of concentration of regional GDP per capita and subnational revenues:
breakdown of revenues by fscal revenues, tax revenues, and revenues from nonre-
newable natural resources. Latin America (selected countries) 2000, 2007 and 2016 
Countries Year Gap (max/min) Coefcient of variation 
Regional GDP Fiscal Tax revenues Revenues from 
revenues nonrenewable 
natural resources 
Argentina 2000 7.8 0.55 0.88 2.14 
2007 7.6 0.63 0.78 1.97 
2016  . . . 0.45 0.76 2.04 
Bolivia 2000 2.7 0.88 0.76  . . . 
2007 4.1 1.08 1.58  . . . 
2012 4.6 1.28 1.73  . . . 
Chile 2000 11.0 0.19 0.35 1.73 
2007 9.2 0.25 0.39 1.70 
2016 6.3 0.19 0.34 1.63 
Colombia 2000 15.7 0.79 0.85 2.72 
2007 7.9 0.69 0.66 2.45 
2016 6.2 0.81 0.58 1.39 
Ecuador 2000 19.1 0.67 0.90 0.73 
2007 20.2 0.48 0.95 0.79 
2015 8.4 0.55 0.56 0.71 
Peru 2005 6.2 0.88 0.96 1.92 
2009 11.1 1.14 1.00 1.84 
2016 4.7 0.50 0.85 1.83 
Source: Own elaboration based on ofcial data. 
Notes: The fgure of the Regional GDP of Argentina for 2007 is taken from the last measurement of 
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combination of the asymmetric allocation at the subnational level of tax rev-
enues related to the exploitation of nonrenewable natural resources, coupled 
with the lack of equalization transfers. The signifcant concentration of regional 
GDP is also expressed in the high concentration of fscal and tax revenues in 
the countries of the region. 
An additional way to show the impact of asymmetric sharing on subnational 
fscal inequality is through an indicator derived from the Gini coefcient, in 
order to capture the relative participation of diferent sources of revenues in 
the subnational fscal inequality (Brosio et al., 2018). Following Lerman and 
Yitzhaki (1985) and adapting it to the subnational fscal revenue structure, the 
Gini coefcient of regional inequality can be decomposed into three indepen-
dent factors relating to the source of fscal revenues (in this case it would be 
nonrenewable natural resources fscal revenues) relative to the Gini coefcient of
subnational fscal revenues (own fscal revenues, nonrenewable natural resources 
fscal revenues, and other fscal revenues). Therefore, for the source of revenue 
from nonrenewable natural resources, the sum of these three components 
(fourth, sixth, and eighth column) would represent their absolute contribution 
to total inequality. 
Table 2.2 Relative participation in the inequality of subnational tax revenues 
Country Fiscal Own revenues Revenues from Other (transfers, 
instrument nonrenewable natural donations, etc.) 
resources fscal 
As * Relative As * Relative As * Relative 
of total participation of total participation of total participation 
revenues in inequality revenues in inequality revenues in inequality 
(GINI) (GINI) (GINI) 
Argentina Royalty 34.6 24.7 S.7 17.5 58 57.8 
Bolivia Royalty 9.3 8.2 43.9 40.8 46.8 51 
and tax on 
hydrocarbons 
Colombia Royalty 28.1 13 24.7 SI.7 47.2 35.3 
Ecuador Oil revenues 9.9 6.1 14.7 11.9 75.4 81.9 




Peru Canon, 6.2 −2.3 14.7 30 79.2 72.3 
sobrecanon, 
and royalties 
Source: Own elaboration based on ofcial data. 
Coverage for Argentina is the provinces (2015); for Bolivia, autonomous governments, departments, 
and municipalities; in Colombia, departments and municipalities (2014); in Mexico were considered 
the federal entities, municipalities, and the city of México (2015); in Peru, local governments (2015). 
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Asymmetric allocation consolidates, and in some cases amplifes, territorial 
disparities. In Table 2.1 and 2.2, a high relative participation of fscal revenues 
from nonrenewable natural resources on subnational fscal inequality can be 
observed. 
Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru represent quite telling examples of the impact 
of nonrenewable natural resources on subnational fnances. In these countries, 
the participation of this revenue exceeds the 30% of the Gini composition. The 
case of Argentina should be highlighted, where the natural resource royalties are 
constitutionally assigned exclusively to the producing provinces. At an aggregate
level, their weight within the total revenues is low, but their participation in the 
inequality of tax revenues between provinces is considerable (17%). 
The high impact on the inequality that may be related to allocation of these 
resources between levels of government makes it relevant to consider the design 
of equalization transfers as an alternative to improve interjurisdictional equity 
(Searle, 2007), particularly in Latin America and the Andean region.4 
In addition, the high fuctuations in the prices of these products have resulted 
in highly volatile fscal revenues and intergovernmental transfers from the exploi-
tation of nonrenewable natural resources. For example, with regard to the vola-
tility of the resources of the mining canon in Peru, the year-to-year variations 
of the transferred resources have changed from a maximum of 167% to a mini-
mum of 20% (Brosio & Jiménez, 2015). These fscal revenue variations make it 
very difcult for the governments (whether local, regional, or even central) to 
maintain an adequate and sustainable level of public spending, without a high 
loss of efciency and equity in the provision of services and benefts. 
Conclusion and challenges 
Beyond the eforts of productive diversifcation, most of the countries of the 
Andean region are characterized by their high specialization in products from 
the extractive sector. This characteristic, coupled with the high volatility of 
the prices of these products, which today is expressed in the post-boom but a 
decade ago was expressed in the supercycle, meant strong fuctuations in tax 
revenues, whether at the level of central or subnational governments. 
In the previous decade, the Andean countries experienced a particular stage 
in their economic history, driven in part by the upswing in commodity prices. 
This fact manifested in sustained processes of high economic growth and great 
improvements in social indicators, such as poverty and income inequality. These 
improvements were achieved in part by the adequate measures taken by policy 
makers throughout the region, who sought to take advantage of the promising 
external context of high commodity prices. Among the sample countries, an 
important fact behind these improvements was a stronger fscal position attained 
through various tax reforms. 
In this sense, it can be seen how these countries implemented a wide array 
of reforms taking diferent approaches that granted a high degree of heteroge-
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place, either through nationalizations in the hydrocarbon sector like in the case 
of Venezuela or Bolivia, or through renegotiation of contracts in Ecuador — 
also through the strengthening of existing instruments or the introduction of 
new ones, such as royalty income tax and specifc taxes in Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Colombia, Peru, and Chile, an aspect of great relative importance in the mining 
sector, where historically the state participation has been reduced; and through 
the implementation of taxes, duties, participations, or contributions linked to 
prices or extraordinary profts in several countries, given the high volatility of 
international prices of nonrenewable resources. 
In the post-boom, a context of declining oil and mineral prices poses major 
challenges to the Latin American economies that are producers/exporters of 
these products. A heterogeneous impact can be expected. In some countries, 
the effects will be more pronounced, due to specific characteristics such
as the share of the nonrenewable resources in their export structure or the fscal 
instruments applied to them. Anyway, at a general level the bonanza cycle led 
to a partial reversion of the process of diversifcation that allowed it to increase 
manufacturing exports. As a result, the share of primary goods and nonrenew-
able resources and other intensive products in the export structure of the coun-
tries concerned increased again (Hanni et al., 2018). 
To address the challenges that the actual international scenario poses over
the countries analyzed in this chapter, it is not enough just to consider the
fscal impacts on the aggregate, as is usually done in the literature on the sub-
ject. Policy makers should also embrace the diferent mixes of fscal impacts,
which had been and will be heterogeneous among all of the countries ana-
lyzed. Lower prices of commodities would mean that these countries should
make the necessary eforts to keep their spending budgets in direct relation
to potential decreases in fscal revenues by seeking to diversify sources of rev-
enue, avoiding excessive dependence on exports of nonrenewable resources,
through the strengthening of other less volatile tax bases such as property
taxes or personal income tax, and implementing countercyclical fscal mecha-
nisms such as stabilization and saving funds. Other bases such as VAT are
more extended throughout the analyzed countries, and direct taxes show a
greater margin and are more progressive in distributional terms. Although
the impact will be diferent among the countries, it is crucial that they keep
their instruments and tax regimes under analysis and gradually improve them
to maximize value and minimize the state’s balance of tax collections from
extractive sectors. 
The post-bonanza has meant, at the level of the central governments, not 
only a fall in the fscal relevance of these revenues, but also a reconsideration 
of the objectives to follow and the tools to use, so as to prioritize not only the 
fscal result but also the sustainability in the investments and production of the 
sector. In the boom period, governments sought to increase fscal revenues from
the sector and their share in the economic rents generated; as prices plummeted,
these eforts were moderated or even receded as governments sought to protect 
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This is a difcult process and must be done with care since there are multiple 
trade-ofs between the diferent evaluation criteria of fscal instruments, requir-
ing some balance between the diferent objectives. This means, for example, 
maintaining reasonable investment dynamism and achieving, at the same time, 
a progressive state participation in economic rents derived from natural resource 
extraction; achieving an adequate sharing of risks among the government and 
the investors by the means of tax arrangements that can transfer part of the com-
mercial risk that entrepreneurs face to the government; and assuring compliance
with a reasonably low administrative cost. 
At the central government level, one of the main challenges for countries 
producing nonrenewable natural resources is to balance the need to close fscal 
gaps and to ensure fair participation in the economic income generated by the 
extractive activity. As emphasized in the chapter, each one of the fscal instru-
ments analyzed has advantages and disadvantages in light of the objectives
pursued by governments. It is essential to fnd a balance between the need to 
obtain tax revenues with the rest of the typical tax objectives (efciency, pro-
gressiveness, equity, stability, fexibility) in order to guarantee a fow of public 
revenues while ensuring the sustainability of investment and production in the 
sector. 
On the intergovernmental allocation and distribution side, the challenges 
are related to how to avoid the high concentration and signifcant volatility of 
these resources. Resulting asymmetries point out to the need to revise those 
tax assignments from the exploitation of nonrenewable natural resources. In 
the event that these assignments promote a high concentration of income, the 
design of equalization transfers that make it possible to compensate for the dif-
ferent resulting capacities can be of great help. The post-boom situation, with 
prices still below those recorded during the bonanza, can be a good opportu-
nity, in terms of political economy, to move forward with less resistance from 
the authorities of producing jurisdictions in reforms in the allocation systems 
and distribution of these resources. 
Notes 
1 I appreciate the support and collaboration of Maria Gil Mendoza and Ignacio Ruelas; and 
the comments of Giorgio Brosio, Barbara Fritz, Bettina Schorr, Gerardo Damonte, Andrea
Podestá, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle. 
2 For more details about the implementation of fscal reforms in that period, see Hanni, 
Jiménez and Ruelas (2018) 
3 In some of these cases, for example in Peru, since the amending of Mining Royalties Law 
in 2011, not only the levels of taxation have been altered but scales of varying rates were 
established according to easily verifable criteria, like the level of production, location and 
depth of the wells, the type of resource extracted, or other variables related to the cost 
structure (see Hanni, Jiménez & Ruelas, 2018). 
4 Brosio and Jiménez (2015) and Brosio, Jiménez & Ruelas (2018), taking as reference the theo-
retical principles of interjurisdictional fscal equity, review the high impact of the exploita-
tion of natural resources on the territorial distribution of fscal revenues and the efect of 






Fiscal reforms and institutional changes 53 
resources, at the level of the intermediate governments of Argentina and Peru. In both 
cases, territorial fscal revenue inequality falls signifcantly if these revenues are distributed 
with equalization mechanisms. 
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3 Cash transfers as citizens’
dividend of the resource boom 
Opportunities and challenges of social 
protection in Bolivia 
Pablo Evia Salas 
Introduction 
Hydrocarbons play a crucial role in the Bolivian economy. According to data from
the National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2020), sectoral
GDP had cumulative growth of 70% in the 2000s, compared to average growth in
the 1990s (around 4%). Likewise, its role in Bolivian exports is signifcant: 40% of
export earnings in the timespan 2000–2018 came from this sector (Banco Central
de Bolivia, 2019). In addition to being important from an economic point of view,
hydrocarbons play a strategic role in Bolivian politics. No other sector from the
industry has been subject to such varied institutional reform in a (relatively) short
time horizon, infuenced by the growing importance of the sector in its potential
to increase the government revenues, mainly through tax collection. 
This chapter explores the interaction between social policy innovations, 
understood as a type of institutional change, and the resource boom in Bolivia 
during 2003–2014 and raises a couple of questions regarding their sustainabil-
ity. A series of reforms related to natural resources were introduced in Bolivia 
in the 1990s. These reforms paved the way for gathering more revenues from 
the natural resource sector (mainly natural gas), which allowed the successive 
governments to try to build a social protection system refecting these increased 
fscal revenues. They could, thus, be understood as a citizens’ dividend of the 
resource boom (Arezki et al., 2012, p. 30). 
The importance of these social protection innovations in overcoming the 
high poverty and inequality rates present in the country is generally accepted 
(Amarante & Brun, 2018; Robles et al., 2019). However, in some periods, the 
social protection policy lacked the necessary fnancial support to be fnancially 
sustainable, which introduced social, fscal, and political pressures that ended 
up twisting the objective under which they originally were conceived. In this 
sense, the social protection system in Bolivia faces some constraints and chal-
lenges that could compromise its fnancial sustainability and potentially put in 
danger the funding of the system and the support provided to its benefciaries. 
The institutional drivers of social policy innovations in Bolivia are mixed: 
First, there has been a strong regional infuence in terms of social protection 
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in Mexico). In fact, this type of policy infuenced not only Bolivia but other 
countries in the region that adopted social protection schemes based on cash 
transfers (both conditional and unconditional). 
On the other hand, innovations in social policy were also endogenously 
driven by the resource boom due to their discovery and subsequent boom in 
commodity prices. The fow of additional resources had to fnd a use by the 
government (apart from minimum wage increases, increased infrastructure 
investments, etc.), and therefore the establishment of conditional and uncon-
ditional transfers was propitious, as well as a way to create a political support 
base for the government of the party Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS, Movement 
towards Socialism), headed since 2006 by President Evo Morales (until 2019). 
The remainder of the chapter consists of the following: Next, I discuss
the background of the conception and implementation of the central social
transfers after the economic reforms (1990s) and the natural resource’s boom
(2000s). Following that, I analyze the fscal sustainability of the Bolivian social
policy alongside its funding rationale, stressing some of its weaknesses and
potential risks. In the last section, I will get into the challenges and the future of
social protection in Bolivia, trying to conceive it as a life cycle–oriented policy. 
Background of social policy in Bolivia: 
domestic reforms and global boom 
The foundations of contemporary social policy in Bolivia could be traced back 
to the 1980s, in which a profound crisis unleashed an unprecedented erosion 
in the living conditions of most Bolivians, and predominantly the poorest and 
vulnerable. The collapse of international tin prices triggered a massive adjustment
of the role of the government in the economy (which was the main employer 
of the country). This adjustment implied a massive layof of workers, with the 
additional harmful consequences of the loss of purchasing power due to an epi-
sode of extremely high infation (Antelo, 2000). At that time, the creation of the
Fondo Social de Emergencia—Social Emergency Fund as an entity that supported 
the most vulnerable through the implementation of economic infrastructure, 
social assistance, and productive counseling installed the basis of social policy in 
the country based on direct government support (Romero, 1988). 
Despite these eforts, poverty rates remained in the range of 50–70% in the 
aftermath of the 1980s hyper-infation episode. Since then, successive govern-
ments have tried to introduce market reforms in the country to try to correct 
the macroeconomic disequilibrium and recover the path for economic growth. 
In 1993, President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada started to implement another 
package of reforms aiming at modernizing state administration. These reforms 
included a substantial component in the hydrocarbons sector. Due to the sec-
tor’s lack of investments, production had stagnated without further exploration 
activities undertaken by Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB), a state-
owned frm. In this sense, an essential part of the reforms during the 1990s 
included the attempt to invigorate the hydrocarbons sector through market 
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These reforms efectively appealed to a number of multinational frms work-
ing in the sector (AMOCO, Pérez Companc, ENRON, among others), which 
became involved in the business through the purchase of stock in the previously 
state-owned company, YPFB. The investment commitments of foreign capital 
enhanced the position of Bolivia in the hydrocarbon business at the regional 
level, including the construction of a natural gas pipeline to Brazil, which was 
a huge market for Bolivian hydrocarbons. 
This privatization scheme included a social policy component: the BONO-
SOL (Bono Solidario—Solidarity Bond). BONOSOL consisted of a cash transfer 
paid annually to all Bolivian citizens proven to be 65 years old or older, using 
the profts of the partially privatized hydrocarbons companies. The BONO-
SOL’s amount was initially about USD257 per year at the present exchange rate 
(USD1 = Bs7). As the byproduct of the hydrocarbons’ reform, BONOSOL 
constituted the frst cash transfer that is still part of the current social policy infra-
structure. The following government of Banzer-Quiroga (1997–2002) renamed 
it as Bolivida and, given the economic crisis of the early 2000s, reduced the 
amount of the pension to only USD65 yearly. 
The reforms in the hydrocarbon sector implemented by the frst government 
of Sánchez de Lozada started to show results soon: new reserves of natural gas 
were discovered, and production increased in a spectacular way. Talks began to 
facilitate the exports of part of these additional reserves to foreign markets, the 
most important one being the Mexican and American markets. 
In parallel to this incipient boom, Bolivia experienced during the years 2000
and 2005 a series of dramatic episodes of social upheaval and mobilizations
including a social revolt against the privatization of water provision in the city
of Cochabamba (the Water War), several weeks-long blockades of the Bolivian
altiplano headed by the Aymara leader Felipe Quispe, and a revolt against a new
direct income tax in February 2003 (Black February) led by the police forces.
During “Black October” in 2003, also known as the War over Gas, weeks-
long massive protests took place against the plans of the second government of
Gonzálo Sánchez de Lozada (2002–2003) for exporting Bolivian natural gas via
a Chilean port. Many Bolivians objected to the selection of Chile because of
the historical memory of Chile usurping Bolivia’s access to the Pacifc Ocean. 
Black October terminated the presidential mandate of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada,
forcing him to go into exile in the United States. Sánchez de Lozada’s resignation
resulted in the automatic succession of Vice President Carlos Mesa, who drafted
a new law governing the hydrocarbons sector based on the results of a previously
conducted popular referendum. This new law increased the taxes raised by the gov-
ernment to 50% of hydrocarbons’ production, from the 18% established by Sánchez
de Lozada. In this way, tax revenues from hydrocarbon production were dramatically
increased. In 2005 the government received a total of USD607 million, which
meant an increase of 112% compared to 2004 (USD286 million). At the same
time, it motivated an intense confict over the distribution of these windfalls among
regions, local governments, and other stakeholders (such as public universities). 
After this new round of intensive social protests, in December 2005 the
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approximately 52% of the votes, which meant the most resounding victory for a
candidate for the presidency since the restoration of democracy in 1982. Morales
won on the basis of an electoral campaign that promised the nationalization of the
countries’ natural resource sector. In May 2006, President Morales’ government
then issued the Supreme Decree Héroes del Chaco,1 declaring state ownership of
all hydrocarbons. According to the decree, all oil- and gas-producing companies
were obliged to hand over their hydrocarbon production to the public company
YPFB. At the same time, YPFB assumed the commercialization of and defnition
of the conditions of sale, volumes, and prices of all hydrocarbons. 
A transition period was established during which the existing contracts with 
foreign oil companies were readjusted and reformulated. Also, those oil felds 
whose production was greater than 100 million cubic feet per day were subject 
to an additional 32% tax on their production value. This percentage was added 
to the 50% tax established in the new Hydrocarbons Law issued in 2005, making
a total of 82% in taxes belonging to the state. 
As a consequence of this reform, the state’s revenues (both national and 
subnational) again increased steeply. In 2005 the government collected approxi-
mately USD333 million in hydrocarbons’ taxes, while this fgure rose to almost 
USD790 million in 2006, and to USD2,241 million in 2014 (Figure 3.1). 
The increase of public revenues not only depended on the changes in the 
hydrocarbons’ regulation, which increased the tax rate from 18% (Sánchez de 
Lozada) to 50% (Carlos Mesa) and 82% (Evo Morales) of the production value. 
Another factor allowing the boom in the hydrocarbons sector was the increase 
in the international price of oil, which is closely linked to the price of natural 
gas. As the price of oil increased, so did the export price of natural gas. 
Figure 3.1 Hydrocarbons’ taxes under diferent regimes (in millions of bolivianos) 
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The boom in the hydrocarbons sector triggered a steady increase in govern-
ment revenues, but also in expenditures. As Figure 3.3 depicts, government 
revenues and expenditures increased substantially from 2006 onwards. In the 
eight years from 2006 to 2013, the fscal balance showed a surplus (as a matter 
Figure 3.2 Hydrocarbons’ tax and WTI 
Source: Own elaboration using data from UDAPE 
Figure 3.3 Fiscal balance, government expenditures and revenues 
Source: Own elaboration using data from UDAPE 
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of fact, the frst surplus in 30 years). Some authors even drew parallels between 
it and the Marshall Plan of US aid to Western Europe. Morales (2014) calcu-
lated that during the booming period (2005–2013), the additional infow of 
resources was around USD50 billion compared to USD130 billion under the 
Marshall Plan. However, the Bolivian fscal balance benefted only temporarily 
during the phase of high oil prices. After 2013, and coinciding with the drop 
in the international oil price, the surplus turned into a defcit, reaching levels 
coincident with the crisis years (2002–2003). 
Bolivia’s social protection foor 
With the extraordinary infux of revenues and following the example of other 
programs in the region (especially Oportunidades in Mexico and Bolsa Escola— 
Bolsa Família in Brazil), the government of Evo Morales intended to establish a 
social protection system based in conditional cash transfers (CCTs) (Cechinni, 
2019; Sojo, 2017). 
CCTs consist of payments given to specifc individuals provided that they 
fulfll certain conditions: for example, attending school or being subject to 
periodical medical check-ups. Those transfers intend to address poverty in the 
short term and break the intergenerational cycle of poverty by increasing the 
human capital of the recipients and their families (Ferreira & Robalino, 2010, 
p. 22). Efective targeting is one of the features of CCTs that improve their 
efectiveness in reducing poverty. 
In the Latin American region, the pioneering examples of Progresa—Opor-
tunidades in Mexico and Bolsa Escola—Bolsa Família in Brazil during the 1990s
inspired many other programs that rely upon conditional cash transfers. Ferreira
and Robalino (2010) estimate that CCTs in Latin America beneft roughly 22
million households, range from 0.1 to 0.6 of GDP, and cover between 1.5% of
the population (El Salvador) and 54% of the population (Bolivia). Thus, the social
protection foor installed in Bolivia is one of the most extensive in the region and
is considered key in the fght against poverty (Amarante & Brun, 2018). 
In current Bolivia, the most prominent cash transfers are BONOSOL/Renta 
Dignidad, a universal pension scheme given to the elderly; Bono Juancito Pinto
(BJP), a conditional transfer given to children and youth in school-age; and 
Bono Juana Azurduy (BJA), another conditional cash transfer provided to expect-
ant mothers and their newborns. The establishment of BJA and BJP aimed to 
increase the coverage of social protection recipients and, at the same time, to 
break the intergenerational cycle of poverty. The continuation of past programs,
like BONOSOL/Renta Dignidad, contributed to reinforce this idea of providing
integral support to the individual throughout their life cycle. Hence, the social 
policy system established in Bolivia resembles the Social Protection Floor (SPF) 
concept as promoted by the International Labor Organization (ILO, 2011). The
ILO conceives SPF as an integrated set of social policies designed to guarantee 
income security and access to essential social services for all, paying particular 
attention to vulnerable groups and to protecting and empowering people across 
the life cycle (Harris, 2013, p. 113). In terms of its funding, SPF is essentially 
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Unstable fnances: a constraint for the future? 
There can be diferent sources to fund a social protection scheme. Gener-
ally, domestic resource mobilization is considered as the most efcient way of
fnancing development (Harris, 2013, p.  117). Likewise, the literature warns
against funding social protection with external sources because of their poten-
tial unsustainability. The notion of the project cycle unsustainability is frequent in
those social protection schemes funded by external donors and implies that the
horizon of planning of the institutions that provide support reaches up to four or
fve years. Usually, the donors or NGOs that fnance social protection schemes
in developing countries have a small window of commitment. The same idea
applies to social protection schemes that are funded using volatile revenues, like
taxes on commodities (Devereux, 2002, p. 31). The problem of fnancing social
protection schemes (or social protection systems, as SPF) with natural resources
taxation is that, in general, this funding is pro-cyclical and subject to the fuctua-
tions of commodities’ international prices (Loza, 2007). Moreover, if the transfers
are funded using debt, this would reduce fscal space in the future, limiting even
more the use of the resources by the government (Harris, 2013, p. 127). 
Figure 3.4 Bolivian CCTs and life cycle 
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These dynamics can be observed in Bolivia and raise serious doubts regard-
ing the fnancial sustainability of the domestic social protection foor enacted 
as a citizens’ dividend of the resource boom. As explained before, reform of 
the hydrocarbons sector increased fscal resources a great deal. These additional 
fscal resources allowed the fnancing of existing social programs (Renta Digni-
dad) and the creation of new ones (BJA, BJP) (Medinaceli & Mokrani, 2010, 
p. 248). In this way, natural resources turned into the primary funding source 
for social purposes (Monterrey, 2013), linking expenditure on social protection 
with volatile international prices. When the economic boom ended, revenues 
decreased while expenditures remained high. As a consequence, in 2019, the 
fscal defcit worsened to reach 8% of GDP, raising serious questions regarding 
the predictability of the social protection programs. 
In the following, I illustrate this set of potential problems in detail for the 
three most important conditional cash transfer programs in Bolivia: Renta Dig-
nidad, Bono Juana Azurduy, and Bono Juancito Pinto. 
BONOSOL/Renta Dignidad 
From its inception in the 1990s, the payment of BONOSOL was highly contro-
versial due to the perception that the dividends of capitalized enterprises did not
sufciently back the resources needed for its payment (Müller, 2009). Indeed,
the program faced problems of fnancial sustainability from the beginning. In its
frst payment in 1997, the BONOSOL amount of Bs1800 (roughly USD257)
demanded a budget of USD90 million for paying the beneft to more than 360,000
recipients. However, the dividends of privatized enterprises only reached USD45
million. The remainder had to be covered by the Tesoro General de la Nación (TGN),
the public budget in an amount of USD45 million (Gamboa, 2006). 
Given this scenario, the payment of Bs1800 was largely unsustainable, and 
the amount was reduced to Bs455 (around USD65) from 1998 to 2001. In the 
year 2002, there was no payment of BONOSOL or Bolivida, while from 2003 
to 2006 the amount and original name of BONOSOL were restituted. 
Shortly after the new government of Morales had assumed in 2006, the 
BONOSOL scheme was changed to a monthly transfer of Bs350 (around 
USD50). The law that created Renta Dignidad (the “new” transfer) established 
the following points: the Renta Dignidad would reach all elderly more than 60 
years old; those that had another pension beneft would only receive 75% per-
cent of the beneft (USD37.50); and most importantly, the funding of the Renta 
Dignidad would be grounded in two sources: the dividends of the privatized 
enterprises, in the proportion that corresponds to the Bolivian stockholders and 
30% of the newly established direct Hydrocarbon Tax (IDH—Impuesto Directo 
a los Hidrocarburos). 
While the frst two changes in the legislation implied a diferent design
of the transfer, the most important modifcation came in the cash transfer
funding. While BONOSOL payment was covered using the privatization
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natural gas was created with the establishment of Renta Dignidad. Thus, as
long as the government had high revenues due to favorable external cir-
cumstances (i.e., a boom in the commodities sector due to a hike in the
international prices), the tax revenues designated to fnance the transfer
would be assured. However, in a highly volatile context, in which commod-
ity prices are subject to demand and supply shocks, it would be, to say the
least, a risky business to heavily rely upon hydrocarbons revenues to fnance
a cash transfer program. 
And indeed, with the bust cycle sending international commodity prices 
plunging, the funding of the program became troublesome. Figure 3.5 shows 
the evolution of funding sources for Renta Dignidad. As can be seen, the com-
ponent regarding the privatization revenues has evolved mirroring the hydro-
carbons tax component: when the privatization revenues arise, there is less need 
to trust in the hydrocarbon tax component, and the converse is also true. In the 
last years, however, it can be seen that the component regarding the dividends 
of the privatized companies has evolved negatively, falling to a historical mini-
mum, only comparable to the revenues in 2012. 
Bolivia’s funding of its Renta Dignidad provides an interesting example of the
use of revenues from the exploitation of natural resources to fund social protection
expenditures and highlights the potential pitfalls posed by the variability of such
revenues. Buoyant oil prices allowed the program to be funded using only a part
of the oil revenues. However, Bolivia’s experience underscores that provisions also
have to be made to secure funding when oil prices are less favorable and absorb
Figure 3.5 Renta Dignidad funding, hydrocarbons tax, and privatization revenues 
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the impact of the inherent volatility of oil revenues, given that they are one of the
most critical sources of funding for the government’s overall expenditures (Harris,
2013, p. 133). 
While the link between highly volatile oil prices and the revenues needed
for the cash transfers to Bolivian pensioners has not had actual negative
consequences for the payment of the transfer (e.g., a reduction in amount of
beneft or in the number of recipients), there are some challenges regarding
its sustainability over time. In the frst place, there is a general concern with
respect to the reduction in public resources due to the drop in oil prices
observed in the last fve years (Sánchez & Velásquez, 2020). Several experts
have expressed their belief that the resources collected by the national trea-
sury will not be able to cover the total expenditure needed for Renta Dig-
nidad, not to mention retirement income in general (Rodríguez Cáceres,
2021). The second concern is the high volatility of the source of funding
for Renta Dignidad. While the bonanza from the middle 2000s to 2010s has
allowed the government to sustain and even increase the amount of the Renta
Dignidad over time, unstable oil prices will make it harder to adopt a similar
pattern in the following years. 
Bono Juancito Pinto 
The Bono Juancito Pinto was established in 2006, and it consists of the payment 
of Bs200 (USD28) annually to school students (both primary and secondary 
school) that are enrolled in public schools. The payment is conditional on an 
attendance rate of more than 80% of the school days during the previous school 
year (running from February to November). 
While the funding mechanism is not specifc regarding the funding source 
for the transfer payment, de facto it was fnanced by the revenues generated by 
the “nationalized” hydrocarbons enterprise, YPFB. Thus, also this transfer is 
inherently linked to the volatile hydrocarbons revenues. 
As in the case with Renta Dignidad, in the frst years of the transfer the resources 
provided by YPFB were enough to cope with the fnancial obligations of 
the program. However, with the revenues shrinking and the overall budget 
expanding (in 2006, the budget was USD248.5 million; in 2019, the budget 
was USD461 million), additional funding sources had to be found considerably 
increasing the number of revenues’ sources comparing it to its frst payment in 
2006. In 2019, besides YPFB, these include a variety of public sources ranging 
from food frms to commercial banks to the cable car transport enterprise in La 
Paz, amongst others (see Table 3.1). 
While the fact that the government was able to ensure more funding sources
for the 2019 budget could be qualifed as a “success”, several concerns arise
from the evolution of the funding structure from 2006 to 2019. The frst one
is associated with a problem of incentives. During the Morales administration,
several state-owned enterprises were created, on the grounds that the state
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Table 3.1 Source of funding for Bono Juancito Pinto (2019) 
Source of funding Business 
YPFB Oil company 
COMIBOL Mining company 
BOA Airline 
DAB Customs 
ENTEL Telecommunications company 
COFADENA Military company 
ENDE Electricity company 
TAB Air cargo company 
VINTO Mining company 
EBA Food processing company 
Nueva EBA Food processing company 
SABSA Airport administration company 
MI TELEFÉRICO Cable car company 
TAM Airline (military) 
ABE Aeronautics and Space agency 
ASPB Port management 
BTV TV company 
LACTEOSBOL Food processing company (milk) 
EBC Building company 
BANCO UNIÓN Bank 
EMAPA Food processing company 
Source: Own elaboration using data from UDAPE 
created enterprises ended up providing resources for the funding of Bono
Juancito Pinto (among other diverse tasks). There is a general concern with the
diverse burdens that these companies need to cover, given the diferent goals
that governments assign to them, ranging from jobs creation to funding social
policy (Lin et al., 1998; Shirley & Walsh, 2000). This diversity of functions and
the multiplicity of objectives for the public enterprises could be problematic
from the point of view of the sustainability of the fnancial resources required
by the social transfer. 
Another source of concern related to the numerous sources of funding for
the Bono Juancito Pinto is more general, related to the creation of fscal space
to gather the resources needed to cover the obligations acquired by the state.
While creating enough funding (i.e., the size) is actually very important to
sustain the transfer over time, a focus on quality of these resources should also
be taken into account (an element of quality being how sustainable are the
resources). 
Bono Juana Azurduy 
The Bono Juana Azurduy (BJA) is a conditional cash transfer program introduced 
in 2009. The transfer benefciaries are pregnant women and children up to two 
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years old, conditional on the regular attendance to medical check-ups. The 
program’s cash payments can sum up to Bs1820 (USD260) per mother/child if 
all the check-ups are correctly undertaken. In addition to these cash payments, 
the program also covers births in public hospitals. 
As in the case of BJP, the source of funding for the BJA transfer was nei-
ther clearly stated from the beginning. The supreme decree establishing the 
transfer afrms that “according to availability, the ‘Juana Azurduy’ transfer will 
be fnanced with resources from a) The National Treasury; b) Donations and 
external/internal credits; c) Transfers from public and private entities and insti-
tutions” (Supreme Decree 066—Creation of Bono Juana Azurduy). 
In 2012, Law 211 mandated that the BJA would be fnanced from then on 
with the central bank’s foreign reserves yields. Apart from the public budget, 
foreign reserves (FX reserves) were the other winner of the commodities’ wind-
fall, given its close relationship with exports. The export revenues are paid in 
dollars (or any other foreign currency), yielding an increase in FX reserves. 
Figure 3.6 Relationship between FX reserves and WTI 
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Figure 3.6 shows the relationship between FX reserves and the international 
price of oil. We see that the relationship is positive, implying once again that 
the funding source of the BJA transfer is closely linked to the variations in the 
international prices of commodities. 
Again, the high dependence on foreign revenues constitutes a potential fra-
gility, since a change in the conditions of gas exports would put the continuity
of social protection policies at risk (Monterrey, 2013). In addition, fnancing
for social policy is not normally a core competence of a central bank, and this
additional burden could in fact distort the customary objective of maintaining
price level stability in the economy. As in the case of the funding of the Bono
Juancito Pinto, although there have been no serious consequences so far (in the
sense of suspension of payments, etc.), there is a clear problem of incentives
between a central bank’s traditional objectives (i.e., maintaining currency’s pur-
chasing power, fnancial stability, or other related) and providing funding for
social policy instruments. The political and economic independence of central
banks is generally understood as a desirable feature of modern monetary and
fnancial policy (Alesina & Summers, 1993) and a guarantee for macroeco-
nomic stability (Grilli et al., 1991). In this sense, relying on the central bank’s
foreign exchange reserves for funding a social transfer program could distort
the objectives of maintaining the currency power purchasing and pursuing
fnancial stability. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the interaction between social policy innovations, 
understood as a type of institutional change, and the resource boom in Bolivia 
during the years 2003–2014. It has been shown that this boom is related to key 
reforms in the natural resource sector which were introduced in Bolivia since 
the 1990s. These reforms paved the way for gathering more resources from 
the natural resource sector (mainly natural gas), which allowed the successive 
governments to build a social protection system refecting the increased govern-
ment fscal revenues. This system could be conceived of as a social protection 
foor that acts as a citizen’s dividend of the resource boom. 
The importance of these social protection innovations in overcoming the 
high poverty and inequality rates present in the country is undeniable. Nev-
ertheless, by linking the diferent cash transfers to the volatile global prices of 
oil and gas, an element of instability is introduced in the system. This element 
may potentially reduce the efects of the social protection system in the future, 
by limiting its capacity to provide support to those in need. As in the case of 
BONOSOL in the past, the instability in the sources of funding could lead in 
the worst scenario to a suspension in the payments of the social transfers with 
negative consequences for all the recipients. In the case of the Bono Juancito 
Pinto, such instability has already been observed. The downturn in the oil 
industry, with declining global prices in the sector, have pushed the government
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foor, skimming resources from a wide array of public companies. While some 
of these already confront problems of fnancial sustainability, converting them 
into sponsors of the national social programs may be a liability for their futures. 
As mentioned before, the literature convincingly argues that using
domestic sources for fnancing social protection systems is critical for their
success, as is the existence of an efcient tax administration (Hujo et al.,
2010). Elements of both reforms include avoiding rent-seeking behavior,
as well as fscal evasion and avoidance, which are phenomena that tend to
appear especially in resource economies. Besides, applying efective taxes to
income and real property would enhance the government’s fscal position.
(Harris, 2013, p. 120). 
In the case of Bolivia, this alternative would imply the adoption of a progres-
sive tax reform enabling the state to raise money from its citizens to protect its 
citizens. For several reasons, such a comprehensive reform of the national tax 
system has not been on the political agenda so far. Particularly, the high degree 
of economic informality prevents raising revenues coming from a progressive 
tax (like, for example, an income tax). Also, increasing taxes is a sensible subject 
in Bolivia that elicits resistance from wealthy and poor sectors alike. In this sense,
the use of the revenues stemming from the natural resource sector to build a 
social protection foor was a way to satisfy both the demands of elites as well 
as the necessities of the poor. However, given the instabilities arising from its 
design, the local mobilization of resources by means of a progressive tax reform 
will be an urgent task ahead. 
Note 
1 Chaco heroes, in reference to the war against Paraguay over control of the northern part 
of the Gran Chaco region (known in Spanish as Chaco Boreal) of South America, which 
was thought to be rich in oil. 
References 
Alesina, A., & Summers, L. H. (1993). Central bank independence and macroeconomic 
performance: Some comparative evidence. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 25(2), 
151–162. https://doi.org/10.2307/2077833 
Amarante, V., & Brun, M. (2018). Cash transfers in Latin America: Efects on poverty and 
redistribution. Economía, 19(1), 1–31. www.jstor.org/stable/90025861 
Antelo, E. (2000). Políticas de estabilización y de reformas estructurales en Bolivia a partir 
de 1985. In L. C. Jemio & E. Antelo (Eds.), Quince años de reformas estructurales en Bolivia: 
Sus impactos sobre inversión, crecimiento y equidad (pp. 15–98). Universidad Católica Boliviana 
San Pablo, IISEC. 
Arezki, R., Dupuy, A., & Gelb, A. (2012). Spend or send. Finance and Development, 49(4), 
28–31. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781475576122.022.A011 
Banco Central de Bolivia. (2019). Boletín del sector externo (No. 85). BCB. 
Cechinni, S. (2019). Protección social universal en América Latina y el Caribe: Textos seleccionados 






68 Pablo Evia Salas 
Devereux, S. (2002). Social protection for the poor: Lessons learnt from recent international 
experience. IDS Working Paper No. 142. Sussex: Institute of Development Studies. http:// 
opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/3907/Wp142.pdf 
Ferreira, F. H. G., & Robalino, D. (2010). Social protection in Latin America: Achievements 
and limitations. Policy Research Working Papers 5305. World Bank. 
Gamboa, R. (2006). Evaluación de la sostenibilidad del pago del Bonosol. Revista de Análi-
sis Económico, 21, 62–82. www.udape.gob.bo/portales_html/analisisEconomico/analisis/ 
vol21/Gamboa21.pdf 
Grilli, V., Masciandaro, D., Tabellini, G., Malinvaud, E., & Pagano, M. (1991). Political and 
monetary institutions and public fnancial policies in the industrial countries. Economic 
Policy, 6(13), 341–392. 
Harris, E. (2013). Financing social protection foors: Considerations of fscal space. Interna-
tional Social Security Review, 66(3–4), 111–143. https://doi.org/10.1111/issr.12021 
Hujo, K., Gaia, E., & McClanahan, S. (2010). Chapter 8: Financing social policy. In
Combating poverty and inequality: Structural change, social policy and politics (pp. 207–228).
UNRISD. 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística—INE. (2020).Boletín sectorial de hidrocarburos N° 1. INE.www. 
ine.gob.bo/index.php/publicaciones/boletin-sectorial-hidrocarburos-no1-2020/ 
International Labour Organization—ILO. (2011). Social protection foor for a fair and inclu-
sive globalization: Report of the Advisory Group chaired by Michelle Bachelet. ILO. www. 
ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-dgreports/-dcomm/-publ/documents/publication/ 
wcms_165750.pdf 
Lin, J. Y., Cai, F., & Li, Z. (1998). Competition, policy burdens, and state-owned enterprise 
reform. The American Economic Review, 88(2), 422–427. www.jstor.org/stable/116960 
Loza, G. (2007). Diseño de la red integral de protección social en Bolivia. Revista de Análisis 
Económico, 22, 164–196. www.udape.gob.bo/portales_html/analisisEconomico/analisis/ 
vol22/7DRIPS.pdf 
Medinaceli, M., & Mokrani, L. (2010). Impacto de los bonos fnanciados con la renta petrol-
era. Umbrales. Revista del postgrado multidisciplinario en Ciencias del Desarrollo, 20, 223–263. 
Millán, T. M., Barham, T., Macours, K., Maluccio, J. A., & Stampini, M. (2019). Long-term 
impacts of conditional cash transfers: Review of the evidence. The World Bank Research 
Observer, 34(1), 119–159. https://doi.org/10.1093/wbro/lky005 
Monterrey, J. (2013). Sistemas de protección social en América Latina y el Caribe: Estado 
Plurinacional de Bolivia. Documentos de Proyectos No. 553. CEPAL. http://hdl.handle. 
net/11362/4103 
Morales, J. A. (2014). Los ingresos extraordinarios de Bolivia en el periodo 2006–2013: Una 
visión de conjunto. In J. A. Morales (Ed.), ¿Dónde está la plata? Los ingresos extraordinarios 
de la bonanza 2003–2013 (pp. 9–30). Fundación Milenio. 
Müller, K. (2009). Contested universalism: From Bonosol to Renta Dignidad in Bolivia. International
Journal of Social Welfare, 18(2), 163–172. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2397.2008.00579.x 
Robles, M., Rubio, M. G., & Stampini, M. (2019). Have cash transfers succeeded in reaching
the poor in Latin America and the Caribbean? Development Policy Review, 37(2), 85–139. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12365 
Rodríguez Cáceres, G. (2021). ¿Prohibido envejecer en Bolivia? Desafíos del sistema integral 
de pensiones. In L. M. Calvo, A. Baudoin, F. Wanderley, W. Gómez, & J. Badani (Eds.), 
Bolivia debate: Un futuro sustentable (pp. 18–24). UCB et al. www.ucb.edu.bo/wp-content/ 
uploads/2021/02/Separata_Bolivia_Debate_compressed_1.pdf#page=18 
Romero, F. (1988). Fondo social de emergencia, Bolivia. CEPAL. hdl.handle.net/11362/33246 
 
 
Cash transfers as citizens’ dividend 69 
Sánchez, S., & Velásquez, R. (2020). Situación de la renta petrolera en Bolivia. Serie 
de debate público, 82. Fundación Jubileo. https://jubileobolivia.org.bo/Publicaciones/ 
Revistas-Especializadas/Situacion-de-la-Renta-Petrolera-en-Bolivia 
Shirley, M. M., & Walsh, P. (2000). Public vs. private ownership: The current state of the debate.
Policy Research Working Papers. World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-2420 
Sojo, A. (2017). Protección social en América Latina: La desigualdad en el banquillo. Libros de la 
CEPAL, N° 143 CEPAL. 
 
 
4 Growing under the 
shadow of oil 
Institutionalizing the mining sector in 
Ecuador between 2002 and 2019 
Paúl Cisneros 
Introduction 
There is now considerable evidence that under certain conditions, petroleum 
tends to produce adverse efects on the economic, social, and political well-
being of a country (Ross, 2015). One particular area of concern for scholars 
and practitioners relates to how oil dependence infuences the capacity of a 
state to promote economic development through competitive diversifcation, 
that is, the creation of competitive advantages in other non-extractive sectors 
(Auty, 1993; Gylfason, 2006). Existing research overlooks how oil dependence 
afects the development of institutions in other extractive sectors such as metal 
mining (gold, copper, zinc, among others) or gas. This chapter studies how oil 
dependence afected the development of the metals mining sector in Ecua-
dor between 2002 and 2019. The interest in this issue arises from the cases 
of Colombia and Ecuador, where governments have unsuccessfully tried to 
develop the metal mining sector with the expectation of replacing oil as the 
primary source of state revenues, and of launching more extensive economic 
diversifcation plans (Ponce Muriel, 2012; Cisneros, 2017). 
Some scholars argue that high dependence on the extraction of natural 
resources creates conditions that allow for and encourage the continued expan-
sion of the extractive sector. They call this the extractive imperative (Arsel et al.,
2016a). Environment and development policies are thought to reinforce extrac-
tive activities deepening and speeding up the extraction of value from nature 
and natural resources (Arsel et al., 2016b). 
The extractive imperative thesis appears sound when extractive sectors, such 
as hydrocarbons, metals, or gas, are analyzed separately. The development of 
metal mining in Peru is a case that conforms with the extractive imperative 
thesis. The expansion of large-scale mining in the past two decades prompted 
the development of institutions that reinforce its importance for the economic 
development of the country (Orihuela & Paredes, 2017). However, the original 
formulation of the extractive imperative thesis fails to explain why, despite the 
important role of the oil sector in the economy and the support given to metals 
mining in their development plans, Colombia and Ecuador have dramatically 
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The argument put forward in this chapter is that economic dependence on 
the oil sector undermines some conditions necessary for the development of the
metal mining sector. Specifcally, the selection of appropriate policy instruments
to deal with the specifc needs mining. While the extractive imperative thesis 
only considers positive or reinforcing feedbacks between extractive sectors, this 
chapter studies negative feedbacks to ofer a more nuanced understanding of the 
processes of institutional development in the extractive sector. 
The main questions in this chapter are: Why did plans to develop the mining 
sector fail in the past decade and a half? What role does oil dependence play in 
the production of this outcome? The study focuses on the process of developing 
the capacity to promote, establish, and develop large-scale metal mining opera-
tions according to long-term plans, and with support from key actors. 
The next two sections, present the background information on the case 
and develop the theoretical approach that underpins the empirical study. The 
following two sections present the methods and the results of the study. The 
concluding remarks brings the chapter to a close. 
The case 
In 2006, Rafael Correa was elected president of Ecuador with a political agenda 
that proposed to bring the state back to the center of public action. This plan 
included the direct participation of public sector organizations in oil and metal 
mining. During his campaign, Correa announced the use of the endowment 
of nonfuel mineral resources—mostly gold and copper—to close the expand-
ing wealth gap, especially in the regions where extractive activities were taking 
place. The main objective of the proposed policy change was to take advantage 
of the unusually high commodity prices that started in 2003 by increasing state 
revenues received from this sector. Developing a strong metal mining sector 
became one of the government’s top priorities. According to the government’s 
plans, the metal mining sector had to grow quickly, and the most advanced 
large-scale mining projects (Mirador and Fruta del Norte) were to yield royal-
ties as soon as 2012 and become the primary source of state revenue by 2020. 
However, by late 2018, investments in the metal mining sector only con-
tributed to 1.61% of the GDP. It had indeed surpassed the 0.05% threshold of 
the 2001 and 2007 period (Ministerio de Energía y Minas, 2007, p. 11), but its 
contribution to the economy is still small. Authorities now expect that metal 
mining will amount to 4% of GDP by 2021. Important challenges remain to 
achieve this goal as critical components of the sector are still largely underdevel-
oped. The government has kept the mining cadastre closed to new concessions 
and suppressed the sectoral ministry in 2018, and several strategic projects are 
facing local consultations seeking to ban mining in their jurisdictions. In short, 
the development of the metal mining sector has fallen short of the expectations 
set by the reformist agenda launched in 2006. 
The Ecuadorean experience under the government of Rafael Correa fts 
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2016b). The government of Rafael Correa was elected with the support of a 
large majority that increased as the government expanded social programs and 
other forms of public investments. The state recovered a central position in the 
extractive industries and pushed for their expansion despite opposition from 
former allies such as the indigenous movement and other progressive actors. 
Despite these characteristics, the extractive imperative in Ecuador did accelerate 
the expansion of the mining sector. 
Theoretical background 
States are organized into policy sectors to manage a wide array of public 
problems at the same time (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991). In the realm of the 
extractive industries, it is quite common to fnd separate ministries to deal with 
nonfuel minerals and hydrocarbons. This division of labor across the public sec-
tor produces the development of specialized means to deal with the particular 
challenges of each sector. However, during their interventions across policy 
sectors, actors carry ideas about how sectoral development should take place. 
Ideas operate as institutions because they constrain and shape the agency of 
policy actors (Lascoumes & Le Gales, 2007) by defning what is appropriate to 
tackle problems in specifc contexts. 
There are two general types of policy ideas. First, ideas may refer to prin-
ciples that defne how the world ought to be. Some of these ideas function as 
paradigms; therefore, they are hard to change via policy-oriented learning and 
usually require a shock to be overturned (Nohrstedt, 2005). An example of this 
type of idea is the role attributed to the state in the development of the extrac-
tive sectors. Two rival paradigms persist in this regard. The market-oriented 
paradigm limits the role of the state to set the conditions for private companies 
to operate. The statist paradigm promotes active and direct involvement of 
public sector organizations in the extractive activities. 
The second type of policy ideas is more instrumental and defnes how actors 
should translate principles into action. They also function as institutions because
they incorporate notions of what is appropriate to address the problems faced 
by target populations, such as the use of direct coercion versus the use of infor-
mative instruments to change an actor’s behavior (Howlett & Cashore, 2009; 
Schneider & Ingram, 1990; Weible & Sabatier, 2009). 
While policy instruments may be part of a developed belief system (Radae-
lli, 1995), they may also be discrete ideational elements that work as cognitive 
shortcuts adopted from other contexts (Weyland, 2006). Often, policy actors 
import designs from other contexts for reasons alien to the outcomes produced 
by such policies. Additionally, they often fail to adapt these designs to the spe-
cifc characteristics of the problem at hand (Mukhtarov & Daniell, 2016). 
Given that the oil sector has dominated the Ecuadorian economy since the
1970s, it is expected that some policy ideas will constrain the selection of instru-
ments in other sectors. Specifcally, it is expected that some policy goals and
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mining sector, reducing the capacity to achieve the objectives set for the latter.
The chapter assesses how objectives and tools from the oil sector infuenced the
political, economic, and administrative dimensions of the metal mining sector. 
Working towards alignment of the political, economic, and administrative
dimensions is crucial during cycles of economic expansion caused by high com-
modity prices in the international markets (Auty, 1993). In the political dimen-
sion, governments need to mobilize support from political and economic elites to
expand and consolidate the extractive sectors. Recent studies on national political
settlements highlight the importance of elite cohesion to pursue institutional
development in the extractive sectors or manage the political spaces where orga-
nized civil society challenges their development (Bebbington et al., 2018, 2019). 
Developing a metal mining sector requires setting economic conditions through
the use of policy instruments both at the sectoral level and at the local level where
companies operate. The sectoral level demands designing a fow of resources that
allows companies to recover their investments and make a proft. Additionally, it
requires the development of competitive advantages that help mining investments
increase the production of public value (Mayorga Alba, 2009; Arzeki et al., 2011).
Cheap electricity and reliable infrastructure are some elements that ofer competi-
tive advantages. Setting economic conditions at the local level means developing
mechanisms to allocate benefts from mining operations to local communities to
reduce the likelihood of confict (Haslam & Tanimoune, 2016). 
Finally, developing an efective administrative system allows for better policy 
implementation and increases the efcacy of revenue collection and redistribu-
tion. For decision-makers, the administrative system becomes one of the most 
important mechanisms for materializing the benefts of extractive activities. 
In the mining sector, a competent administrative system requires clarity con-
cerning who makes the rules, who administers them, and who enforces them 
(Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2014). 
Method 
The analysis presented in this chapter relies on the systematic review of policy 
and technical documents, and local newspaper articles published between 
2002 and 2018. An original database of newspaper articles was built using two 
sources with national coverage: El Comercio and El Universo. These sources 
were reviewed to identify major policy discussions and references to the policy 
instruments used to develop the mining sector in the period of interest. In-
depth interviews with six policy elites (including ministers, vice-ministers, and 
presidential or ministerial advisors) were used to expand and validate the data 
obtained in the document review. 
Results 
This section presents the interdependent development of the oil and mining 
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the latter. The presentation of the data is chronological, and it is organized into 
two subsections. The frst one presents the general development of the two sec-
tors until 2006. The second subsection identifes the main policy instruments 
adopted to develop the metal mining sector across the political, economic, and 
administrative dimensions. 
Two interdependent policy sectors: oil and mining 
Since the 1980s, Ecuador has experienced a regressive pattern of specialization 
driven by the increase in oil extraction. Between 2000 and 2012, the weight 
of oil extraction in GDP and the percentage of the total income of the non-
fnancial sector that originated from oil earnings increased (Mateo & García, 
2014; Caria & Domínguez Martín, 2015). The economic crisis of 2008 and 
the consequent decrease of commodity prices reduced dependence in the 
2008–2009 period, but there are indications that dependence grew after 2009. 
During the 2002 and 2012 period, the percentage of state revenue generated 
from oil exports increased from 22% to 40% (Mateo & García, 2014). 
The mining sector has trailed behind the oil sector in terms of its contribu-
tion to GDP, with less than 1% in the average during the same period. How-
ever, the development of these sectors has been deeply intertwined since 1999 
because they were regarded as the main sources of revenue to maintain and 
expand social programs amid a major economic crisis. They were also seen as 
the main sources to serve the debt assumed through the bailout received from 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 2000 (Ruiz Acosta 
& Cisneros, 2014). 
The expansion of the oil frontier in the Amazon and the attraction of invest-
ments for exploration in the mining sector were two top priorities for the gov-
ernment of Gustavo Noboa (2000–2003). In this line, the government passed 
a package of open-market reforms for both sectors in the early 2000s. These 
reforms allowed the construction of a second oil pipeline by a consortium of 
private companies, which started in 2002 (the OCP or oleoducto de crudos pesados; 
see Figure 4.1). 
In addition, the government passed an almost entirely new set of mining regu-
lations in early 2001, creating “the most favorable conditions for the industry in
Latin America.”1 Despite the legal overhaul and the positive efect on the business
climate, low mineral prices in the international markets, mergers, acquisitions,
and changes of global corporate strategies delayed the advancement of the most
important prospects (Velasco, 2002, 2003). Therefore, the bulk of gold produc-
tion in Ecuador was carried out by small mining cooperatives (Velasco, 2002). In
2003, the World Bank reported that the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM)2 
had abandoned overseeing and control in the mining sector because its limited
administrative capacity was devoted to processing requests for new concessions
and the development of the oil sector (Cisneros & Christel, 2014).3 
By 2004, dependency on oil had deepened due to rising prices in the 
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Figure 4.1 Location of oil extraction and metal mining projects in Ecuador 
Source: Own elaboration 
in 2004, the political landscape was deteriorating quickly. President Lucio 
Gutierrez (2003–2005) was ousted during social mobilizations after illegally 
replacing judges in the Supreme Court. Alfredo Palacio, who succeeded Guti-
errez, announced a nationalistic turn in economic and oil policies to reverse 
the control that foreign private companies gained in the past half-decade in 
the production of oil and the capture of the extractive rent (Ruiz Acosta & 
Iturralde, 2013). To this end, his government pushed for an amendment to the 
hydrocarbons law which mandated that the state should receive at least 50% of 
the benefts generated in the oil sector. The reform also raised the royalties paid 
by foreign oil companies on windfall profts (Anderson, 2009). 
Palacio’s plan to reform the oil sector that included a renegotiation of exist-
ing contracts with private foreign companies stalled growth of investments 
in the mining sector. One informant argues that “legal cases brought by the 
government against foreign oil companies and by foreign companies against 
Ecuador deterred foreign frms from investing in new exploration and devel-
opment of mineral and fuel properties or from acquiring existing operations.”4 
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Public protests against the exploration and development of large-scale projects 
increased during Palacio’s government, further deterring investments (Ander-
son, 2007). 
In 2005, numerous confrontations between activists and the military near 
mining sites led to the suspension of mining activities in Mirador and other 
large-scale projects. The government declared a halt to all mining operations for 
the sectoral authority to implement free, prior, and informed consultations with
local communities and launched an initiative to reform the Mining Law (Ley 
de Minería). Palacio was unable to secure support from the National Congress 
to pass this reform before the end of his government. 
Policy goals and instruments 
With the election of Rafael Correa in 2006, the nationalistic policy agenda for 
the mining sector was revived. Correa was elected with support from Alianza 
País, a coalition of left-leaning groups and political fgures who supported anti-
establishment rhetoric. Correa forged alliances with former president Lucio 
Gutierrez’s party to call for a referendum to install a Constituent Assembly. 
Alianza País and its allies won the elections for Assembly representatives, obtain-
ing 70% of the seats. This result gave Correa and his political movement the 
power to shape the structure of the new constitution and the new regulations 
for oil and mining. The remainder of this subsection identifes some policy 
instruments used in the oil sector that were adopted in the mining sector to 
achieve political, economic, and administrative objectives and the outcomes of 
this adoption. 
The political dimension 
One of the main challenges for Correa’s frst government (2007–2011) was 
setting the conditions for developing a mining sector despite opposition from 
local communities and private companies (SENPLADES, 2007). Private com-
panies, represented by the Mining Chamber of Ecuador (Cámara de Minería de 
Ecuador, CME), feared the consequences of the imminent increase of the tax 
burden, as occurred in the oil sector, where the state collected 99% of windfall 
profts. The CME warned that reintroducing royalty payments and taxes on 
windfall profts through a new sectoral law would discourage investments in 
mining (Cisneros, 2011). 
On the other hand, civil society organizations demanded adequate controls 
over corporate behavior and open debate about the potential benefts and 
costs of advancing large-scale projects in certain areas. To reduce opposition 
from local communities, the MEM organized the so-called Mining Dialogue 
(Diálogo minero) in 2007. In the dialogue, companies and local communities 
were to defne a strategy to advance several projects that had been stalled since 
2005 (Ministerio de Energía y Minas, 2007). During the dialogue, civil soci-
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strategic projects. Under pressure from the national anti-mining network or 
Coordinadora Nacional para la Defensa de la Vida y la Soberanía (National 
Coordinator for the Defense of Life and Sovereignty, CNDVS), the MEM 
formed tripartite technical commissions with representatives from the commu-
nities to investigate these allegations. The reports produced by the commissions
documented systematic violations of administrative procedures in three projects 
(Mirador, Llurimagua, and Quimsacocha). Still, the government refrained from 
taking legal actions to avoid retaliation in international tribunals (Cisneros, 
2011). 
Civil society organizations decided to end their participation in the dialogue 
and turned to the Constituent Assembly to achieve bans on existing and new 
large-scale projects. Responding to this pressure, the Constituent Assembly 
passed the so-called Mining Mandate (Mandato Minero) or Mandate 4 in April 
2008. With this decision, the Assembly ordered the government to implement 
a temporary moratorium on mining activities. It also ordered the suspension 
of exploration activities for six months or until a new Mining Law could be 
approved. Additionally, it mandated the government to revoke 80% of the 
country’s mineral concessions and suspended the other 20%. Mandate 4 extin-
guished 3,000 concessions where administrative requirements have not been 
met. Finally, the Mining Mandate halted approximately 1,200 pending requests 
for new concessions (Wacaster, 2010). 
Correa’s government used the implementation of the Mandate to gener-
ate consensus among the economic elites—the mining companies and the 
CME—regarding conditions for the development of the mining sector (Cis-
neros, 2011). To gain support for a new Mining Law, Correa eased regulations 
on social and environmental consultations, which legalized the continuation of 
the most advanced projects (Mirador, Fruta del Norte, and Quimsacocha; see 
Figure 4.1), even if they did not comply with Mandate 4 (see Murillo Martín 
& Hurtado Caicedo, 2016). 
Conficts between mining companies and local communities increased with a
partial implementation of Mandate 4. To manage these conficts, the government
adopted policy instruments used for decades in the oil industry. The govern-
ment’s approach relied on so-called community-relations teams, who paid com-
munity representatives to grant social licenses for companies (Narváez, 2004).
An informant commented on how this approach afected the mining sector: 
Despite the ofcial announcement of a new approach to managing social 
conficts, it [corporate-community relations] was seen as something that 
could be managed based on the experience developed in the oil sector. 
The government thought they could assemble a team to negotiate minor 
investments in the communities, somehow paid for by companies that were 
not yet making any money. Such community-relations teams managed 
intense conficts in the oil sector, which drew permanent political attention 
from national authorities, and had money. However, these teams were not 
prepared to build long-term relationships that could last during 30 to 40 
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years of mineral extraction. . . . [T]hey had no resources to ofer. Now we 
see the efects of that lack of true consensus-building, not only in projects 
but for the development of the industry itself.5 
The legacy of the policy instruments imported from the oil sector to deal with 
socio-environmental conficts constrained the chances of Correa’s successor, 
Lenin Moreno (2017–2021), to push the development of the mining sector 
forwards. By mid-2019, several strategic projects (Río Blanco, Loma Larga, 
and Llurimagua) were under heavy pressure by local communities and anti-
mining organizations that demanded consultations in their jurisdictions. These 
demands were voiced in parallel to legal processes to stop mining projects due 
to a lack of compliance with social and environmental regulations. The town of 
Pacto near the capital city of Quito organized the frst consultation in 2015, in 
reaction to the presence of a project owned by the National Mining Company 
(Empresa Nacional Minera, ENAMI-EP) (Ávila, 2015). Nearly 67% of the 
population participated, and 97% rejected ENAMI’s project. In August 2018, 
the provincial court of Azuay ratifed the suspension of the Río Blanco project 
in Azuay after determining the company had not carried out a process of free, 
prior, and informed consultation. 
The economic dimension 
In 2007, Correa’s government introduced reforms that allocated 99% of wind-
fall profts from the oil sector to the government. Additionally, the government 
introduced a new contractual form by which the state pays private companies 
for specifc services (exploration, extraction, and commercialization). The 
refusal of private companies to accept the terms laid out by the government 
prompted a reduction of the tax on windfall profts to 70% through the Law for 
Tax Equity (Ley de Equidad Tributaria) in mid-2008 (Mateo & García, 2014). 
The legal actions launched by private companies dragged the country through 
a lengthy fve-year process to renegotiate existing contracts (Wacaster, 2011). 
Despite this setback to the implementation of the nationalistic approach to 
natural resource governance, the same policy instruments were adopted for the 
metal mining sector a year later. In a context of increasing social spending and 
high metal prices, the government announced the reintroduction of royalties 
for mining operations, and the adoption of windfall taxes despite opposition by 
the mining guild. As one informant commented: 
At the time, the government did not understand the nature and the mag-
nitude of investments required in the mining sector before sales produce 
profts. The idea they had that granting a mining concession means that 
mineral production starts soon after, as it more or less happens with oil, had 
people believing that the most advanced projects (Mirador and Fruta del 
Norte) would start paying royalties in a couple of years. That is not how the 
mining industry works. Companies have to invest large amounts of money, 
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which has to be recovered within the frst years of production, and only 
from then on is there a proft that could be taxed by the state.6 
This decision stalled the fow of new investments to the metal mining sector 
between 2008 and 2010. Moreover, the owners of the most advanced proj-
ects sold part or the entirety of their assets in the country. In 2008, Aurelian 
Resources sold Fruta del Norte to Kinross Gold, and Corriente Resources sold 
Mirador to a conglomerate of Chinese mining companies. Policy actors fully 
grasped the consequences of the decisions made regarding the tax regime when 
Kinross Gold, owner of the Fruta del Norte project, announced it would sell 
the majority of its interests in mid-2013. At the time, Kinross Gold CEO said, 
“we have been at the negotiating table for two years . . . and sometimes the best 
deal is the one you don’t sign, and we believe that’s the case here” (El Telégrafo, 
2013). The exit of Kinross from one of the most signifcant gold discoveries of 
the decade marked 
the moment when government authorities perceived mining as funda-
mentally diferent from oil. It also made it clear that other countries in the 
region were still operating in a completely diferent scenario, one similar 
to the regulations dismantled in 2008 by the new constitution. Moreover, 
for some people in the government, the limits of the nationalistic project 
became apparent, and more so considering the recent exponential growth 
of mining in Peru and Chile.7 
Between 2007 and 2012, the government allocated a budget to develop com-
petitive advantages that would serve to attract investments to the mining sector. 
It invested nearly US$16 billion or 4% of the annual GDP on infrastructure for 
the strategic sectors.8 Among these, investments in renewable energy (hydro-
power) and roads were the most considerable, receiving US$4.5 billion and 
US$6 billion, respectively (Caria & Domínguez Martín, 2015). According to 
the objectives laid out in the 2009–2013 National Development Plan (Plan 
Nacional para el Buen Vivir), the remainder would provide cheap energy to 
reduce the reliance of the economy on the primary sector. Caria and Domín-
guez Martín show that between 2009 and 2014, the Ecuadorian economy did 
not show signs of diversifcation or improved systemic productivity (Caria & 
Domínguez Martín, 2015, pp. 53–54). 
On the other hand, when the government refrained from adopting instru-
ments from the oil sector, it produced some positive outcomes for the devel-
opment of the mining sector. This is apparent in the case of redistributing 
revenue to local communities. Whereas in the oil sector this redistribution 
was largely in the hands of oil companies, Correa’s government made use of 
various mechanisms to boost public investment in mining regions. In 2010, it 
reformed the General Regulations of the Mining Law (Reglamento General 
de la Ley de Minería) to defne the percentage of the royalties to be paid by 
mining companies and the criteria for their allocation to the local governments 
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(municipalities and parishes) where extraction takes place. The government 
also created the public company Strategic Ecuador (Ecuador Estratégico, EE) 
in 2011, under the Coordinating Ministry for Strategic Sectors (Ministerio 
Coordinador de los Sectores Estratégicos, MICSE).9 EE’s mission was to invest 
resources from royalty payments as part of local development plans or through 
programs and projects defned at the national level. These decisions reduced 
opposition to mining in certain areas, in particular near the Fruta del Norte 
and Mirador projects.10 
Regarding the taxation of private mining companies, the policies adopted 
by the government diverged from those in use in the oil sector. Not all mining 
companies had made signifcant discoveries that allowed them the cash fow to 
commit to paying anticipated royalties to the government. Therefore, the min-
ing guild continued lobbying to reform the tax regime. By the government’s 
initiative, in late 2016, the National Assembly approved the Ley de Plusvalía 
(Law on Capital Gains) that contained a mechanism to defer tax payments for 
four years after mining companies recovered their capital investments. The min-
ing minister expected these reforms to bring nearly US$4.6 billion until 2021 
to help the Río Blanco, Mirador, and Fruta del Norte begin with production.11 
Aided by the infux of new investments, the latter two projects started produc-
tion in 2019. 
The administrative dimension 
Despite the clear policy objective of extracting metals to increase state revenue 
and social spending, the required changes in administration came slowly. To 
begin with the development of a new institutional architecture for the strategic 
sectors, Correa’s government split the MEM into two agencies in 2007. One 
agency received the competencies on electricity and renewable energy (the 
Ministerio de Electricidad y Energías Renovables, Ministry for Electricity and 
Renewable Energies), while the other became the Ministry of Mines and Petro-
leum (Ministerio de Minas y Petróleos, MMP). Within the latter, the mining 
sector was headed by the Vice Ministry of Mines (Viceministerio de Minas). 
Still, the administrative reform of the mining sector faced the challenge of struc-
turing a competent administrative system. At the time, “the mining cadastre, 
which is arguably the administrative heart of the mining industry, existed in an 
Excel spreadsheet without any proper securities or control”.12 To make matters 
worse, the intervention of the Constituent Assembly over existing concessions 
delayed initiatives to improve the administrative capacity until 2009. 
The process of institutional development resumed when the Legislative 
Commission,13 where Alianza País still held the majority, approved the Mining 
Law in early 2009. The Law defnes the structure of the mining sector with 
the MMP as a sectoral authority, and two ascribed agencies, one for regula-
tion (ARCOM), and one for geological research (INIGEMM), and a depen-
dent national mining company, ENAMI-EP. In this context, the government 
changed the name of the MMP to the Ministry of Nonrenewable Natural 
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Resources (Ministerio de Recursos Naturales no Renovables, MRNNR). 
This organization maintained the responsibility for the exploitation of nonre-
newable natural resources, policy management, and research and development. 
ARCOM received the task of updating and managing the mining cadastre, 
while the Vice Ministry of Mines held the responsibility of designing sectoral 
policy. 
Before the end of the year, the Vice Ministry of Mines issued new environ-
mental regulations, as well as rules for small and artisanal mining, and the Gen-
eral Regulations of the Mining Law. However, by the end of the year, there was 
still uncertainty among private companies regarding the general conditions for 
the administrative management of mining in Ecuador. Concerns were related 
to how strictly the new legislation would be applied, and the extent to which 
foreign investment would be afected by the new rules (Wacaster, 2011, p. 1). 
One of the critical amendments related to demands made by private compa-
nies and the CME was the creation of a specialized and competent authority, 
a proper ministry of mines. Some key actors from within the government also 
supported this idea: 
We at the Coordinating Ministry of Strategic Sectors (MICSE) were con-
vinced that it was necessary to separate mining and oil. Due to the nature of 
the oil sector, you cannot divide your attention between the two. . . . One 
of the main reasons to demand a diferent institution is that in practice, the 
minister will always prioritize oil due to its current economic importance. 
. . . Even within the MRNNR, there was support for the break-up.14 
In 2015, Correa admitted that developing the mining sector required a special-
ized ministry. He stated that “currently, as a Vice Ministry within the Ministry 
of Nonrenewable Resources, mining has been absorbed by oil. . . . There has 
not been enough support or resources for the mining sector” (El Telégrafo, 
2015). Therefore, he created the Ministry of Mines in 2015. Now that mobi-
lizing authority resources had pushed the mining sector to the forefront, the 
challenge was to ensure that treasury resources followed. However, due to the 
economic crisis caused by the reduction in oil prices since 2014, 
the Ministry of Finance assigned only half the money and resources 
required for the new Ministry of Mines, and ARCOM, which is a regu-
latory agency, retained the most important piece of mining policy: the 
management of the mining cadastre. This decision split policy authority 
in two.15 
Another critical piece of the institutional architecture for the mining sec-
tor mandated by the 2009 law was the creation of a state-owned company. 
This organizational model was adopted from the oil sector even though the 
two state-owned oil companies had performed poorly in previous years. On 
December 31, 2009, the government created ENAMI-EP with preferential 
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access to mineral resources to be developed in association with other public 
companies, and only as an exception with private partners (Wacaster, 2011, 
p. 1). Therefore, the efect of the creation of ENAMI-EP over the operations 
of private mining companies was unclear. Several informants acknowledge that 
ENAMI-EP emerged mostly from the dominant ideas in the oil sector: 
ENAMI-EP .  .  . is Correa’s pipedream. His nationalist ideology made 
him emulate the system we had in place for hydrocarbons. In principle, 
it makes sense that operating directly through a public company, the state 
could make more money, as CODELCO in Chile does. However, in the 
mining world, proftable public companies are rare. The private sector 
drives the mining industry because the risk of investing and not fnding 
anything is high, and because of the long-term horizons of extraction that 
are incompatible with most political horizons. Moreover, having a public 
company that assumes risks in exploration is incompatible with our system 
of control of public resources, because not generating revenue is punished 
by the Comptroller General’s Ofce, it is just not a viable option.16 
Between 2010 and 2019, ENAMI-EP did not produce a single project or part-
nership with a clear outcome for large-scale projects. 
The process of granting new concessions had also been infuenced by policy 
ideas and instruments used in the oil sector: 
Both the state and society were used to the so-called oil rounds. It was what 
we knew how to do. Therefore, the local professionals who are just learning
about mining steered us (the MEM) towards the mechanisms used in the 
oil sector. We decided to hire a company with global experience to look 
at the factors promoting competitiveness in the region. They suggested we 
adopt a Swiss challenge to grant concessions. Help from outside actors was 
key to create something viable.17 
The adoption of this mechanism produced some positive outcomes for the 
mining sector. With this novel instrument, the government granted a total of 
235 new concessions, and between 2016 and 2017, Ecuador received roughly 
US$1.153 billion in investment. 
The economic crisis of late 2015 and early 2016, and the austerity measures 
deployed by President Moreno between 2017 and 2019, slowed down the 
consolidation of the institutional architecture described previously. ENAMI-
EP’s budget was slashed. As one informant notices: “It was hard to justify the 
existence of a national company that at some point had made some progress 
towards working with small mining cooperatives but had not developed major 
projects yet.”18 
Additionally, ENAMI was not able to manage the social conficts created by 
private companies in previous years (Avci, 2015). The conficts in the region 
of Intag dragged on and afected a copper-molybdenum project known as 
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Llurimagua, where ENAMI-EP partnered with CODELCO in 2011. The 
confict escalated in September 2014 when the government released a hast-
ily completed 1,000-page environmental impact assessment for public review 
(Wacaster, 2017, p. 2), which, according to local organizations, did not comply 
with existing regulations for environmental assessments. The Ofce of the 
Comptroller General (Contraloría General del Estado) verifed these failures 
in a report released in 2019 (Redacción La Hora.EC, 2019), and the project 
came to a halt. 
As part of the austerity measures launched in 2017, President Moreno 
announced a merger between the ministries of Electricity, Mines, and Hydro-
carbons. The argument presented by the government for this decision was that 
creating a strong super-ministry (the Ministry of Nonrenewable Resources) 
would increase the government’s capability for pushing the new long-term poli-
cies designed for the energy, mining, and oil sectors. With this new architecture 
in place by early 2018, the sectoral authority of the mining sector was again 
the Vice Ministry of Mines, under the Ministry of Energy and Nonrenewable 
Resources. The president appointed an expert in hydrocarbons as head of this 
new Vice Ministry. Although this re-organization went against the process of 
learning experienced between 2008 and 2015 and historical demand of the 
mining guild for having the support of a specialized authority, the biggest 
concern for mining companies at the time related to the proliferation of local 
consultations to stop large-scale projects as discussed earlier. 
Concluding remarks 
The literature on the resource curse shows several adverse efects or negative 
feedbacks that occur with the development of the extractive sectors over the rest
of the economy. The Dutch disease and middle-income traps are some of these 
adverse efects. More recent discussions on the extractive imperative propose 
that the growth of extractive activities generate conditions for their continuous 
expansion. However, scholars have said less about the negative feedbacks caused 
by one extractive sector on the development of another. The aim of this chapter 
was to expand the current discussion of the potential negative efects of resource 
dependence on institutional development. 
To this end, this chapter studied some negative feedbacks created by the 
dynamics of the oil sector on the development of the mining sector in Ecuador 
along political, economic, and administrative dimensions. The empirical fnd-
ings show that, between 2006 and 2019, the adoption of policy instruments 
used in the oil sector constrained the development of the mining sector because 
they were inconsistent with the objective conditions existing in the latter. 
Fighting this form of cross-contamination between policy sectors is a chal-
lenging task. Policy-makers, as well as other actors, make sense of the world 
through existing policy ideas and the instruments they know best. Often, as 
shown in this chapter, changing existing ideas on how the mining sector should 
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desired goals. However, this problem may be harder to tackle in countries 
like Ecuador, where decision-making is so concentrated in the fgure of the 
president, and a pluralistic selection of policy instruments is difcult to achieve. 
Countries where industry actors and civil society organizations have greater 
legitimacy in the policymaking process may see reduced negative efects of oil 
dependence on the development mining sector. 
Findings also show that learning is still possible under the extractive impera-
tive. Several policy instruments were chosen that departed from what had been 
previously used in the oil sector and helped the government achieve some 
policy goals. Future research should look comparatively at the performance of 
policy designs employed to develop the mining sector in countries with greater 
and milder economic dependence on natural resources. Pursuing this line of 
inquiry will help scholars gain a better understanding of the political, economic,
and administrative conditions that infuence the adoption of policy ideas and 
instruments. This would add another layer of complexity to the phenomenon 
of the resource curse, one that uncovers important institutional implications. 
Notes 
1 Interview with former president of the Mining Chamber of Ecuador, Quito, August 20, 
2020. 
2 At the time, the Ministry of Energy and Mines (Ministerio de Energía y Minas, MEM) 
was the national authority for oil and mining sectors. The Undersecretary of Mines 
(Subsecretaría de Minas) was the national authority for the mining sector. 
3 Since 1997, when environmental decentralization was adopted, the MEM was also in 
charge of approving environmental impact assessments, coordinating with the Ministry 
of the Environment, processing annual follow-up environmental reports, enforcing 
environmental regulations, and overseeing negotiations between mining companies and 
local communities. 
4 Interview with former president of the Mining Chamber of Ecuador, Quito, August 20, 
2020. 
5 Interview with former Undersecretary of Mines, Quito, February 7, 2019. 
6 Interview with former Vice Minister of Mines, February 15, Quito, 2019. 
7 Interview with former Undersecretary of Mines, Quito, February 7, 2019. 
8 The 2008 constitution defnes the strategic sectors as those that decisively infuence the 
economic, social, political, and environmental life of the country. Among others, the list 
of strategic sectors includes energy and nonrenewable natural resources. 
9 The democratic reform of the state launched by Correa’s government in 2007 defned 
a level of intersectoral coordination headed by Coordinating Ministries, of which seven 
were created. These ministries presided over the so-called sectoral councils. The Coor-
dinating Ministry for Strategic Sectors (Ministerio Coordinador de los Sectores Estraté-
gicos, MICSE) presided the sectoral council for strategic sectors that by 2017 included 
the Ministry of Hydrocarbons (Ministerio de Hidrocarburos), the Ministry of Mines 
(Ministerio de Minas), the Ministry of the Environment (Ministerio del Ambiente), 
and the Secretariat for Water (Secretaría del Agua). MICSE was suppressed in 2017 by 
president Moreno within the implementation of austerity measures needed to access 
loans from the World Bank and other international lenders. 
10 It is worth noting that the government also increased the criminalization of protest as a 
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11 See Redaccción Plan V (2017). In February 2018 the Law of Capital Gains was repealed 
in a national referendum. 
12 Interview with former Undersecretary of Mines, Quito, February 7, 2019. 
13 When the period of the Constituent Assembly ended in July 2008, representatives were 
appointed to the Legislative Commission, which was later replaced by the National 
Assembly in 2009. 
14 Interview with former Vice Minister of Mines, Quito, February 15, 2019. 
15 Interview with former Vice Minister of Mines, Quito, February 15, 2019. 
16 Interview with former Vice Minister of Mines, Quito, February 15, 2019. 
17 Interview with former Undersecretary of Mines, Quito, February 2019. 
18 Interview with former president of the Mining Chamber of Ecuador, Quito, August 20, 2020. 
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5 Hybrid institutions 
Institutionalizing practices in the 
context of extractive expansion 
Gerardo Damonte 
Introduction 
Since the 1990s, for more than two decades, extractive activities such as small-
scale mining and agribusinesses have fourished in Peru under governments that 
were anxiously looking for the unexpected benefts ofered by the prosperous 
commodity world market. During this cycle, extractive companies, such as 
mining and agro-export companies as well as small-scale miners, increased their 
number, territorial presence, and political importance. The extractive boom 
intensifed extractive activities and pushed forward the extractive frontiers, 
generating the need for rules and procedures to facilitate, organize, and contest 
extractive activities. Since the state was not able to regulate such activities, old 
and new extractive practices fourished following state, corporate, and/or cul-
turally embedded institutional frameworks. 
Some of these practices were gradually institutionalized in interplay with new
state norms, corporate practices, and/or culturally legitimated local conven-
tions. Other extractive rules and procedures emerged from formal or informal 
institutional arrangements between state, private, and local actors. In this con-
text, state laws, corporate norms, and local rules complemented, conficted, 
and intertwined, constituting in some cases hybrid institutional entanglements, 
that is, rules and procedures that partially respond to both formal and informal 
institutional frameworks. 
How do practices become institutionalized as hybrid entanglements in the 
context of extractive expansion? This article aims to respond to this question 
by presenting, defning, and analyzing specifc cases of institutionalization of 
local practices that have fourished in the context of extractive boom as hybrid 
institutional entanglements: agribusiness companies’ groundwater extraction in 
the Ica Valley and small-scale miners’ access to gold alluvial deposits in the Peru-
vian Amazonia. These institutionalized practices are good examples of how the 
processes of institutional hybridization unfold in places where state governance 
is seen as limited or became hybridized (Risse, 2011; Li, 2005), places that can 
be found in all regions in the world. 
The article argues that hybrid entanglements are produced when govern-
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formal and informal frameworks in processes of institutional hybridization 
when their practices became neither completely formal nor completely infor-
mal institutions. Moreover, it argues that the type of relationship established 
by specifc social groups with state authority, such as processes of state capture 
and resistance, adaptation, or subjection to the state, shapes the generation of 
diferent forms of institutional entanglements. 
This article draws on both primary and secondary data. Primary data has been
collected between 2013 and 2018 in two research projects conducted by the 
author: one on conficts in small-scale mining in the Amazon basin and another 
on the role of state policies in scenarios of water scarcity in Ica. In both projects, 
primary data has been collected through qualitative and ethnographic methods 
and instruments such as in-depth interviews and non-participatory observation. 
The systematization of secondary data is drawn from, among others, academic 
articles, state, and other public reports, maps, and datasets. 
The text is divided into three sections preceded by this introduction. The 
frst section presents the theoretical framework and key concepts used for the 
analysis. The second section analyzes the institutionalization of agribusiness’ 
groundwater extraction in Ica and small-scale miners’ access to alluvial gold 
deposits in the Amazonia as examples of hybrid institutional entanglements. 
Finally, the most important points of the argument presented as concluding 
remarks are highlighted. 
Conceptual framework 
Institutions are commonly defned as a set of persistent rules and procedures 
that structure, or shape, political and socioeconomic relationships, as well as 
the interactions between individuals and the social groups that make up society 
(Leftwich, 2006). Moreover, institutions are generally classifed into two groups:
formal and informal (North, 1990). Helmke and Levitsky (2004) assert that the 
former is understood in terms of rules that are arranged, transmitted, and repro-
duced through channels recognized as ofcial, while the latter originate and 
reproduce in unofcial domains. For the authors, an institution that is formal 
implies that the rules are formally established and that infraction of such rules 
has sanctions prescribed by an authority constituted in a code. Informal insti-
tutions also prescribe appropriate behavior and sanctions; however, these are 
generated in the non-formal areas of collective action and can be explicit or not. 
The literature on institutions follows a top-down approach when institutional
analyses are driven from a legalist or state view, and informal institutions are 
thereby mostly seen as marginal or complementary to formal forms of gov-
ernment. Thus, the persistence and reproduction of informal institutions are 
perceived as indication of limited governance (Risse, 2011; Helmke & Levitsky, 
2004). Another common view is to see informal institutions circumscribed to 
the realm of traditional cultures (North, 1990). However, the simple associa-
tion of informality with the realm of tradition runs the risk of taking informal 
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(Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 727). Several studies have shown that informal 
institutions are not marginal, but constitutive to governance schemes and even 
are inherent to efective forms of governance in many parts of the world (Boege,
2017; Sindzingre, 2006). 
Governance schemes are driven by social actors vis-à-vis changing formal 
and informal domains. Institutions are institutionalized practices performed and 
legitimated by social actors. Social actors’ institutionalizing practices may follow 
formal frameworks established by the state or corporate powers recognized by 
the state (Ferguson, 2005) or informal frameworks such as culturally founded 
rules that are not recognized or regulated by the state or corporate powers. In 
addition, the formal domains are dynamic; changes in formal frameworks can 
formalize or forbid long standing informal institutions, transforming them into 
formal institutions or making them illegal, respectively. Likewise, and against 
the erroneous perception that they originate from an immovable cultural sub-
strate, informal institutions, like formal ones, are in constant transformation, 
and one of the main incentives they have to do so is the presence of changes in 
the formal institutional environment (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 731). 
In many cases, social actors combine formal and informal frameworks while 
institutionalizing practices. As Olivier de Sardan (2013, p. 288) asserts, it is more
productive to think of institutions as mechanisms for coordinating collective action
rather than abstract structures. The institutions that regulate collective action are,
in this way, part of a disorderly process and without fxed assembly direction made
by individuals within the limits of their circumstances (Cleaver, 2002, p.  17).
These are not defned a priori by a set of necessary, specifc, and sufcient forms
and functions (Sindzingre, 2006, p. 70) but are continuously transformed by the
combination of forms of authority, cooperation, and behaviors perceived as more
credible or efective than others. 
Some authors regarding the way in which formal and informal institutions are
intertwined have used the state strength/weakness or presence/absence as possible 
values for this kind of explanatory variable. Drawn in this framework, the ability 
of states to provide public services and maintain internal security is evaluated by 
international organizations, classifying them in an ascending line that goes from 
failed or collapsed states, passes through weak or vulnerable states, and culmi-
nates with stable or consolidated states. In contexts characterized by a tenuous 
or weak state presence, formal institutions achieve some degree of efectiveness 
thanks to the mediation of non-state institutions that follow their own logic or 
that are informal (Boege et al., 2008, pp. 3–7). 
As Boege et al. (2008) assert, the identifcation of a state as weak implies 
recognizing the existence of other political actors that are strong in relation to 
the state. This is especially true in societies where the idea of the state has not 
solidifed in a solid manner and where the notion of citizenship, as opposed 
to other, more rooted identities, does not connect with individuals (Turn-
bull, 2002). In these contexts, social actors can combine formal and informal 
institutional practices, developing hybrid institutions. Moreover, one can think 
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by combining normative practices with traditional, moral, or customary ones 
(Sindzingre, 2006). The legitimacy of these hybrid institutions is based on refer-
ence to socially acceptable ways of doing things, as well as existing or previous 
tradition, identity, rights, or relationships of authority (Hall et al., 2014). 
Assessments of state-building policies based only on the understanding of such
societies as fragile states have, however, shown a series of problems in the achieve-
ment of their objectives (Grävingholt et al., 2012), so that some alternative per-
spectives that understands these spaces as hybrid political orders have been developed
(Boege et al., 2008, 2009). From this alternative perspective, there are informal
institutions that dispute to the state their privileged position in the establishment
of rules and procedures of coexistence. These institutions, such as those generated
by religious movements or transnational criminal networks, have the capacity to
establish norms of coexistence and some type of order (Mehler, 2003). 
The central issue, however, is not necessarily to fnd mechanisms to incorporate
informal institutions into the hierarchies of the state. The instrumental use of
native or local institutions by for example colonial governments through the
indirect rule is already known (Asad, 1973; Hart, 2006) and does not constitute a
real collaboration: the state recognizes traditional chiefs to build their power, and,
in return, the bosses take refuge in a powerful and foreign structure, which may
call into question its legitimacy vis-à-vis the population (Boege et al., 2008, p. 8). 
Moreover, the collaboration of formal and informal institutions does not 
consist necessarily in an inclusion of a weak structure by a stronger one. Actu-
ally, the places where the limits between formality, informality, or even legality 
are difuse constitute fertile spaces to produce institutional hybridization rather 
than collaboration (Das & Poole, 2004). In such contexts, frictions occur 
between traditional collective identities and the notions of state citizenship, 
frictions that need to be transformed into constructive interactions to build an 
efective state. For this, it is useful to think about the fundamental functions of 
the state and how they are being carried out in these spaces, as well as to address 
the sources of legitimacy of formal and informal institutions. The functions of 
the state, as recognized by Clements et al. (2007), are not an end by themselves, 
and in conditions of hybridity, their ultimate objectives of providing develop-
ment, security, and peace can be best achieved through institutional hybridiza-
tion and not by processes of state formalization. 
This article aims to shed light to the institutionalization of practices that regu-
late the actual social interaction in extractive realms. It argues that these rules 
are formed in a dynamic with formal and informal institutional frameworks. 
Thus, they can be related to state norms, corporate, and/or local practices, 
forming hybrid institutional entanglements which cannot be fully enclosed by a 
single formal or informal institutional framework. The way such institutions are 
produced and reproduced depends on the state and other social actors’ agency 
and political leverage. 
In developing this argument, the article asserts that hybrid institutional 
entanglements are dynamic, and as such it is fundamental to understand 
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institutionalized practices. Moreover, the state may formalize practices or legally
ban them in the context of changes to public policies. These changes may not 
signifcantly afect the reproduction of rules in places where the state is not 
capable or has no real interest in implementing formal law, but certainly could 
move such institutions to the formal or informal side of the continuum. 
In addition, following Boege (2017, p. 219), this article asserts that hybridiza-
tion of formal and informal institutions reveals the variety of forms of political 
and economic agency of the subjects in specifc social situations: obstruction, 
resistance, capture, re-appropriation, cooptation, or subordination. As Chat-
terjee (2004) asserts, societies are divided by an axis of legality in which there is 
an illegal component that, however, is backed by a certain social legitimacy. In 
such situations, hybridity can emerge as a political tool that directs the action 
of the state, redirecting its resources towards the interests of the group. So, the 
question that emerges at what point the hybridizations become “dysfunctional” 
and to what extent it can be said that it orders “consolidate the position of the 
local and traditional elites”, reinforcing in this way social inequalities of diferent
types (Bagayoko et al., 2016, p. 15). 
This conceptual framework allows us to analyze the way by which power 
in the two diferent cases proposed in this article infuence the characteristics 
acquired by formal-informal institutional entanglement, in spaces of greater or 
less institutional hybridity. 
Institutionalized practices as hybrid 
institutional entanglements 
The two cases presented show how social actors combine formal and informal 
frameworks in institutionalizing their practices; however, they do so from dif-
ferent power positions vis-à-vis the state. While agribusiness companies are able 
to use political infuence, small-scale miners can resist state regulations. In both 
cases, power shapes the way institutional hybridization has unfolded. 
Case 1: Agribusiness companies’ extraction of scarce groundwater 
resources in Ica: institutional hybridization pushed from above 
Since the early 1990s, the Peruvian government’s policy was mainly to appeal to 
private investments for agro-export expansion. This policy attracted domestic 
and foreign capital, introducing for new export crops. With increased demand 
for asparagus on the international market, the Ica Valley consolidated by the end 
of that decade as one of the country’s main agro-export zones. 
Under this productive model, small family farms were regarded as inef-
fcient in producing for a global market requiring high-quality, massive
volume, and constant production. Therefore, the government concentrated
on appealing to and fostering the formation of export companies with access
to large land areas. Between 1994 and 2012, while agricultural land owner-
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properties of 500 hectares or more increased by 347.90% (INEI, 1994,
2012). Mass-production of new crops mainly for export has risen along
with traditional cotton. The model’s economic success is intimately linked
to the increased worldwide demand for fresh crop luxury foods, which is
accompanied by a steeply increased demand for resources (water and land)
to grow these products. The main crops produced by the agribusiness were
asparagus (whose harvest area has increased from 411 ha in 1991 to 10,400
ha in 2011) and table grapes (with a harvest area increase from 3,000 ha in
1994 to 5,082 ha in 2011) (ANA, 2018). Export destinations for the table
grapes have changed from Europe and the United States to China because
of less stringent agrochemical residue norms. 
In addition to population growth, this agro-export boom brought increasing 
demand for groundwater. The Ica River irrigates the Ica Valley, while aquifers 
are located in the west end of the valley close to the sea (see Figure 5.1). Cur-
rently, the Ica River and aquifers feed some 26,000 ha of irrigated land in the 
Ica Valley, while also providing water to the city of Ica and surrounding villages. 
Figure 5.1 Map of agricultural activity on aquifers in the Ica Valley, 2018 (UTM-18S) 
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Most small- and medium-size holders irrigate their land from the river, while 
large-scale producers use groundwater from the Ica and Villacurí aquifers. 
The agro-export boom in the Ica Valley has had profound consequences 
in terms of generating water scarcity (Damonte et al., 2014; Damonte, 2015; 
Damonte & Boelens, 2019). In an arid climate such as Ica’s, expanding the 
agricultural frontier requires access to new water sources. In this scenario, agro-
exporters are the ones with the necessary capital to access groundwater, which 
is the only additional quality water source available at this time. In accordance 
with the reports of the National Water Authority (ANA), in 2009 the exploita-
tion of the aquifers surpassed the reserve volume by 125% and in 2013–2014 
by 171% (Muñoz & Zuñiga, 2018, p. 114). 
What are the formal rules and procedures for groundwater extraction in 
the Ica Valley? Before 2019, there was no formal regulation for groundwater 
extraction. In 2009, a new law for water resources was enacted in Peru. In 
their regulatory norms enacted in 2010, this law establishes that the well owner 
must be a formal producer and needs to own the land where the well will be 
built and get a usage license that is a water concession for each well in use. 
The amount of water the producer can extract in a given period is specifed 
in the water concession. The producers must assume all costs related to the 
well building and maintenance. Agribusiness companies own and use the vast 
majority of groundwater wells over the aquifers of Ica, Lanchas, and Villacurí. 
These companies are formal producers and formally own the land where wells 
are located; however, just a small number of the wells have usage licenses, and 
the others have been informally built or are informally used. Ofcial numbers 
show that in Ica, some 860 groundwater wells are installed, of which only 249 
have a license (ANA, 2018). 
In addition, the state previously had a formal right to directly control the
amount of water extracted in each well. However, the agribusiness association
fercely opposed direct state regulation during the discussion about the regulation
of the new law of 2019. Indeed, they even physically prevented ANA function-
aries from entering their private property where their wells were drilled, despite
the legal mandate for state regulation. So, the state resorted to include them as
well. In such a situation, all well licenses could have been canceled and thereby
all actual wells used would be considered to be informal or illegal, but the state
did not want to start such a fght with the agribusiness companies, so the legal
regulations in place since 2010 assign to the wells’ owners an obligation to count
and declare to the ANA the amount of water they extract, in efect giving agro-
export companies the right to self-regulate. From then on, companies have
simply declared to the water authority the amount of water they extract. 
However, the formalization of a former informal self-regulation of the vol-
ume of groundwater extraction per well did not resolve the issue of the increas-
ing number of informal wells in the context of increasing groundwater scarcity. 
Thus, the state decided to declare a water emergency in the Ica region. In 2011 
Chief Resolution No. 330 was passed, thereby ratifying a ban on the drilling of 
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in Villacurí and Lanchas. ANA’s local ofcials have focused on detecting illegal 
drilling works, identifying non-registered wells, and inspecting fow meters 
in order to verify the quantity of water being extracted. As a result, infringers 
have been issued fnes up to S/.3,850 (approximately USD1,200), and unlaw-
ful wells, mostly on the land of small holders, have been closed. Just before this 
punitive process, the government declared a legal amnesty for all informal wells 
that were informally used. Companies could formalize their informal wells with
no fnes just before the ban on new wells took place. 
The policy was partially successful since many existing informal wells were 
formalized or closed down, but it did not prevent the drilling of new informal 
wells by the companies. So, the government enacted a new norm that allowed 
the producers to build new wells but only to replace unusable old ones. Again, 
this norm facilitated the formalization of formerly informal wells, but did not 
prevent the companies from continuing to drill wells to supply their increasing 
groundwater demand for cropping crops for exports. ANA estimates that the 
number of informal wells has increased even during the water ban period: by 
2015, about 65% of wells in Villacurí and 81% in Lanchas had no license at all 
(ANA, 2015). Clearly, the self-regulation policy was not working, but the lack 
of adequate government regulation seems to be politically motivated and key to 
the constitution of their territory, especially since small and medium well own-
ers have been regulated. Agro-exporters, on the contrary, rely on their power 
and political legitimacy to avoid state oversight. 
Throughout this period, the companies have extracted the water they have
needed for furnishing their increasing demand with no efective state regulation
even in the context of water scarcity and emergency. This practice has been
institutionalized since no efective state sanction or signifcant social opposition
has been able to prevent it. The state has tried to frm up their formal framework
while other possibly afected water users have not raised their voices against com-
panies’ extractive practices (Damonte, 2015). The actual rules and procedures
that govern the companies’ extraction of groundwater entangles formal rights
and informal procedures: companies are formal, part of their wells is formal, their
exports follow formal channels and pay formal taxes; however, they informally
manage the number of wells and the amount of water extraction in accordance
with their markets’ needs, irrespective of formal rules or environmental concerns. 
In Ica as in other Peruvian coastal valleys, the agro-export group’s political 
and economic power has become the main agent driving hydro-territorial 
redefnition (Damonte, 2019; Damonte & Boelens, 2019). Supported by the 
neoliberal polices and mindset promoted by the government in the last decades, 
the agro-export companies established their power by developing the fnancial 
and technical capacity to pursue high-tech export agriculture and contest exist-
ing territorialities and alternative imaginaries related to smallholders’ livelihood, 
food-based agriculture, and dignifed drinking water services for the cities. 
Next, they build on their political capacity to establish the rules to access 
groundwater, overriding other organizations in the watershed—including the 
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& Gonzales, 2018; Damonte et al., 2016). Private enterprise makes the desert 
bloom; it earns foreign exchange for the country and provides employment for 
the region; it uses cutting-edge irrigation technology so they are an example of 
“efcient” water management, which must be followed to utilize other aban-
doned land in Ica and other valleys on the Coast. 
Case 2: Institutionalized practices for small-scale miners’ access 
to gold alluvial deposits in the Amazonia: an institutional 
hybridization pushed from below 
Madre de Dios is a region in the southern Peruvian Amazon bordering Bolivia 
and Brazil. With a total population of approximately 134,100 permanent 
residents, it is the least-populated province in the country (INEI, 2014). Over 
the last decade, this province has caught national attention due to the massive 
environmental destruction caused by the multiplication of small-scale mining 
activities in this fragile environment (Damonte et al., 2013; Ipenza & Valencia, 
2014; Mosquera, 2006; Pachas, 2011a; Valencia, 2014; Dargent & Urteaga, 
2016; Baraybar & Dargent, 2020) (see Figure 5.2). 
Figure 5.2 Map of mining activity in Madre de Dios, 2018 (UTM-19S) 
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The miners are the most important group in economic and political terms, 
although they represent only around 10% of the population (Mosquera et al., 
2009; Pachas, 2011b). Most miners are Andean immigrants, but there are also 
some Amazon natives and even a few foreign miners from China and Russia. 
In Madre de Dios, miners have difering ways to access ore deposits. There 
are miners with formal mining concessions given by the state. They are the 
formal concession holders and have the right to formally mine in their conces-
sion. Sometimes, formal holders prefer to invite guest miners to mine on their 
concessions for a payment, usually a percentage of the ore extracted. In this 
case, the guests are informal miners, informally allowed by formalized miners 
to access their formally received concession. However, miners can also invade 
a vacant concession or no-mining zone and seek social (informal) recognition 
as holders by force or by claiming frst possession rights. Again, they can invite 
guest miners. Then, there are the peons who are miners working for holders 
or guests for a payment, usually a small percentage of the gold extracted daily, 
called a royalty. Finally, the chichiqueros are miners who temporarily invade other 
people’s concessions where they mine individually until the holder fnds out. 
They are independent, free, and mobile miners. 
Thus, in Madre de Dios miners have four non-exclusive ways to access the 
ore deposits: as a holder, as a guest, as a peon, or as a chichiquero, which made up 
several combinations. Just as an example, a miner can hold formal and informal 
concessions and be a guest miner in another holder concession. Moreover, a 
chichiquero can be also a peon. In general, newcomers are peons and chichiqueros
who aspire to someday become guests and then holders, which had commonly 
happened in the context of actual labor mobility and extractive territorial 
expansion. 
The rules and procedures for accessing ore deposits are clear and well estab-
lished; they are mostly informal institutions. Just when formal holders access 
their given concession directly or through formally hired workers, it is fol-
lowing only formal norms for accessing ore deposits (and formal concessions 
account for only a small portion of the mining land). Moreover, almost no 
formal holders comply with all formal requirements for mining extraction, such 
as environmental provisions, so there is almost no completely formal mining 
in the region. However, the most common ways to access the ore deposits are 
completely informal, and their degree of informality is changing in accordance 
with changing state formalization initiatives and policies. 
Before 2001, there were no specifc formal rules to govern small-scale mining
in Peru. In that year, the government enacted a Supreme Decree (27651),1 of-
cially recognizing artisanal mining for the frst time and incorporating it into the
General Mining Act. The law defnes artisanal miners as individuals or groups
who work for their living by mining manually or using rudimentary equipment.
In the case of gold producers in gold placer ore deposits formed by gravity sepa-
ration during sedimentary processes, which is the Madre de Dios case, produc-
tion capacity must be at most 200 m3/day for being considered artisanal mining
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obtain a tax number and a mining concession or a mining contract with the
concession owner, as well as an artisanal miner certifcate in order to access the
ore deposits. From this general framework, the state started to develop regula-
tions to foster formal and prevent the expansion of informal artisanal mining. 
In 2005 the government passed the Environment Act (2005), which defnes
the guidelines for environmental management, the sustainable use of natural
resources, and land planning and zoning in Peru. The EEZ proposal establishes
eight zones grouped into fve main categories (Fernandez, 2010). It prioritizes
ecological protection (49.64%) and non-mining production (40.22%), leaving just
10.14% of the territory for potential small-scale mining activities. Interestingly,
this zoning plan does not preclude large-scale extractive projects since it addresses
only land use, not subsoil resource extraction—though it could establish some
land access restrictions for extractive purposes particularly in conservation areas. 
However, new miners’ groups in the 2010s expanded their activities into 
banned reserves areas’ bufer zones such as La Pampa, which overlaps with the 
bufer zone of Tambopata National Reserve, transgressing the mining limits 
established by the EEZ and menacing this protected area. In February 2011, the 
state responded by enacting Act 1100 which declared illegal all mining activities 
not authorized by the state. As a result, informal miners mining ore deposits 
in rivers, lakes, and protected areas become illegal miners. Subsequently, the 
Ministry of Environment urged the navy to launch a punitive campaign against 
illegal miners in the region, sinking many dredger boats on the Madre de Dios 
River. In the same 2011, the Ministry of Energy and Mines published the 
Supreme Decree No. 013–2011, approving the National Plan for the Formaliza-
tion of Artisanal Mining (PNFMA). 
Miners resisted the state pressure for formalization and mobilized against puni-
tive campaigns. They accused the state of being ill prepared to understand the
mining activities in the region while demonstrating against state crimes towards
miners in the context of punitive campaigns. After some years, it was clear that
the formalization plan was a failure in the region since less than 1% of miners were
trying to obtain the status. Consequently, the state looked for some policy changes
to provide incentives for miners to seek formalization (Damonte, 2016, 2018). 
In 2013, the central state enacted a supreme decree to create an exceptional 
procedure under the same law to drive forwards formalization.2 Under this 
exceptional procedure, non-formal miners are required to submit a declaration 
of commitment in order to be considered “in the process of formalization”, 
until they fulfll all the requirements to complete the process. This opened up 
a new window for informal miners to achieve certain degree of formalization. 
Moreover, the ministry of environment recognized some chichiquero associa-
tions as miners “in the process of formalization” (Damonte, 2018). Interestingly 
enough, chichiquero miners have neither formal nor informal concessions, and 
many of them work in no-mining zones such as La Pampa, so the window of 
formality was opened also for illegal miners. 
The same process of repression and conciliation has been repeated several 
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opinion, launches a repressive intervention against so-called illegal miners, but 
the miners resist, and the pace of formalization stops. Miners mobilize against 
punitive measures through demonstrations, road blocks, and general strikes. The
government is forced to put the formalization process on hold and establish 
roundtables to conduct dialogue and negotiate some conditions. By 2014, more 
than 90% of miners were “in process of formalization” in Madre de Dios, but by 
2020, when the formalization process has been suspended due to the Covid-19 
pandemic (Benites & Bebbington, 2020), very few had completed the process. 
Rules and procedures for access to ore deposits have not changed. 
In this case, small-scale miners’ power to produce and reproduce their rules for
ore deposits comes from their capacity to mobilize and negotiate state regulations
(Cortés-McPherson, 2019). State policy has tried to regulate the access to ore
deposits by creating mechanisms for recognizing actual miners (as artisanal miners)
as well as limiting their area of extraction (no-go zones) (Pachas, 2011a; Pachas,
2011b). Miners have responded to these evolving formal frameworks by accept-
ing recognition and resisting punitive campaigns (Damonte, 2021). They have
chosen to accept some state regulations to get some rights and recognition that in
turn would help them to resist other regulation. In this way, the institutionalized
practices to access ore deposits in Madre de Dios are mostly but not completely
informal; that is, they can be regarded as hybrid institutional entanglements. 
Final remarks 
The institutionalization of informal institutions has been a fundamental process 
for developing governance schemes in the context of extractive expansion. 
Extractive activities have fourished without formally established or actually 
enforced rules and procedures. In such contexts, some local practices have been 
reproduced and produced as informal institutions to govern extractive inten-
sifcation and territorial expansion and as a way to maximize the unregulated 
use of resources. In addition, the reproduction of informal institutions in the 
context of increasing state regulatory eforts has fostered processes of institu-
tional hybridization. 
The cases of water extraction in Ica and alluvial gold deposit access in Madre 
de Dios show how agro-export companies and miners institutionalized their 
extractive practices not just as informal institutions but as hybrid institutional 
entanglements. In Peru, the state has gradually developed formal frameworks 
to regulate extractive activities, but these formal regulations have been only 
partially adopted (Damonte, 2021). Agro-export companies and miners have 
chosen to follow some formal procedures while maintaining their informal 
rules, intertwining formal and informal frameworks to get formal rights to 
extract resources while avoiding the regulation that would restrict their extrac-
tive activities. Thus, the rules and procedures for water extraction and ore access 
are not formal but not completely informal either. 
Moreover, the way these hybrid institutional entanglements have been
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regulatory agencies and the companies or local groups that pursue unregu-
lated extractive activities. In the frst case, agro-export companies are able
to compel the state to formalize some of their informal extractive practices
while avoiding the efective regulation of others such as the volume of water
extracted. In this sense, they have hybridized the state governance from above,
showing their power to infuence state regulatory eforts (Damonte, 2019). In
the second case, miners have efectively resisted state regulation in order to get
recognition and negotiate changes in the state institutional frameworks. Thus,
they have hybridized state governance from below. In both cases, hybrid insti-
tutional entanglement has been the result of power-laden disputes for resources
control between the state (in its diferent levels, sectors, and branches) and
local extractive agents. These cases show that diferent social groups establish
diverse relationships with the state based on their political interests and capaci-
ties (Chatterjee, 2004). Thus, more than the weakness or institutional strength
of the states, the nature of the formation of the entanglement between formal
and informal institutions will depend on the way in which the political sce-
narios that frame the institutional development in diferent social spaces have
been constituted. 
The hybridization of governance schemes in places of extractive expan-
sion or intensifcation have generated signifcant institutional challenges
for governance, which may be understood in the theoretical realm of
institutional curses. Governments eager for windfall profts have opened up
territories for extractive developments without proper public regulation,
creating confictive and sometimes ungovernable scenarios. However, this
is not to say that a lack of established state regulation has produced only
chaos; extractive agents have managed to establish governance schemes by
institutionalizing their practices as institutional entanglements. Thus, the
possible institutional curse would depend on the forms adopted by these
entanglements and their functionality in the quest for developing more
institutional governance. 
Analyses of these cases prove to be no exception, and reinforce the argu-
ment already present in the literature that informal institutions and hybrid 
institutional forms do not respond to situations of marginality, but structure in 
themselves forms of social behavior (Boege, 2017; Sindzingre, 2006; Helmke 
& Levitsky, 2004; Olivier de Sardan, 2013). Thus, state presence does not lead 
to some linear process of gradual formalization but to processes of hybridiza-
tion or distinct assemblages (Li, 2005) that are established dynamically between 
local groups and diferent state representatives. In such scenarios, power disputes
play the key role in shaping institutional governance precluding or reinforcing 
institutional rule. 
Notes 
1 Supreme Decree No. 013–2002, passed April 21, 2002. 
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6 Prior consultation to halt the 
resource curse? 
Potentials and pitfalls of a participatory 
innovation in Peru and its implications 
for the Andean countries 
Riccarda Flemmer 
Introduction 
The recent cycle of the commodity boom as well as the reliance of national 
economies on resource revenues has driven Latin American governments to 
expand the extractive frontier further into the Amazon and the Andes (Beb-
bington & Bury, 2013; Svampa, 2015). Indigenous peoples inhabiting these 
areas are the main afected parties and projects have signifcantly increased 
contestation between them, states, and companies (Engels & Dietz, 2017). 
These socio-environmental conficts have also turned violent because states and 
companies did not respect indigenous ways of life or their physical wellbeing. 
Participatory processes have been used as indicators of a Latin American 
exceptionalism to the political resource curse (Ahmadov, 2014), with consulta-
tion mechanisms being promoted by international organizations, policymakers 
and academia as a central democratic means to improve resource governance 
and transform conficts (GIZ, 2015; Laplante & Spears, 2008; United Nations, 
2011; World Bank, 2016). Scaling-up in-depth insights into the implementa-
tion of prior consultation in Peru—the only country in Latin America with a 
national framework legislation—this chapter explores and compares reasons for 
the implementation of prior consultations as well as the potential and pitfalls of 
consultations to reform resource governance in the Andean countries. 
Prior consultation and the principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent
(FPIC) have become the most important participatory mechanisms for indig-
enous peoples vis-à-vis extractive industries. In international law, indigenous
prior consultation was frst introduced in 1989 by International Labour Organ-
isation Convention 169 (ILO C169). Later, consultation rights and FPIC were
recognized in the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (UNDRIP) as well as in the regional American Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples (ADRIP) from 2016. Only recently, since the late 2000s
and early 2010s, consultation has been further institutionalized in the Andean
countries—with Colombia being the only exception, conducting the frst consul-
tation process in 1994 (Rodríguez, 2011, p. 65). Therefore, Special Rapporteur on
DOI: 10.4324/9781003179559-8 
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the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Rodolfo Stavenhagen frst diagnosed an imple-
mentation gap in 2006 (see Wright & Tomaselli, 2019, p. 279). 
Consultation regulations and implementation progress have provoked a sur-
prising and almost complete reversal in the political positions of actors. From 
being a central claim of indigenous movements and an unwanted obligation for 
governments and companies, the initial resistance of state and corporate actors 
changed to approval and—at the same time—the claims of indigenous peoples 
have turned into contestation and opposition by these previous advocates. 
However, international organizations and development agencies still celebrate 
consultations as a guarantee for indigenous peoples’ rights per se and as a cen-
tral means to tackle the high number of socio-environmental conficts in the 
Andean countries. This chapter argues that prior consultation is highly con-
tested and the shift in advocacy is due to the limitations of the processes imple-
mented. In principle, consultation legal frameworks should permit afected 
indigenous populations to have a meaningful voice in state decision-making. 
However, the scope of domestic consultation regimes (Szablowski, 2010) varies 
substantially in legal texts and in practice. 
The main argument of this chapter is that the reversal in the direction of 
advocacy has resulted from prior consultation being a promising institutional 
innovation established in constitutions and laws but was subsequently down-
sized by formal regulations of governments and state administration as well as 
by informal practices following corporate interests in the industry of resource 
extraction. Conceptually, the chapter takes an agency-focused perspective on 
the institutionalization of prior consultation combining critical approaches to 
law, participation and the transformation of resource conficts used in the felds 
of international relations, postcolonial studies and anthropology. The empirical 
material stems from an in-depth study of indigenous mobilization and contesta-
tion leading to and accompanying the implementation of prior consultation in 
Peru. The data comprises transcripts of interviews and participant observations, 
primary sources, and legal documents during the law-making process in 2011 
as well as during the implementation of prior consultations, especially in the 
hydrocarbon sector between 2012 and 2016. The empirical material is embed-
ded into an extensive review of secondary literature on prior consultation in 
international law and domestic contexts. 
The frst section of the chapter introduces prior consultation as discussed in 
international law and distinguishes it from other mechanisms of citizen partici-
pation. The second section gives an overview on the reasons for and the prog-
ress of introducing prior consultation focusing on the Andean countries. The 
third section critically analyses the complexities of implementing prior consul-
tation in the case of Peru. Based on these in-depth insights, the fourth section 
discusses the potential and pitfalls of prior consultation for reforming resource 
governance in the Andean region. Finally, the concluding section refects on 
the broader implications of prior consultation as an institutional innovation to 
break the resource curse and to contribute to sustainable development. 
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Prior consultation and FPIC as institutional innovations 
Prior consultation is often presented as the most important institutional innova-
tion in Latin American resource governance. Legal scholars have also termed 
prior consultation as a globally prevalent “new approach to ethnic rights and 
multiculturalism, with its own language and rules” (Rodríguez-Garavito, 2011, 
p. 268). Prior consultation can be understood as a participatory institution. In 
line with Falleti and Riofrancos (2018, p. 87) participatory institutions can be 
defned “as formal, state-sanctioned institutions explicitly created to augment 
citizen involvement in decision making over public goods or social services.” 
From the perspective of formal institutions, consultation processes are based 
on the international indigenous right to prior consultation and the principle of 
FPIC. The main international legal instrument in this regard is the ILO C169 
and the UNDRIP. The ILO was the frst international body to draft interna-
tional frameworks for indigenous peoples’ rights. Responsible for formulating 
international labor standards, the ILO started its concern for indigenous peoples 
out of preoccupation for their conditions as exploited workers and forced labor 
(ILO, 2009, p. 153). In the revision process of an earlier standard, prior consulta-
tion was frst defned by the ILO C169 and later interpreted as a “cornerstone” 
of the Convention (ILO, 2009). The ILO C169 is the only legally binding 
instrument for indigenous peoples’ rights on an international scale. The prin-
ciple of FPIC was established by the UNDRIP, which is an important instru-
ment of soft law (for a detailed account, see e.g. Barelli, 2012). Additionally, 
the ILO supervisory system and the UN Special Rapporteurs on indigenous 
peoples’ rights articulate recommendations. In the Latin American context, 
the ADRIP, jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights 
(IACtHR), constitutional courts, and national constitutional frameworks and 
laws have infuenced the implementation process. Recommendations of the 
Expert Commission on ILO C169 as well as jurisprudence of the IACtHR 
have infuenced the implementation process (Baluarte, 2004). 
Without going into detailed legal analysis, prior consultation and FPIC need 
to be distinguished from public participation, from corporate social responsibil-
ity programs (CSR) and from each other. First, indigenous peoples’ participa-
tion has a diferent legal and normative basis than public participation. While 
public participation aims at involving citizens in democratic state decision-
making, setting emphasis on equal rights for everyone, prior consultation and 
FPIC are derived from indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination and their 
special connection to their lands. Therefore, standards for prior consultation 
specifcally include cultural adequacy. Second, prior consultation and FPIC 
primarily are historical debts of postcolonial states and not company obliga-
tions. Third, consultation and FPIC both defne indigenous peoples’ rights 
but are two diferent legal concepts. A fundamental diference between these 
two concepts is that prior consultation should give indigenous peoples the 
opportunity to participate in decision-making but does not necessarily attri-
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(and companies) to reach the consent of indigenous peoples before a project 
starts. Vice versa, indigenous peoples can withhold their consent and say no to 
external interventions. 
The emergence of FPIC can be traced as a central controversial issue in the 
elaboration of formal international, regional and national legal texts as well as 
in regional and national court decisions (for detailed accounts, see e.g. Doyle, 
2015). However, the concepts of consultation and FPIC are not clear cut (see 
e.g. Rodríguez-Garavito, 2011). Therefore, depending on weaker and stronger 
interpretations, prior consultation may or may not include FPIC. 
Reasons for implementing prior consultation 
in the Andean countries 
Legal texts and rulings on prior consultation and FPIC are the result of indig-
enous protests and are the subject of on-going controversies (see e.g. Falleti & 
Riofrancos, 2018; Tomaselli & Wright, 2019). Globally, Latin America is the 
region most advanced in the institutionalization of indigenous peoples’ prior 
consultation and FPIC. The ILO C169, which is the only international treaty 
open for ratifcation exclusively referring to indigenous peoples, is almost a 
regional convention. The majority of 15 of a total of 23 ratifying states of ILO 
C169 are located in Latin America. 
Although countries signed the ILO C169 early in the 1990s, many gov-
ernments were reluctant to implement consultation rights. Briefy review-
ing variation between the Andean countries in terms of legal frameworks
and regulations, the ILO C169 has played a role in several constitutions
of the 1990s and 2000s but has not resulted in coherent legal frameworks
or the systematic implementation of consultation processes. In terms of
legal frameworks, Bolivia ratifed ILO C169 June 1991, consultation was
then incorporated into a new law of hydrocarbons in May 2005, but prior
consultation was not implemented “because it was not regulated” (Urteaga-
Crovetto, 2018, pp. 10–11). Under the government of Evo Morales, prior
consultation was regulated for the hydrocarbon sector, the UNDRIP became
part of national law, and the new Bolivian Constitution of 2009 granted
ILO C169 constitutional status (Urteaga-Crovetto, 2018, p. 11). However,
irreconcilable claims between the government and indigenous organizations
hindered the adoption of a conjoint national legal framework on consulta-
tions (Schilling-Vacafor, 2014). In the hydrocarbon sector, consultations are
implemented starting in 2007 and in the mining sector in 2015 (Zaremberg
& Torres Wong, 2018, pp. 50–56). In Colombia, ILO C169 was ratifed in
1991 and has constitutional status, and prior consultation was incorporated
into the 1991 Constitution. Since then, the Colombian Constitutional Court
has developed an ample jurisprudence to further defne consultation proce-
dure and substance (Urteaga-Crovetto, 2018, pp. 12–14). Prior consultations
have been conducted in the extractive industries since 1994 (Calle Alzate,
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was incorporated into the 1998 Constitution (Urteaga-Crovetto, 2018,
pp. 14–16). In 2012, Executive Decree 1247 was adopted to regulate prior
consultation, and the Secretary of Hydrocarbons (SHE) has been implement-
ing consultations since 2013 (Burgos, 2015, p. 54). In Chile, diferent legal
texts were adopted without indigenous participation, and a frst regulatory
norm under the Bachelet government had to be replaced by the new regula-
tion DTO-66 of March 2014, which is also vigorously opposed by indigenous
peoples (Blanco, 2016, p. 14; Tomaselli, 2019). 
Recent literature has identifed four reasons for states to legally imple-
ment prior consultation in the Andean countries that can be traced his-
torically in the waves and counter-waves of the recognition of indigenous
peoples’ rights. First, indigenous mobilizations of the 1990s reached a
formal recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights. The multiculturalist turn
in Latin America refers to the success of indigenous movements in Latin
America in establishing domestic political parties and forming at least part
of the state governments, especially in Ecuador and Bolivia (see e.g. Van
Cott, 2005; Yashar, 2005). 
Second, indigenous peoples’ rights recognized in the multicultural reforms 
remained only on paper. This limited impact resulted in frustration, which is 
most prominently refected on by Charles Hale’s criticism of the limitations 
of Neoliberal Multiculturalism (Hale, 2004). In this context, indigenous peoples’ 
rights, including participation and prior consultation, had been formally rec-
ognized but were not put into practice. Therefore, scholars have frequently 
criticized an implementation gap of rights (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006; Schilling-
Vacafor & Flemmer, 2015; Sieder, 2011). 
Third, a new wave of resource extraction moving into indigenous peoples’ 
territories has caused high numbers of conficts, which sparked protests in
many communities, often in alliances with national as well as international
human rights, environmental and indigenous organizations, leading to
political pressure on governments (and companies) to implement consulta-
tion rights (Brysk, 2000; Wright, 2014). These protests also led to rulings
of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, with the Saramaka people
versus Suriname (2007) and the Sarayaku people versus Ecuador (IACtHR,
2012) cases in favor of the right to FPIC being the most emblematic ones
(Doyle, 2015). 
Fourth, consultation processes were implemented and further regulated.
Comments of the ILO have an infuence on the international level and “[d] 
emonstrating compliance was also signifcant, as Convention 169 became a
marker of internationally approved good behavior. Reactions to the request
were soon to follow” (Larsen, 2016, p. 12). Although the legal implementa-
tion of prior consultation and FPIC are no longer rejected by governments in
Latin America, their scope is highly contested. Against this background, the
contested interpretation of regulations has become the new feld of struggles
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Implementation of prior consultation in Peru: 
unwanted change 
The Peruvian consultation law is internationally celebrated as a forerunner 
because it provides a national framework for prior consultations, which has 
served as a leading example for its neighboring countries, such as Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile and Colombia; they are elaborating similar legislation. However, Peru’s 
pioneering role came as a surprise for observers. The country has long been 
discussed as an outlier case in the multiculturalist turn of the region because of the 
absence of indigenous political parties at the national level despite having one 
of the largest indigenous populations in South America (e.g. Merino, 2019). 
Peru had ratifed ILO C169 under the authoritarian government of President 
Alberto Fujimori in 1994, a time still marked by the internal armed confict 
(1980s to 1990s) with leftist guerrillas. However, the ratifcation was mainly 
to show donors compliance with international standards (Orihuela, 2014). 
For over a decade, the implementation of ILO C169 was not advanced in a 
comprehensive way. In response, indigenous and peasant communities staged 
protests against various projects and started conducting their own consultation 
processes to avoid imposed mining projects with the Tambogrande consultation 
being the most famous case (Fulmer, 2014; Walter & Urkidi, 2017). In June 
2009, the violence of the Baguazo confict opened a window of opportunity for 
indigenous organizations to push for the implementation of prior consultation 
despite the strong opposition of the government of Alan García (2006–2011; 
Hughes, 2010). 
In 2011, the newly elected left-wing President Ollanta Humala adopted 
the Peruvian Consultation Law (Law of the Right to Prior Consultation of 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, recognized in the Convention 169 of the 
International Labor Organisation (ILO), Law No. 29785: Republic of Peru, 
2011; in the following: LPC) as part of his election promises in 2011. Peruvian 
indigenous organizations were then involved by the Humala administration in 
the participatory elaboration of a national regulatory norm. Indigenous orga-
nization had hoped for the regulation to fll faws in the restricted version of 
the initially negotiated consultation law but were disappointed by the govern-
ment’s reluctance. Nevertheless, the Regulating Decree (Regulating Decree 
of Law 29785, Law of the Right to Prior Consultation of Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples, recognized in the Convention 169 of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO), No. 001–2012-MC; Republic of Peru, 2012) was adopted 
without the approval of the main indigenous organizations in 2012 (Flemmer, 
2019; Schilling-Vacafor & Flemmer, 2015). 
From a legal perspective, the Peruvian consultation law even stays behind 
the minimal standards defned in international law. Despite being celebrated 
internationally, the legal framework and the further institutionalization of prior 
consultation in Peru are criticized by indigenous and civil society organiza-
tions for four main shortcomings: First, the legislation defnes whom to consult
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authority to decide on the status of being indigenous. Further, the legal frame-
work defnes that only people directly descended from precolonial populations are 
to be considered indigenous peoples—which is more limited than the ILO C169 
defnition—and stipulates that the representative organizations that participate 
in the consultations have to be from the geographic area of the planned measure.
Accordingly, higher-level indigenous organizations with more experienced 
leaders remain outside of the processes. Second, the legislation leaves all deci-
sions about how to consult to the state. In this regard, the Peruvian government 
ignored indigenous demands for an obligatory phase of joint planning. Instead, 
the framework puts the consulting state entity in charge to prepare a consulta-
tion schedule and then present it to the peoples to be consulted. Third, the 
Peruvian consultation legislation insists that all measures, including extractive 
projects, adopted without consultation before the national legal framework 
went into practice, remained in force. From a legal perspective, this is ambigu-
ous because the Peruvian government had already ratifed ILO C169 in 1994, 
and therefore was formally obliged to implement consultations since 1995. 
Fourth, the LCP does not establish a consent obligation and the regulatory 
decree stipulated that reaching a consensus is mandatory only when relocation 
of indigenous populations or the disposal of hazardous waste is planned. The 
fnal decision about projects remains with the consulting state entity. The legal 
framework stipulates that only agreements are binding, which means that in 
the case of disagreement—if communities oppose a measure—the state can still 
implement the projects, but the communities do not have a legal possibility to 
veto them. 
Under the subsequent Humala administration (2011–2016), a total of 24 
consultation processes on extractive projects involving communities from 23 
diferent indigenous peoples were concluded, 11 of which concerned hydrocar-
bon concessions in the Amazon, and four of which dealt with mining projects 
in the Andes (Ministerio de Cultura, 2016). For oil, gas and mining projects, 
the consulting state entities are sub-divisions of the powerful Ministry of Energy
and Mines (MEM). As in the other Andean states, Peru’s economy depends 
highly on the extraction of natural resources. Legally, the state owns all sub-
soil resources. The national government via the MEM is the central entity that 
defnes areas for mining and hydrocarbon (oil and gas) concessions, organizes 
international auctions and signs contracts with the highest-bidding company. 
These formal concessions are leased for 30 to 40 years and managed by foreign 
companies, whilst only sub-contractors—for infrastructure etc.—are Peruvian 
(Orihuela, 2012). 
For the hydrocarbon and mining sectors, the MEM decided that consulta-
tions are to be implemented only once in the licensing process of the projects. 
For hydrocarbon projects, this is at a very early stage when only a broad area for 
a future license is defned but there are no details on the projects and activities 
planned (Flemmer & Schilling-Vacafor, 2016). For mining, the consultation 
takes place very late, right before the company begins to work, when the project
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not defned yet and impacts remain unclear, or that the project is already fully 
designed and difcult to change. 
In the hydrocarbon sector, from the 26 hydrocarbon processes initially 
announced (El Comercio, 2013), only 11 were concluded by the end of the 
Humala government in 2016. Nine of these processes were concluded “as 
planned”, one was partly opposed (Block 191), and one is still the subject of a 
contentious renegotiation for a new consultation (Block 192/Ex-1AB). Addi-
tionally, other consultation processes began but were cancelled due to local 
opposition (Block 157) (see Flemmer, 2019). 
In general, the concluded consultation processes in Peru can be character-
ized by three shortcomings: First, the ownership of indigenous peoples is very
limited. States usually design the proceeding, control the access to consultation
arenas, and establish general rules of the game. Therefore, prior consultation has
turned from an indigenous peoples’ claim into a state-controlled space and a stage
for state monologues. Second, the substantial participation of indigenous peoples
during consultation is limited. Third, the infuence of indigenous peoples on
the results of consultations and ultimately on the projects’ implementation is
limited (for a detailed account, see Flemmer & Schilling-Vacafor, 2016). This
is in line with a more general critique of the public participatory mechanisms
implemented by the Peruvian government in resource governance since the
1990s. Formally, the country’s legal framework for participation and environ-
mental licensing has been celebrated for being one of the most advanced in the
region (Orihuela, 2014). However, in practice, these mechanisms have proven
to be inefective for protecting the environment or for giving local populations a
meaningful say, because they are partial to company interests focusing on attract-
ing large-scale projects, rather than on state control (Dargent et al., 2017). 
In mining, the implementation process started only after repeated claims 
from the Peruvian Human Rights Ombudsman, the Ministry of the Environ-
ment, indigenous and other non-governmental organizations at the end of 2015
(Irigoyen, 2016). The minister and high-ranking ofcials of the MEM qualifed 
prior consultation polemically as an investment obstacle (La Primera, 2013) and 
repeatedly articulated opposition against the implementation of consultations 
together with mining companies (Gálvez & Sosa Villagarcia, 2013). Until the 
end of Humala’s term in 2016, four consultations were conducted. These were 
criticized for being rushed, i.e. taking between 34 to 43 days (Defensoría del 
Pueblo del Perú, 2015; Irigoyen, 2016). Critique was also articulated by the 
Peruvian human rights ombudsman about the interference of companies in 
the consultation processes and that the agreements would only repeat already 
established obligations of the MEM to supervise the projects (Defensoría del 
Pueblo del Perú, 2016). Nevertheless, these mining consultations were not 
contested, which was mainly because companies were already working in the 
areas and had previously established working agreements with the communities 
(Ocampo & Urrutia, 2016). 
However, indigenous organizations and communities have opposed the top-
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communities have opposed extractive projects and criticized the fawed public 
participation processes before prior consultations were conducted (Schilling-
Vacafor et al., 2018). Two hydrocarbon-related cases of contested consulta-
tions are particularly interesting: First, in the long confictive history of the 
oldest Amazonian oil-producing region in Peru, Block 192 in the Northern 
Amazon region of Loreto, the state-led consultation has served indigenous 
organizations and communities as a platform to gain attention for long-standing 
claims for environmental remediation, compensation payments and an increase 
of communities’ infuence in the project design by UN entities and opened 
negotiations with the Peruvian Congress as well as with the Executive (Lévano, 
2017). Second, in the southern Peruvian Amazon region of Madre de Dios, 
communities rejected participation in consultations convened by the state. In 
reaction to the communities’ opposition, the state reduced the area of the future 
concession in order to not overlap with indigenous territories. This means that 
communities were able to use the state’s formal obligation to conduct prior 
consultations to avoid a new hydrocarbon project on their territories by reject-
ing any consultation at all (Flemmer, 2019). 
Implications for the Andean countries: 
potentials and pitfalls 
The absence of national legal frameworks has long been an excuse for govern-
ments to not implement prior consultations. Peru is still the only country in 
the region that has adopted a general national framework law. However, other 
Andean states have incorporated prior consultation into legal regulations, and 
the implementation of consultation processes has made progress. The potential 
of prior consultation as an institutional innovation is commonly advertised as 
providing spaces to facilitate participation, mediate negative impacts on afected 
populations and ensure benefts for communities afected by resource extrac-
tion. Further, consultation processes are supposed to transform conficts before 
they can turn violent and provide platforms to discuss and reconcile diferent 
visions of development (McNeish et al., 2015). 
In the dimension of formal institutionalization, prior consultation is ambigu-
ously interpreted and highly contested. Although Peru has set an important 
sign with the consultation legislation of 2011 and 2012—compared to Bolivia, 
Colombia and Ecuador—the law stays behind in the formal recognition of 
indigenous peoples and their rights (Schilling-Vacafor & Flemmer, 2015). 
However, even in countries more progressive in recognizing indigenous peo-
ples’ rights, such as Ecuador (Constitution of 2008) and Bolivia (Constitution 
of 2009), hybrid regimes between prior consultation and FPIC were established 
(Szablowski, 2010). In practice, the resource-based economies impose narrow 
interpretations of prior consultation (Schilling-Vacafor, 2017 on Bolivia; Bur-
gos, 2015 and Vallejon, 2014 on Ecuador). Falleti and Riofrancos (2014) speak 
of poison pills, which are formal rules, e.g. in the form of regulatory presidential 
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that whilst constitutions and national laws may establish consultation as part of 
indigenous rights, those rights become downsized by further regulations in the 
extractive industries sector or are limited by other political decisions. Larsen 
(2016) fnds in a comparative study on Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru a 
trend of domesticating and compartmentalizing indigenous peoples’ rights and 
limiting them by national interests in resource extraction. Also in Colombia, the 
government and private industries intended and partially annulled progressive 
rulings of the Constitutional Court recognizing FPIC (Doyle, 2015, p. 200). 
Regarding efective participation, the literature has found that consulta-
tion processes are merely procedural. In Peru, the limitations on consultations 
included even the fact that the ideas, interests and identities of the weaker 
party—indigenous communities—are often not respected, and may not even 
enter into the process at all (Flemmer & Schilling-Vacafor, 2016; Schilling-
Vacafor & Flemmer, 2015). Similar observations can be made in other Andean 
countries. Bolivia, for example, implements prior consultation processes in the 
hydrocarbon sector based on sectoral norms since 2007 with a narrow process. 
The state generally acts as an accomplice to the companies, using participatory 
arenas to silence dissent (Fontana & Grugel, 2016; Schilling-Vacafor, 2017; 
Schilling-Vacafor & Eichler, 2017). In the same vein, Colombia ultimately 
has the amplest experience in conducting prior consultations. However, these 
processes are considered to be merely procedural and are said not to give com-
munities a meaningful say (Rodríguez-Garavito et al., 2010). In Chile, the 
recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights is still absent in the constitution, but 
the legal implementation of prior consultation has advanced (Tomaselli, 2019). 
However, the government seems to consider “consultation as a tick in the 
box” (Ibid., p. 129). Recent protests against President Sebastián Piñera and the 
results of a referendum in 2020 call for revising the current constitution and 
holding discussions on further recognition and realization of indigenous rights 
in practice (Montes, 2020). Lastly, Ecuador has recently begun to put consulta-
tions into practice in the hydrocarbon sector in 2013. Yet, scholars fnd that the 
Ecuadorian processes were solely classifed as prior consultation and much closer 
to a procedure collecting complaints than to a participatory process (Burgos, 
2015; Leifsen et al., 2017; Vallejo, 2014). 
Finally, prior consultations and legal frameworks for indigenous peoples’ 
rights have been criticized as providing merely symbolic solutions to material 
problems (Fontana & Grugel, 2016; Goodale, 2016). Power relations underlying
resource extraction are highly asymmetric. Like the Political Ecology literature 
emphasizes, the structures distributing negative impacts and benefts of these 
projects are fundamentally asymmetric and unjust (Bebbington & Bury, 2013). 
Consequently, prior consultations are implemented in this context of power 
asymmetry. While international standards, such as the ILO C169 and the 
UNDRIP, urge governments to share benefts with the afected communities, 
most negotiations only include compensation payments and social programs 
(Flemmer & Schilling-Vacafor, 2016; Schilling-Vacafor, 2014, 2017). Also, the 
ECLAC report (2014, p. 23) on indigenous peoples’ rights in Latin America 
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concludes that the region has incorporated important participatory rights, but 
“too often there is greater emphasis on the consultation procedure than on 
reaching agreements for the full exercise of indigenous peoples’ rights.” As Tor-
res Wong (2018, p. 144) writes, 
in a context of persistent and deep economic inequality and generalized 
violence, it should come as no surprise that the implementation of the right 
to prior consultation has failed to protect Indigenous territories in the ways 
envisioned by its most forthright advocates. 
Additionally, power asymmetries also exist within and between communities. 
In this regard, consultations have been characterized as favoring local elites, dis-
advantaging women (Eichler, 2019), and leading to fragmentation and confict 
(Arellano-Yanguas, 2011). 
Reasons for the limitations of prior consultation to reform resource gov-
ernance are generally attributed to the poor institutional embeddedness and 
governments’ lack of political will to meaningfully implement participatory 
reforms. In terms of institutional embedding, the preconditions for par-
ticipatory governance are not in place in most countries. These preconditions 
include: On the state’s side, the imposition of consultation procedures, a lack 
of intercultural capacities of the state personnel and the absence of follow-up 
mechanisms. On the communities’ side, these include weak structures of local 
organizations as well as a lack of capacity to understand and evaluate the infor-
mation presented by the consulting entity. In this regard, Schilling-Vacafor and 
Flemmer (2015, p. 811) summarize: “Establishing these preconditions would 
result in state institutions capable of justly balancing the diverse interests at stake; 
measures that reduce power asymmetries within consultations; and joint deci-
sion-making processes with binding agreements.” However, consultations with 
indigenous communities in remote areas sufer from an overload of demands for 
basic state services, when they are almost the sole contact between communities 
and the state (Ibid.). Another crucial issue is that the regulations were elaborated 
unilaterally by the state administration and the social movement actors were 
not included—or as in Peru, left the processes. Based on a comparison of the 
institutionalization of consultation processes in Bolivia and Ecuador, Falleti and 
Riofrancos (2018, p. 88) argue that 
for the newly created institution to strengthen there must be a process of 
political incorporation of the mobilized social actors during the early stages 
of regulation and implementation. We show that while social mobilization 
is a necessary condition of institutional strength, it is not sufcient. 
They conceptualize (Ibid., p.  91) institutional strength as institutions being 
“legitimate, efcacious, and enforced” and conclude (Ibid., p. 91), “[e]nforce-
ment is not solely a function of the state’s institutional capacities, but also of its 
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However, communities and their allies also have strategies to use prior con-
sultation in informal ways. While for communities there is no formal legal way 
to veto projects through prior consultation processes, communities can still use 
formal consultations to (1) mobilize for more meaningful negotiations over 
project terms and agreements; (2) block processes and articulate broader griev-
ances; (3) deny consultations and block projects (Schilling-Vacafor & Flemmer, 
2020; also Jaskoski, 2020). Further, indigenous peoples started to refrain from 
engaging in dialogue with the state out of frustration that these processes do not 
respect their own development visions and because projects were implemented 
without their concerns being taken seriously (Leifsen et al., 2017). Indigenous 
organizations and communities have also claimed prior consultation and FPIC 
to be part of their own institutions and conduct self-led community consulta-
tion to decide about projects (Fulmer, 2014; Walter & Urkidi, 2017). 
Conclusion 
This chapter explored why in the case of prior consultation the initial resis-
tance of state and corporate actors has shifted to approval and—at the same 
time—the previous advocacy of indigenous peoples turned into contestation 
and opposition. The main argument is that this shifts in advocacy has resulted 
from prior consultation being a promising institutional innovation established in
constitutions and laws but then has become downsized by formal regulations of 
governments and state administration as well as by informal practices following 
corporate interests of the extractive industries. 
At the same time, despite the eforts of states and companies to limit it, prior 
consultation has nevertheless become more institutionalized throughout Latin 
America. After being formally established in the 1990s and 2000s, in the 2010s a
wave of consultation regulations and participatory processes were implemented 
in the Andean countries. Reasons for the fnal push for institutionalizing prior 
consultation vary among the diferent countries. However, in almost all cases 
indigenous peoples’ mobilizations and international pressure played a key role. 
For the Andean states, this means that institutional change was imposed by civil 
society actors, international organizations and donor agencies. 
Rather than adapting the extractive sector to indigenous peoples’ rights,
prior consultation has been adapted to the logic of the extractive industries.
For the Andean countries, scholars distinguish broadly between “classi-
cal”, neoliberal forms of extractivism and more recent heterodox models of
extractivism (Larsen, 2016) in Bolivia and Ecuador. Prior consultation has
been institutionalized in both contexts but with similar results. In general,
the processes implemented in the hydrocarbon and mining sectors have been
criticized due to the state-controlled access to consultation, the limited infu-
ence of indigenous peoples during the processes and the narrow agreements.
Thereby, particularly alarming is that the regulation of prior consultation has
“contributed to disempower indigenous peoples and communities” (Urteaga-
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Beyond shortcomings in the implementation of consultation processes, a 
fundamental problem is that prior consultation and FPIC are implemented 
as isolated mechanisms without changing the general logic of the extractive 
industries sector. Two factors are responsible for this: On the one hand, this is 
an issue of strategic framing that narrows discussions over indigenous peoples’ 
rights to procedural questions and single participatory instrument (Rodríguez-
Garavito, 2011; Merino, 2018). On the other hand, prior consultation and 
FPIC on a more profound level have problematic conceptual underpinnings. 
First, consultations are conducted only once during the life-cycle of a project. 
Timing is important, and consultation starts rather too early before projects 
are designed, or too late when changes are no longer possible. Either way, 
projects and conditions may change, and therefore participation needs to be 
continuous. Second, the role of indigenous peoples becomes merely reactive 
as they are confronted with outsiders’ proposals to either reject or approve, but 
lack any further say in the actual construction and negotiation of the proposals 
themselves (Masaki, 2009). 
In conclusion, the potential of prior consultation to reform resource
governance is at present rather limited. Prior consultations in the Andean
countries range on a spectrum between two points: The minimal state-led
interpretation converts prior consultations into stages for project advertise-
ment and state monologues. Thereby, consultation turns into an instru-
ment that serves to legitimize extractive projects which have been already
approved. In their more meaningful version, consultations can at least serve
to (re)confgure project designs to lower their impact on local populations
and ecosystems and to (re)negotiate compensation payments and/or the
funding of social projects. However, in comparison to consultations in
Canada and Indonesia, negotiations over beneft sharing agreements are not
even discussed in the Andean countries. Neither is the possibility of call-
ing into question of the implementation of the project itself. FPIC and the
possibility for communities to deny a project is not on the table. However,
communities can still use consultations to mobilize and block projects by
refusing to participate in them. Consequently, from an emancipatory per-
spective of indigenous peoples’ rights there is a need to shift from a top-down
to a bottom-up approach for realizing the true potentials of prior consultation
and FPIC in Latin America. 
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7 The curse among citizens 
Corruption, democracy, and citizen 
participation in the Andean region 
Daniel E. Moreno Morales1 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the relationship between the boom–post-boom cycles 
typical for resource-based economies, corruption, and citizens’ perceptions on 
democratic institutions in Andean countries. I concentrate particularly on how 
corruption, as an informal institution that seems to be intrinsic to economic 
booms related to resource extraction (Dadasov et al., 2017), erodes citizen sup-
port for formal democratic institutions. This erosion can fnd a way of expres-
sion through declarative statements about democratic governance, but can also 
be expressed by a tendency among dissatisfed citizens to avoid forms of political
participation that are channeled through formal democratic institutions. 
While there is ample literature showing that corruption has a detrimental 
efect on the quality of democracy and on the legitimacy of political institu-
tions, this subject has not been thoroughly studied under the specifc dynamics 
of an economic boom in resource-rich nations driven by exports of extracted 
resources. This chapter aims to examine how the particular characteristics of 
a boom and post-boom cycle can set the conditions for corruption to have 
its perverse efect on democratic institutions. By doing so, the chapter starts 
a dialogue between two diferent and rarely interacting research agendas, one 
focused on the institutional legitimacy of democracy and the second on the curse
of resources. Bridging these two research agendas should be useful for better 
understanding setbacks in democratic institutionalization as one of the less vis-
ible facets of the complex relationship between democratic institutions and a 
model of development based on resource exploitation. 
Using recent public opinion data for Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, 
Argentina, and Chile, this chapter explores hypotheses that explain the nega-
tive efect of corruption on citizens’ attitudes towards democracy, focusing on 
beliefs in democracy and their willingness to use its formal mechanisms—or 
alternative and less formal institutions—to participate. The frst section presents 
a theoretical framework based on relevant literature on support for democracy 
and corruption, while the second illustrates data from on these concepts for 
Latin America and the Andean region for the last 15 years. The research strat-
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corruption and democratic institutions for both the individual country cases 
and the regional pooled database. The chapter concludes discussing how the 
specifc characteristics of boom and, particularly, post-boom contexts could 
be enhancing the efect of corruption on democratic legitimacy and political 
participation. 
Support for democracy and corruption 
Democracy and citizen support 
One of the main concerns of contemporary political science has to do with 
citizens’ willingness to support democratic regimes. Scholars from diferent lines
of research have concentrated for decades on popular support for democracy 
and its implications (Almond & Verba, 1963; Easton, 1975; Inglehart & Welzel, 
2005; Welzel & Inglehart, 2007). In order to work and to become fully consoli-
dated, a democracy needs citizens to support it; this means that the people have 
to believe in democracy as the only possible way of disputing power and orga-
nizing society (Linz & Stepan, 1996). It seems clear that democratic government
requires democratic citizens, and while there is ample evidence supporting this 
claim (Diamond, 1999; Inglehart, 1988; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), there is also 
a wide body of research that discusses if and under what conditions support 
for democracy can guarantee that democracy thrives (Fuchs, 2007; Przeworski, 
1991; Seligson, 2002b). 
Support for democracy has diferent levels, arranged along a continuum that 
ranges from the most specifc to the most difuse. Difuse support relates to val-
ues that intrinsically allow democracy to exist and function in a given society; 
in other words, democratic government requires that citizens share some basic 
values related to a few basic concepts, such as freedom, equality, and rule of law. 
This is the most indirect form of support for democracy, and has been named 
intrinsic support (Booth & Seligson, 2009; Bratton & Mattes, 2001). Values are 
likely to stay relatively stable across time, and while several factors afect them 
(including education, confict, and regime performance), they change gradually 
and as part of larger societal processes (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). 
On an intermediate point in the difuse-to-specifc continuum is support 
for the democratic regime. Regime support has to do with the acceptance 
that democracy might have some problems, but is still the best possible way of 
government. This Churchillian understanding of democracy as imperfect but 
superior to any other form of government is at the core of consolidation of 
democracy as the only game in town, or the restriction of the political feld to 
only democratic principles. 
Much more dependent on the context, and thus more variable across time, 
are the more specifc forms of support for democracy. The focus of this support, 
rather than being the underlying democracy or the abstract idea of democracy 
itself, is on the people and the institutions that manage a democracy. This form 
of support can also include satisfaction with the way democracy works in the 
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country, which is a straight-forward evaluation of regime performance. Trust 
in electoral authorities and trust in elections are part of these specifc forms of 
support for democracy (Booth & Seligson, 2009). 
Participation via the formal channels that democracy ofers to citizens is 
perhaps the most direct form of institutional acceptance. Participating in the 
meetings of a political party implies acceptance of this form of political par-
ticipation; this implies the recognition of political parties as valid institutions 
for channeling participation, and the implicit assumption that representative 
democracy is appealing enough to engage citizens. In addition, voting in an 
election has value not only as a mechanism of expressing interests and deciding, 
but also as an almost ritualistic form of participation in the fundamental institu-
tion of democracy (Dalton, 2006). 
Besides these formal mechanisms for participation, individuals can participate 
using informal channels. Informal political institutions are understood as the 
usually unwritten rules that are known by actors, guiding their behavior. Infor-
mal institutions coexist with formal rules and can shape the way in which they 
work (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004), and are particularly visible in countries with 
low levels of democratic institutionalization (Börzel & Risse, 2015). 
It is important to keep in mind that informal mechanisms of participation 
are not the same as informal institutions, in the sense that they are not actual 
informal rules but opportunities to participate derived from such rules. Thus, 
using informal participatory mechanisms depends on the existence and practical
relevance of set of rules that give sense to them. 
Engaging in informal or alternative forms of political participation implies, 
at least to some extent, the acceptance of a parallel set of rules that can be as 
important as the formal and legally prescribed institutions. In other words, 
participating through informal channels means that the formal and procedural 
rules and mechanisms of participation are insufcient for channeling the politi-
cal energy of a society. This participation is not necessarily detrimental to the 
formal set of participatory rules; in fact, informal rules can have a positive efect 
on the performance of formal institutions (Stokes, 2006). 
Informal channels of participation are diverse, and they range from traditional 
forms of organization based on local and indigenous culture to global move-
ments based on post-materialist demands. Many of these forms of participation 
are on the rise around the world, suggesting to some researchers the emergence 
of new forms of doing politics (Calderón, 2011). And they are in part fueled by 
the communication capabilities derived from the social networking applications 
of the Internet (what has been dubbed mass self-communication (Castells, 2009). 
Corruption and democratic institutions 
The relationship between corruption and democratic institutions has attracted 
the attention of political researchers for quite some time now (Della Porta & 
Vannucci, 2012; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006; Rose-Ackerman, 1996b), in particu-
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Vannucci, 1999; Linz & Stepan, 1996). Research has shown that corruption has 
a negative efect on the quality of democracy. Widespread corruption distorts 
formal institutions of democracy, producing a series of efects that result in less 
functional institutions and, thus, in a democracy of poorer quality (Mungiu-
Pippidi, 2006; Rose-Ackerman, 1996a, 1996b). 
On the other hand, corruption afects citizens’ support for democracy.2 The
problem seems to be related not with the existence of corruption per se, but with
the magnitude of corruption as perceived by citizens.3 The literature distinguishes
between large-scale or grand corruption where politicians engage in collusion
and petty corruption. While the dimension of the frst is generally a matter of
citizen perception dependent upon the availability of information (for instance
provided by investigative journalism), petty corruption is the actual experience
of corruption that citizens can have while interacting with public ofcials. In this
form, citizens are victimized by a request to give a bribe in order to satisfactorily
conclude some interaction with formal institutions (Seligson, 2006). 
Support for democracy and corruption in 
Latin America 
Citizen support for democracy has been declining around the world during 
the last decades (Norris, 1999; Pharr et al., 2000). Citizens are becoming more 
aware of the limitations and problems that are intrinsic to democratic regimes, 
and are growing more critical of the political system and its institutions. And this
dissatisfaction often leads to the questioning of not only the individual politi-
cians in ofce, but of the political system as a whole (Dalton, 2004). 
For the case of Latin America, information available from diferent sources 
suggests that average support for democracy has experienced an important 
decline during the last few years (Cohen et al., 2017; Corporación Latinobaró-
metro, 2018; Zechmeister & Lupu, 2019). Likewise, during the last decades, 
corruption has become a central feature of politics mainly because of its 
increased visibility in large-scale corruption scandals. All over the continent, 
former presidents and visible political leaders are facing judicial processes related 
to alleged—or already confrmed—corruption cases. Research has documented
extensively the negative efect of these scandals on the quality of democracy and 
on the perceptions that citizens have about democratic institutions (Canache & 
Allison, 2005; Seligson, 2002a, 2006). 
The Andean region has witnessed some of the most visible corruption 
scandals within Latin America, with deep implications for national politics 
in several countries. Peru is perhaps the most noticeable example, with most 
of this nation’s living ex-presidents facing corruption allegations and judicial 
processes. Also, the Maduro administration in Venezuela and the government 
of Evo Morales in Bolivia, former president Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and 
Cristina Fernandez in Argentina are implicated in serious acts of corruption. As 
a consequence, in the Andean nations the perception of corruption as widely 
spread has reached a historical majority of the population. 
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But the most relevant piece of information has to do with the synchronicity 
in the variation of support for democracy and the perception of generalized 
corruption. Figure 7.1 shows this relationship for the pooled database, which 
includes six countries in the Andean region, illustrating the change in the per-
centage of people that are satisfed with democracy and the percentage of the 
population that think that corruption is widespread in their countries.4 
The cycle of the most recent boom for resource-based economies in the 
Andean region has seen a very particular pattern in the relationship between 
citizens and the state. The boom has brought along both a decline in the 
perception of corruption and also an increase in the satisfaction with the way 
democracy actually works. But this lasted only until 2012; since 2014, the per-
ception of corruption increases, and the satisfaction with democracy decreases 
sharply. In 2019, the majority of individuals in the Andes are dissatisfed with 
democracy and think that corruption is very common among politicians in 
their country. Most importantly, the graph reveals that the trend for all three 
regions coincides with the commodities export boom cycle: Perceived corrup-
tion is lowest right when the boom reaches its peak, and then starts increasing 







*Widespread corruption question not asked in 2017 
Figure 7.1 Percentage of people who feel satisfed with how democracy works in their coun-
try and percentage who think corruption is very common among politicians in 
the Andean region, 2004–2019 
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Research strategy 
The perception of corruption in Andean countries has increased signifcantly as
the commodity-export boom cycle ended. What is the efect that perceived cor-
ruption has on citizens’ beliefs in democratic institutions in the Andean region? 
The empirical analysis focuses on the more specifc forms of support for 
democracy: regime support, satisfaction with democracy, and trust in elec-
tions.5 Participation through formal and informal institutions is also considered, 
assuming that they are more likely to be afected by corruption perceptions or 
experience than actual democratic values.6 
Given this, this work attempts to contribute with answers to three specifc 
empirical questions, with a focus on the Andean region marked by a gener-
alized perception of corruption coinciding with the post-boom: First, does 
corruption afect democratic legitimacy? Second, does corruption afect the 
chance that a person engages in both formal and informal ways of political 
participation? And third, can we speak of new or emerging forms of relation-
ship between citizens and the state that are less formal as a result of corruption? 
The hypotheses guiding this work are based on the understanding that 
democracy is sensitive to the performance of the political regime, and that the 
consolidation of corruption as a stable yet dysfunctional relationship between 
society, the market and the state will have an efect on both citizens’ beliefs and 
practices towards democracy. 
The former can be translated into three diferent specifc hypotheses: 
1 Corruption should have a detrimental efect on support for democracy, 
with individuals who perceive that corruption is generalized among politi-
cians less willing to support a democratic regime. 
2 Individuals who perceive that corruption is more generalized are likely 
to be less eager to engage in the formal ways of political participation 
ofered by the political system. 
3 Individuals who perceive more corruption engage more commonly in less
formal ways of participation, such as protests and public demonstrations as
alternative means of expressing their dissatisfaction with the system. 
This project uses survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project
(LAPOP) and specifcally from their 2018–2019 round of surveys within the 
AmericasBarometer.7 
Data from six countries are employed in analyses both for each individual 
country and using a multi-country pooled database with a total of 9,565 obser-
vations. Individual country samples are representative of the national popula-
tion in voting age, and range from 1,521 to 1,683 observations collected in 
national surveys conducted between 2018 and 2019. The countries included are
Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. Chile and Argentina 
add variability and contrast to the four Andean countries, allowing for a wider 
test of the hypotheses, without losing the capability of identifying particular 
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A series of multivariate statistical models were ftted on the data in order to
estimate the independent efect of corruption.9 The methodological strategy
includes the ftting of the models both using the multi-country pooled database,
which allows to identify efects that could be deemed as general for the Andean
region, and the specifc individual country datasets, in the attempt to identify
particular trends for each country. 
Variable operationalization 
Democratic legitimacy is understood with a theoretical approach that distinguishes
between diferent levels of citizens’ support for democracy along a continuum that
ranges from difuse to specifc. Three diferent measures of support for democracy
are employed as dependent variables in the analyses: One focuses on support for
the democratic regime; the second measure taps more into regime performance,
which is operationalized through the standard question of satisfaction with democ-
racy; and the third variable employed in the study is trust in elections. 
Participation via formal institutional mechanisms is operationalized with two
items: whether the person sympathizes with a political party and if the person does
intend to vote in the next national elections. Engagement in informal mechanisms
of political participation is measured with two diferent variables: one that registers
whether the person participated lately in a public protest or demonstration; a second
one that asks whether the person engages in community based voluntary activities. 
Corruption, the main independent variable, is measured by two variables 
that tap into diferent dimensions of corruption. First, the perception of how 
generalized corruption is in the country;10 and second, the actual experience 
of corruption that the person has had during the last year (whether the person 
was a victim of a bribe request by a public ofcial during the last 12 months).11 
The actual wording of the questions employed for all dependent and the main 
independent variables is included in the annex. 
Additional independent variables included in the models as statistical controls 
are: the individual’s approval of the president,12 an index for general support for 
the political system,13 level of education, trust in the media, the socioeconomic 
level measured in quintiles defned by the availability of capital goods in the 
household, the highest level of education attained by the person, the retrospec-
tive perception of the individual’s personal economy, and the person’s sense of 
physical insecurity at their neighborhood or community. 
Results 
H1. Corruption reduces support for democracy 
The frst hypothesis suggests that perceived corruption decreases citizens’ sup-
port for democratic rule. As mentioned before, the three diferent dependent 
variables defned for measuring support for democracy are regime support, 
satisfaction with democracy, and trust in elections. Table 7.1 presents the inde-




The curse among citizens 129 
Table 7.1 Summary of independent efects from regression models for regime support 
Variable/Country Colombia Ecuador Bolivia Peru Chile Argentina Pooled DB 




Presidential + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
approval 
Trust in the + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
media 
Education + + + + + + + + + + + + 
Gender (female) − − − − − − − − − 
Wealth quintiles + + + + + + + + 
Personal – − − − 
economy perc. 
Insecurity − − − – − − − 
772 704 761 701 745 718 4,401 
Source: Lapop AB 2018–9; + + +/− − −p<.01; + +/− − −p<.05; +/− − −p<.1 
Table 7.2 Summary of independent efects from regression models for satisfaction with 
democracy 
Variable/Country Colombia Ecuador Bolivia Peru Chile Argentina Pooled DB 




System support + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
Presidential + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
approval 
Trust in the 
media 
Education − − − − − − − − − 
Gender (female) – − − − − − − 
Wealth quintiles – – 
Personal – − − − 
economy perc. 
Insecurity − − − – – − − − 
N 769 698 752 693 754 717 4,383 
Source: Lapop AB 2018–9; + + +/− − −p<.01; + +/− − −p<.05; +/− − −p<.1 
Corruption is found to have a negative efect on support for a democratic 
regime, though this efect is limited. While its negative efect is highly sig-
nifcant in the pooled database (representing the combined population of the 
Andean region) and in Chile and Argentina, perception of corruption is not 
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Table 7.3 Summary of independent efects from regression models for trust in elections 
Variable/Country Colombia Ecuador Bolivia Peru Chile Argentina Pooled DB 




System support + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
Presidential + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
approval 
Trust in the + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
media 
Education − − − − − − + + + + 
Gender (female) − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
Wealth quintiles + + + + + + + 
Personal − − − – 
economy perc. 
Insecurity 
N 774 707 768 703 786 717 4,437 
Source: Lapop AB 2018–9; + + +/− − −p<.01; + + /− − −p<.05; +/− − −p<.1 
In addition, having been a victim of corruption by a public ofcial has no efect 
whatsoever on regime support. 
When a more contextually dependent variable such as satisfaction with democ-
racy is considered, the perception of the generalization of corruption among poli-
ticians has a clearer negative efect. Not only the pooled database with its larger
number of observations shows a signifcant efect, but also four out of six of the
individual countries included share this result. In fact, satisfaction with democracy
(measured in a 0 to 100 scale) is 20 points lower for those who believe that all politi-
cians are involved with corruption when compared to those who believe that only a
few are. Only in Bolivia and Peru are corruption perceptions not related with lower
levels of satisfaction with democracy. And again, corruption victimization has no
efect on satisfaction with democracy, other than a minor mild efect in Colombia. 
When trust in elections is considered as the dependent variable, results are 
very similar to when satisfaction with democracy is the focus. Perception of 
generalized corruption has a strong statistical efect when the pooled data are 
considered (on average in the region there is a 22-point gap between those who 
believe that corruption afects only a few politicians versus those who think it 
involves most or all), but corruption victimization does not afect confdence in
elections. But this does not happen in Bolivia nor Peru, where confdence in 
elections does not seem to depend at all on corruption. 
H2. Corruption reduces engagement in formal participation mechanisms 
The second hypothesis posits that high levels of perceived corruption should 
have a negative efect on the likelihood that a person participates using the for-
mal mechanisms available in a democracy. The two formal participation mecha-
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from voting in the next national elections. Tables 7.4 and 7.5 present results 
from logistic regression models ftted on the data for these two items. 
Having a sympathetic relationship with a political party seems to be the 
variable least afected by corruption among all dependent variables considered 
here. Only in Argentina does the perception of corruption decrease the chance 
Table 7.4 Summary of independent efects from logistic regression models for sympathiz-
ing with a political party 
Variable/Country Colombia Ecuador Bolivia Peru Chile Argentina Pooled DB 
Corruption − − − − − − 
perception 
Corruption + + + 
victimization 
Regime support + + + + + + + + + + + + 
Presidential + + + − − − 
approval 
Trust in the 
media 
Education − − − – 
Gender (female) − − − – − − − 
Wealth quintiles + + + + + + 
Personal 
economy perc. 
Insecurity − − − – – 
N 769 700 758 700 744 718 4,437 
Source: Lapop AB 2018–9; + + +/− − −p<.01; + +/− − −p<.05; +/− − −p<.1 
Table 7.5 Summary of independent efects from logistic regression models for willingness 
to vote 
Variable/Country Colombia Ecuador Bolivia Peru Chile Argentina Pooled DB 




Regime support + + + 
Presidential 
approval 
Trust in the 
media 
Education + + + + + + + + + + + 
Gender (female) + + 
Wealth quintiles − − − 
Personal 
economy perc. 
Insecurity – – 
N 744 696 685 679 703 673 4,180 
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that a person sympathizes with a political party, and having been a victim of 
corruption only has a mild positive efect in Peru. 
Willingness to vote in the next national election (if they were held this com-
ing weekend, as opposed to abstaining from voting) is negatively afected by the 
perception of corruption in Chile and in Argentina, as well as in the six-country
pooled database. The decision of whether to vote or not does not seem to be 
afected by either the perception of corruption or the practical experience with 
it in the Andean region. 
H3. Corruption increases engagement in informal participation mechanisms 
The third hypothesis argues that the efects of corruption on political institutions
go beyond formal institutions and fuel participation in informal institutions.
The fnal analyses, thus, explore whether corruption has any efect on voluntary
engagement in community activities and on participation in public protests and
demonstrations. Tables 7.6 and 7.7 present summarized results for these analyses. 
Once other factors are controlled for, perception of corruption was found to have
a mild and partial negative efect on the probability that a person engages in com-
munity activities (it is only signifcant in Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru). But having
been a victim of corruption surprisingly increases this probability, with a signifcant
positive efect in all six countries considered individually and in the pooled database. 
Similar to community activities, those who have been requested a bribe by a 
public ofcial are more likely to engage in protests and public demonstrations 
Table 7.6 Summary of independent efects from logistic regression models for voluntary 
engagement in community activities 
Variable/Country Colombia Ecuador Bolivia Peru Chile Argentina Pooled DB 
Corruption – – − − − − − − 
perception 
Corruption + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
victimization 
Regime support – 
Presidential + + + + + + + + + + 
approval 
Trust in the + + + + + + + + + 
media 
Education – − − − − − − 
Gender (female) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
Wealth quintiles − − − − − − − − − 
Personal − − − + + + + + 
economy perc. 
Insecurity 
N 744 696 685 679 703 673 4,180 
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Table 7.7 Summary of independent efects from logistic regression models for protest 
participation 
Variable/Country Colombia Ecuador Bolivia Peru Chile Argentina Pooled DB 
Corruption − − − 
perception 
Corruption + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
victimization 
Regime support + + + + + 
Presidential − − − − − − − − − − − − 
approval 
Trust in the − − − – 
media 
Education + + + + + + + + + + + + 
Gender (female) + + 




N 771 701 760 701 745 717 4,395 
Source: Lapop AB 2018–9; + + +/− − −p<.01; + + /− − −p<.05; +/− − −p<.1 
than individuals that have not been exposed to this form of corruption. And 
perceiving that corruption is generalized fails to have an efect on protest par-
ticipation anywhere except Argentina. 
Discussion 
The results presented in this study ofer an ample array of implications about the
efects of corruption on democratic institutions and participation under econo-
mies that are booming as a result of an international market avid of commodities.
First, it is important to point out that both support for the political system and
perceptions of corruption change during the post-boom period. During the
good times, average levels of democratic legitimacy in the Andean region not only
remained high but kept increasing until reaching a peak in 2012. Conversely, the
share of the population in the six-country aggregate sample who believed that
corruption was widespread reached its lowest in 2012, after a continuous decline
during the previous years. After that the trend reversed, and citizens began to feel
less satisfed with democracy and more convinced that corruption was institution-
alized since 2014, and by 2019 showed historically extreme values. 
Is there a causal relationship between the loss in system support and the receding
of the resource-export cycle? The information presented here suggests that this
is at least a plausible hypothesis, identifying a correlation between the moments
in which system support declines and the resource cycle ebbs. Corruption seems
to be an intervening variable associated with both the end of the economic cycle





134 Daniel E. Moreno Morales 
The following paragraphs discuss possible answers for these questions, considering
both evidence that confrms the hypotheses and that raises questions about them. 
The results of the analyses presented here show that corruption has a relevant 
efect on the more specifc forms of support for democracy: both satisfaction 
with the way democracy works and trust in elections depend signifcantly on 
the perception of how generalized corruption is among politicians. The more 
widespread corruption is to the eyes of citizens, the less legitimate a democracy 
is when its most distinctive institution (elections) is considered. 
However, there is an interesting variation in the efect of corruption on 
support for the democratic regime. While the efect is evident and statistically 
robust in Chile and Argentina (and the pooled six-country database that rep-
resents the combined population of the Andean region), it is far less defnitive 
in the other four countries considered individually, where the basic belief that 
democracy is the best form of government does not depend on the perception 
of corruption once all other factors are controlled for. 
As part of the same variation, the efect of perceived corruption on support 
for democracy is clear across the region, but it fails to have an independent efect
on any of the variables that measure this support in Bolivia and in Peru. Societ-
ies in these two Andean countries seem to be more impervious to corruption, 
and neither its perception or its actual experience afects the evaluation they 
make of the political system. It is not clear at this point why corruption fails 
to afect support for democracy in these two countries at the same time that it 
has such a signifcant efect elsewhere. Perhaps it has to do with the fact that 
corruption victimization is higher in these countries than in the other coun-
tries included in the analyses (though Ecuador has similar fgures as Peru, with 
Bolivia leading by far with more than twice the percentage of people victimized 
by corruption in Argentina and six times the percentage in Chile). This could 
mean that societies are more used to corruption and thus less afected by it. 
The other way in which corruption is measured here, whether the person 
was recently a victim of a bribe request from a public ofcial, does not seem 
to have any signifcant independent efect on support for democracy. Citizens’ 
evaluations of democracy do not depend on their actual experience with cor-
ruption expressed as bribery, but on their perceptions of corruption among 
politicians. In that sense, it is large-scale corruption, with their prime-time 
media difusion, that afects democracy, not the form of corruption to which 
citizens are directly exposed to (petty corruption). 
The second hypothesis discussed in this paper suggests that corruption should 
have a detrimental efect on the probability that a person opts to participate in 
formal institutional politics through the formal mechanisms available within a 
democracy. Exercising the right to vote and participating in (or at least sym-
pathizing with) a political party are the indicators used for the analyses. This 
hypothesis fnds weak support in the cases studied here; with the exception 
of Argentina, where the data show the expected relationships, and partially in 
Chile, corruption does not afect engagement in formal institutions. 
The lack of a signifcant efect, however, might have to do with particular 
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efect of corruption on institutions: Voting is compulsory in Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Peru, and Argentina, so the “might not vote” has a less clear meaning.14 Under 
a context of compulsory voting, this variable does not seem to be the best 
measure of support for democratic institutions. It is relevant, however, that 
perceived corruption has a negative efect in Chile, precisely one of the two 
countries in which voting is optional. 
Sympathizing with a political party is not deterred by the perception of cor-
ruption, despite the fact that this is a voluntary activity in all countries. Only 
in Argentina does the probability of sympathizing with a party decrease with 
perceived corruption. A plausible explanation would point at the possibility 
that individuals do not see engagement with a political party as an act of faith 
in the democratic system, and conceive it more in practical terms as a means of 
attaining some particular goals or interests. This is almost the exact defnition 
of a clientelistic linkage between parties and voters (Kitschelt, 2000). 
It is more interesting to observe the results of this research related with the efect
that corruption has on citizens’ participation in informal institutions. In contrast
with what happens with support for democracy, what mobilizes participation
through informal mechanisms is not the perception of how generalized corrup-
tion is, but actual personal experience with it through bribe solicitation. While
perception of large-scale corruption afects the legitimacy of the democratic
system and its institutions, the actual practices of petty corruption increase partici-
pation in protests and in community activities (with the exception of Argentina).
Corruption victimization increases the probability that a person participates in
protests and in community activities, once every other factor is held constant. 
There are two possible explanations for this. First, the experience of cor-
ruption causes a sense of malaise among people and that leads them to react 
against formal institutions, engaging in contentious forms of participation. This 
is a plausible explanation, particularly for the variable that measures participa-
tion in protests and demonstrations, and is consistent with an explanation of 
participation in protests as a form of dissatisfaction with the political system 
(Christensen, 2016; Morlino & Tarchi, 1996). 
But the explanation that points at a sense of malaise with the political system
seems to have less capacity to explain the second form of participation through
informal institutions, which is engagement in community activities. Why would
people who have sufered a bribe solicitation engage more in community activities?
Because they have lost faith and confdence in formal institutions? That does not
necessarily have to be the case. It is also possible that there are some individuals that
are simply more active and get in contact with diferent institutions, and that is why
they engage more in community activities and are more exposed to corruption (so
both variables depend on some other factor not considered in the equation). 
Conclusion 
The resource curse theory predicts an increase of corruption in booming 
economies dependent upon the export of natural resources. Increased corrup-
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participation, as an ample body of literature demonstrates. This chapter shows 
that there is strong empirical evidence from the Andean region supporting these
claims over time, suggesting that the malaise brought aside by corruption is 
installed among citizens in form of negative feelings towards the political system. 
Support for democracy and its institutions has seen important declines during 
the last few years in Latin America. Citizens throughout the region are growing 
warier of the political system and of those in charge of it, with a sense of dis-
satisfaction that exceeds discontent with individual politicians and reaches the 
core of democratic support. While support for democracy has been declining 
around the world during the last decade, in Latin America the pattern suggests 
a reversion of a trend that showed an increase in support during the good years of 
the export-boom cycle. A similar but inverse trend can be found in the percep-
tion of corruption, which has increased signifcantly across the region as soon 
as the commodity-export tide started retreating. 
This raises a relevant new angle for research on the resource curse: The decline
in political support and the increase of perceived corruption take place when the
export-boom cycle starts to ebb and recede, not during its peak as it could be
expected from the extant literature. This implies that the negative institutional
efects of the resource curse are a by-product and afterefect of a boom cycle,
and not a direct part of it. This seems to be the case at least in the Andean region
during the latest cycle and might be explained by diferent factors, including a
likely shrinking of the benefts distributed via both corrupt and legal practices. 
The data analyzed here suggest that corruption acts on the way citizens relate 
with democratic institutions in at least two diferent ways: First, the perception 
of corruption as a common attribute among politicians reduces support for the 
political system, afecting both trust in elections and satisfaction with how the 
political system is currently working in the country. Second, actual experience 
with corruption increases the chances that a person participates in a public 
demonstration or engages with other citizens in order to solve problems in the 
community or doing other community-based activities. 
While large-scale corruption is diferent than the petty corruption to which
citizens are directly exposed to, they both refect a problematic way in which pol-
iticians and bureaucrats can take advantage of their position in the state. If both
forms of corruption are large in magnitude and perceived as such by the major-
ity of citizens, then support for democracy and its institutions can be expected
to decrease, while informal ways of participating can be expected to increase. 
While this study does not prove that there is a causal link between the end of 
an economic commodity-export cycle, an increase in perceived corruption and 
a decrease in support for democratic institutions, the information analyzed in 
this chapter shows that this is a plausible relationship. Further research focusing 
specifcally on this question could add valuable knowledge on this issue. What 
the data clearly shows is that corruption and system support are strongly related 
to each other. Thus, corruption might be seen as an economic boom’s curse 
on democratic legitimacy in resource-dependent contexts. 
Appendix 1 
Variable operationalization: questions 
used for main variables 
Variable Question Coding treatment 
Dependent variables (support for democracy) 
Support for the Democracy may have 1 thru 7 original scale 
democratic regime problems, but it is better recoded into 0 to 100 scale 
than any other form of for analyses 
government. To what extent 
do you agree or disagree with 
this statement? 
Satisfaction with In general, would you say that Recoded into a 0 to 100 
democracy you are very satisfed, satisfed, scale for multivariate analysis 
dissatisfed or very dissatisfed and in satisfed/dissatisfed 
with the way democracy dichotomous for graphs 
works in (Country)? 
Trust in elections To what extent do you trust 1 thru 7 original scale 
elections in this country? recoded into 0 to 100 scale 
for analysis 
Sympathy for political Do you currently identify Original dichotomous yes/no 
party with a political party? 
Willingness to vote If the next general elections All options other than 
were being held this week, wouldn’t vote coded 
what would you do? (1) positively in dichotomous 
Wouldn’t vote (2) Would vote variable 
for the current (incumbent) 
candidate or party (3) Would 
vote for a candidate or party 
diferent from the current 
administration (4) Would 
go to vote but would leave 
the ballot blank or would 
purposely cancel my vote 
Participation in public In the last 12 months, Original dichotomous yes/no 
protests have you participated in a 
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(Continued) 
Variable Question Coding treatment 
Engagement in I am going to read you a list At least once a week and 
community activities of groups and organizations. once or twice a month coded 
Please tell me if you attend positively in dichotomous 
meetings of these organizations variable 
at least once a week, once or
twice a month, once or twice
a year, or never. Meetings of
a community improvement
committee or association? 
Independent variables (corruption) 
Generalization of Taking into account your own Recoded into a 0 to 100 scale 
corruption experience or what you have for multivariate analysis and 
heard, corruption among public in very common vs other 
ofcials is: (1) Very common (2) options dichotomous for 
Common (3) Uncommon or graphs 
(4) Very uncommon? 
Corruption During the last 12 months Dichotomous variable 
victimization has been asked for a bribe coded positively if any bribe 
by: a government employee, solicitation took place 
a police ofcer, the military, 
municipality, at work, at the 
courts, at a public health 
service, at a public school 
Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), www. 
LapopSurveys.org. 2004–2019 
Notes 
1 This chapter beneftted from valuable and patient comments by Gerardo Damonte, Bet-
tina Schorr, and Paul Talcott. Errors and omissions are only the author’s responsibility. 
Part of this research was conducted during a post-doctoral research fellowship granted 
by trAndeS at PUCP in Lima, during 2019. 
2 While corruption usually reduces the legitimacy of a political system, it does not always 
work that way. For instance, in countries with weak institutions and clientelistic govern-
ments, citizens can tend to support corrupt government because it ofers some predict-
ability (Manzetti & Wilson, 2007). It has also been shown that corruption can sometimes 
work as oil for moving a slow and inefective bureaucracy (Kaufmann, 1997), but despite 
these facts, corruption has a negative general balance for democracy. 
3 If corruption is widespread but no one is aware of it, support for the political system is 
unlikely to decline as a direct result of it. 
4 Lines represent the percentage of people who a) feel satisfed with democracy and b) per-
ceive that corruption is very widespread, averaging results for six countries: Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, and Chile, between 2004 and 2019. 
5 While the perception of corruption also has consequences for trust in the rule of law 
and for the broader perspective of democratic rule (Heidenheimer, 2002; Lapalombara, 
1994), this chapter limits its analysis to more-specifc democratic institutions. 
6 The analyses consider two diferent yet related informal channels of participation for
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is participation in public protests or demonstrations. Both have to do with the strength of
civil society and its capacity to mobilize and act on an institutional basis that is not stated-
based and is not formal, and they are both relevant to this paper in that they refect a logic
of participation that takes place outside the realm of the formal democratic institutions.
Both are part of a cluster of attitudes that is based on informal institutions as opposed to
those formal mechanisms provided as means of participation by the political system. 
7 LAPOP is a project well-known for producing high-quality comparative survey data 
from most countries in the Americas, and its AmericasBarometer is a survey conducted 
approximately every two years on nationally representative probabilistic samples in each 
country across the region. The 2018–9 round is the latest available dataset at their reposi-
tory. All the data employed here are publicly and freely available at LAPOP’s website 
(www.lapopsurveys.org), which also includes diferent studies and additional information
on the data. I thank LAPOP and its major donors for making these data available. 
8 Venezuela was excluded from the study as the latest round of LAPOP’s AmericasBarometer
could not be conducted in this country due to the political instability and current social 
conditions in this country. 
9 All models employ robust standard errors that account for the efect of sampling design 
(Kish & Frankel, 1974; Knott, 1991; Rust, 1985). 
10 The 2018–2019 round of the AmericasBarometer included two slightly diferent questions 
for measuring perception of corruption in a split-sample setting. Assuming that the dif-
ferences in the wording of the questions were insubstantial to the results, I used both 
questions for the analyses with almost identical results, but reported only one of them. 
11 While a high correlation between these variables could be expected in theory, the cor-
relation is in fact strikingly low (.09). This means that the two variables are found to be 
in fact independent; in other words, corruption among politicians is independent of the 
actual victimization that citizens experience during their exchanges with the state. 
12 Approval of the president is a usual control variable for the individual’s personal evalua-
tion of the government. While it is negatively correlated with perception of corruption 
(-.24), the relationship is low enough to avoid a multicollinearity problem in the statistical
models. 
13 This variable is included as a statistical control in an attempt to control for the fact that 
some individuals tend to have a more positive view of the political system in general, 
which might explain some of their support for democracy, particularly at the most 
specifc level. This statistical control was included in the models for satisfaction with 
democracy and trust in elections. 
14 In fact, 70% of all respondents in the pooled database that say that they will not vote 
in the next elections are in either Chile or Colombia, the two countries where voting 
is not compulsory. The proportion of people that say that they will not vote in Bolivia 
or Ecuador is minimal (less than 5% in each case). However, the relationship between 
compulsory voting laws and voter turnout in Latin America has demonstrated to be less 
straight-forward than expected (Carreras, 2016; Fornos et al., 2004; Haime, 2017). 
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8 Towards new rules for political 
transparency 
Lessons from anti-corruption 
initiatives in Peru and Chile 
Bettina Schorr1 
Introduction 
The assertion that good governance by means of efective regulatory institutions
will mitigate the diferent expressions of the resource curse is commonplace 
in the literature.2 In contrast to this omnipresence and with a few notable 
exceptions (Dietsche, 2007; Haslam, 2016; Orihuela, 2013, 2018; Orihuela 
et al., 2021), silence reigns as to how these institutions can be built. In fact, 
as the resource curse literature points out, achieving political change can be 
assumed to be particularly challenging in resource-rich economies. For a 
variety of incentives set by resource dependency, these polities tend to feature 
political closure (Lipsky, 1968), i.e. the existence of high barriers preventing 
non-hegemonic (non-elite) demands for regulation from entering the policy 
processes to initiate institutional change. How can countries under these
adverse circumstances overcome their resistance to regulatory change and 
improve governance—even against the will of established gatekeepers in the 
executive and legislative branches? 
The Andean countries are a case in point: given their focus on the extractive 
sector, they depend on and perform according to global price cycles. Poverty 
is widespread even after the latest economic boom, and they are characterized 
by strong and multidimensional social inequalities including important power 
asymmetries (Damonte et al., 2018). Both economic elites as well as politicians, 
two groups that tend to overlap in the region, are focused on the resource 
sector, and the political will to regulate it is rather weak (Bebbington, 2012; 
Durand, 2016; Karl, 1997). Business elites enjoy strong infuence, and the policy
processes are generally considered to be closed (Bogliaccini & Luna, 2016; 
Crabtree & Durand, 2017; Durand, 2016; Fairfeld, 2015; Olavarría-Gambi & 
Dockendorf, 2016). 
Recent anti-corruption politics in Chile and Peru are examples for conten-
tious political processes that did achieve institutional change, notwithstanding 
the adverse conditions described before. During the last decade, the societies 
of both countries learned about several enormous corruption scandals that 
elicited enormous social disapproval and, ultimately, drove presidents to draft 
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Congress and by other politicians, a series of reforms aiming at political trans-
parency, e.g. the regulation of political fnance and rules regarding electoral 
integrity, were adopted. 
This chapter explores the recent transparency politics in Chile and Peru
as processes that led to institutional change in the context of the potentially
adverse conditions of resource economies. The cases were selected because
they share important similarities and interesting diferences. Regarding simi-
larities, in both countries, transparency politics are not new: since before the
recent waves of corruption scandals swamped the countries, specialized actors
existed that have lobbied for political transparency for quite some time. How-
ever, it was not until the period inaugurated by the recent wave of scandals
that activism and social disapproval actually translated into institutional change.
Exploring the political processes in Chile and Peru will allow us to identify
the causal mechanisms that worked towards translating social disapproval and
activism into actual change. 
On the other hand, the two cases reveal diferences regarding the ways and 
the time-frame in which the recent transparency processes have unfolded: Chile 
went through a much quicker and less contentious process, while in Peru it 
took more time and brought the country repeatedly to the brink of collapse. 
Thus, the comparison will identify background conditions that account for a 
smoother or more turbulent process respectively. On a more general level, this 
comparison adds nuance to the exploration of opportunities for institutional 
change in resource economies (and other difcult environments). 
The case of anti-corruption politics is particularly insightful for resource 
economies, which research has found to be very prone to corruption (Brollo et al.,
2013; Kirsch, 2014; Vicente, 2010; Zhu & Wu, 2014). The easy money pro-
vided by the extractive sector especially during boom times sets strong incen-
tives for rent-seeking behavior and collusion between politics and money. Also, 
the opportunities to access rents can motivate state ofcials to prevent institu-
tional changes that would end up limiting this access. Thus, political corruption 
and resistance to change do mutually reinforce each other, and this vicious cycle 
can only be broken by pushing the regulators to regulate themselves. 
This chapter explores the political processes targeting political transparency 
regulation in Chile and Peru in order to achieve a better understanding of the 
conditions and mechanisms facilitating institutional change in political environ-
ments unreceptive to change, such as those characterized by resource depen-
dence. Regarding the period under analysis, in both cases the exploration starts 
with the recent waves of mega-corruption scandals (2014 in Chile and 2016 in 
Peru). It fnishes with the terms of the respective presidents who had promoted 
the reforms in their Congresses (in Chile, Michelle Bachelet in 2018, and in 
Peru, Martín Vizcarra in 2020). In neither case was the reform agenda adopted 
completely, and the political processes are still ongoing. 
The chapter draws on empirical data collected during two feld stays in Chile 
and Peru in 2018 and 2019. Interviews were conducted with public ofcials, 
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and with experts. In addition, secondary literature including grey literature and 
press articles (print and electronic) were consulted. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: The following section ofers background 
information on political corruption and anti-corruption initiatives in the 
Andean region during the last two decades. Section 3 describes the political 
processes that have unfolded in Chile and Peru aiming at the adoption of new 
regulation for political transparency. The analysis in Section 4 highlights two 
factors that were key to institutional change in both cases: pressure by presidents 
and by organized civil society. The last section concludes with some general 
refections on the conditions and factors promoting institutional change in 
resource economies. 
Political corruption and anti-corruption 
politics in the Andes 
While corruption is defned as the abuse of public ofce for private gain, which 
can be individual or collective (Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2017; World Bank, 
1997), grand or political corruption refers to the type of collusion occurring at a
high level of the state apparatus. It involves politicians embezzling public money 
or bending the law for private interests. In some cases, outright state capture 
takes place where legislation, formally developed and properly passed by the 
legislature, grants benefts in a corrupt manner (Dal Bó, 2006). Thus, corrupt 
infuence is used to have laws written for specifc private benefts. 
In the Andean region, political corruption constitutes a grave problem that 
has enormous economic costs, perpetuates poverty and social inequality and 
prevents the development of institutional quality (Hessami, 2014; Rose-Ack-
erman & Palifka, 1999).3 It includes diferent expressions such as the bribing 
of politicians by private actors, secretive contributions to electoral campaigns 
or political parties, trafc of infuence and the use of public resources for 
personal benefts or patrimonial practices (Barozet et al., 2020; Bogliaccini & 
Luna, 2016; Cañete Alonso, 2018; Crabtree & Durand, 2017; Durand, 2018; 
Fairfeld, 2015; Matamala, 2015; Mönckeberg, 2015) on the national as well as 
the subnational levels (Barozet et al., 2020; Dargent & Muñoz, 2016; Melgar, 
2017; Muñoz, 2019). 
In the face of the latest mega scandals, citizens’ perception of corruption and 
especially political corruption has steadily grown in the region.4 Following the 
Global Barometer on Corruption in Latin America and the Caribbean 2019 
(Pring & Vrushi, 2019), 85% of the respondents think that government cor-
ruption is a big problem, more than 50% perceive that corruption is getting 
worse in their country, and 65% think their government is run by and for a 
few private interests. Politicians and public ofce holders are seen as the most 
corrupt groups. 
The growing perception of political corruption and its costs has catapulted 
the subject on the top of domestic and international political agendas. On paper,
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Morris, 2009; Rotberg, 2019). Prosecutors and attorneys are increasingly tak-
ing up the battle against individuals allegedly involved in acts of corruption. 
However, existing legislation has been criticized for not raising the stakes for 
collusion in the political arena. In particular, rules ensuring electoral integrity 
and preventing vote-buying, transparency of political fnance and the efciency 
and transparency of public services and investments are lacking. In fact, TI 
reports that the majority of citizens (57%) think that their government is not 
doing enough to end corruption. 
Towards political transparency in Chile and Peru 
Refecting regional developments, Peru and Chile share a history of political 
corruption, which became especially pronounced during the respective dic-
tatorships of Augusto Pinochet (Orellana Vargas, 2018) and Alberto Fujimori 
(Dammert & Sarmiento, 2019; Schulte-Bockholt, 2013; Torrico et al., 2017). 
In both countries, corruption scandals continued to pop up after the transition 
to democracy.5 The last decade eventually saw a whole wave of corruption 
scandals revealed, which enormously raised public attention to the subject and 
laid the grounds for the initiation of political processes targeting institutional 
change in anti-corruption matters. 
In Chile, starting in 2013 several major cases of collusion were revealed 
which involved public ofcials and their families from across the entire politi-
cal spectrum (Casas-Zamora & Carter, 2017, p. 20). The most important cases 
were two tax frauds involving private companies, the National Tax System and 
both the conservative party UDI (Unión Demócrata Independiente) (in the 
Penta Case)6 as well as the left-wing Nueva Mayoría (the SOQUIMICH case).7 
The Caso Corpesca confrmed the large infuence of the fshing industry on the 
sector’s governing legislation. While these scandals (and many more) provoked 
public outrage and nurtured demands for stricter regulation, the revelation 
of the Caso Caval became a political tipping point. It involved then President 
Bachelet’s son Sebastián Dávalos and his wife in an act of trafc of infuence. 
Given a rising public attention to the case, Bachelet declared the struggle against
corruption as one of her top priorities and instituted in February 2015 a tech-
nical commission, the Consejo Asesor Presidencial contra los Confictos de Interés, el 
Tráfco de Infuencias y la Corrupción (Presidential Advisory Council against Con-
ficts of Interest, Trafc of Infuence and Corruption, henceforth Consejo Asesor) 
charged with preparing a report with policy proposals for a governance scheme 
that would promote political transparency and reduce political corruption. The 
Commission was comprised of 16 persons who came from very diferent politi-
cal backgrounds and headed by economist Eduardo Engel, a renowned expert 
in the feld, hence its other name Engel Commission (Arís et al., 2019; Sahd & 
Valenzuela, 2018). 
After only 45 days, the Consejo Asesor submitted a fnal report of 217 pages 
with 234 policy recommendations for probity and transparency in the pub-
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corruption, regulation of conficts of interest, political fnance, trust in markets 
and, fnally, integrity, ethics and civil rights (Consejo Asesor, 2015). With the 
exception of those policies afecting subnational governments, President Bach-
elet accepted the majority of the recommendations and sent them to Congress 
for adoption. In the following three years, a frenetic reform process set in and 
as of 2018, the Chilean Congress had approved 62% of the policy proposals for-
mulated by the Engel Commission (Arís et al., 2019; Sahd & Valenzuela, 2018). 
In Peru, the various scandals related to the Odebrecht Case revealed in 2016
opened up a window of opportunity for a process of policy change addressing
the relationship between politics and money. Investigations in the US con-
frmed that Odebrecht had bribed several high-ranking Peruvian politicians
in order to obtain public contracts (Durand, 2018). Former politicians were
put under arrest, amongst them virtually all ex-presidents of the country and
several high-profle political leaders such as the opposition leader Keiko Fuji-
mori. Eventually even then-President Pedro Pablo Kucinsky resigned when
facing congressional impeachment because of his involvement with Odebrecht
during his time as a minister of the government of Alejandro Toledo (Vergara,
2018). His vice president Martin Vizcarra followed him into ofce. Only a
couple of months later, a new corruption scandal convulsed the judiciary (the
so called NCM Audios), revealing a vast collusive network of judges, ofcials
and members of a criminal organization. Given the high public salience of
the subject of political corruption at the moment, Vizcarra seized the oppor-
tunity to advance a wider political reform. In December 2018, he convened
the Comisión de Alto Nivel para la Reforma Política (High-Level Commission for
Political Reform), which consisted of fve political scientists from important
Peruvian universities led by the renowned expert Fernando Tuesta. In March
2019, the Commission submitted a report of over 400 pages, which contained
12 reform proposals organized in four thematic blocks: anti-corruption and
reporting, governability, political organizations and representation, and elec-
toral participation and civic politics (four constitutional changes and eight
legislative changes). Political transparency and accountability were a transversal
subject. With the exception of the reintroduction of a bicameral system of rep-
resentation, President Vizcarra accepted all reform proposals and passed them
on to the Constitutional Committee of the Peruvian Congress. By 2020, the
Congress had adopted the majority of the reform proposals (Muñoz & Neyra,
2021). 
Promoting institutional change: pressures from the inside 
and from the outside 
Notwithstanding the support of individual congressmen and -women, in Chile 
and Peru the reform proposals concerning political transparency and account-
ability encountered a reluctant legislature. Members of both commissions con-
sider the dominant motives to have been ideological reasons or the perception 
that the reforms would jeopardize legislators’ private interests.8 Despite of
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this resistance, legislators were driven to adopt the reforms by a combination of 
pressure exerted from the inside and the outside of the government. 
In both countries, presidents were key in promoting the reform agendas from 
within the government. They convened the technical commissions, accepted 
their proposals and pressured the legislatures to adopt them. Their motives 
to initiate the reform processes were diferent. While Vizcarra acted out of a 
political belief that a reform was necessary, Bachelet’s decision responded more 
to the desire of immediate political survival. Because the Caso Caval involved 
her son, the opposition and the media accused her of collusion and of covering 
up her son’s illegal activities. While initially inactive, when public disapproval 
of her presidency rose to an astonishing 61%, she announced that the struggle 
against corruption would be one of her top priorities. 
Regardless of these diferent motivations, both presidents would act in the 
following years as ferce defendants of the reform proposals. They faced dif-
ferent conditions: in Chile, the relation between the president and Congress 
was much less tense than in Peru which per se facilitated the reform process. In 
addition, Bachelet had two factors playing to her advantage: First, her govern-
ment was based in a stable parliamentary coalition and she was able to mobilize 
the support of the members—or pressure them into support. To do so, she used 
an institutional vehicle called “urgency legislation” which forces legislators to 
vote on proposals classifed as “urgent” within a two-week period.9 The exten-
sive use of this instrument avoided the danger that the probity agenda would 
be shelved by congressional committees, or diluted in endless discussions, and 
thereby contributed greatly to the rapid adoption of many proposals.10 
In Peru, Martin Vizcarra had a much longer and more aggressive struggle 
to fght with Congress over a reform agenda of a wider scope, which included 
constitutional reforms requiring special majorities in Congress and more com-
plicated processes of negotiation. Vizcarra had a harder time pressuring Con-
gress into approval because he could not rely on a stable majority in a highly 
fragmented and divided Congress. The dominant party was Fuerza Popular led 
by Keiko Fujimori, who was not only the daughter of former dictator with 
a similar anti-democratic posture but also fercely engaged in a fundamental 
opposition to the sitting president who had beaten her at the polls (Dargent & 
Muñoz, 2016). To achieve the adoption of the transparency reforms, Vizcarra 
had to use heavier artillery and endure several political crises. In the following 
two years, the Peruvian president imposed a public referendum to bolster the 
legitimacy of his reform proposals in 2018 (which he won);11 he threatened 
Congress with a motion of confdence and with closures in case of non-conf-
dence in 2018 (to realize the referendum); he actually raised two questions of 
confdence tied to the acceptance of reform proposals in 2019, which ended 
with Congress granting confdence and adopting several proposals (the frst 
motion pressured Congress into approving without violating its essence of six 
reforms the presidents’ considered priority; the second came tied to the adop-
tion of an amendment to the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court);12 he 
dissolved Congress after a majority denied the second motion of confdence;13 
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and he decreed new elections in 2020. While the Congress elected in 2020 
adopted further reforms basically to the rhythm of social pressure, the strug-
gle between Congress and president continued. Parliamentarians staged two 
attempts to remove the president from ofce in 2020 on the concept of moral 
incapacity because of unconfrmed allegations of corruption. The second one 
ended up succeeding and plunged the country into another violent political 
crisis that ended with the institution of interim president Francisco Sagasti in 
charge of organizing new elections in 2021.14 
To promote the reform proposals, the presidents in Chile and Peru received 
important support from civil society in general and non-governmental orga-
nizations in particular. In both countries, the presidents and their transparency 
agendas counted on massive social support as expressed in the media, surveys 
and, in the case of Peru, mass manifestations in the streets. In Chile, a whole 
trend was reversed during this period. Originally, Chileans had not considered 
their political authorities and system to be particularly corrupt. With the media 
revealing one corruption scandal after the other starting in 2013, the subject of 
political corruption rushed onto the public agenda and at moments appeared in 
surveys as the most important issue for the majority of the Chilean people (Arís 
et al., 2019, p. 20). While approval for President Bachelet had plummeted in the 
aftermath of Caso Caval, it gradually increased again when her commitment to 
the probity agenda became clear.15 
In Peru, the corruption cases revealed in the context of the Odebrecht case 
spurred massive public outrage of a citizenry already very sensitive to the subject 
of political corruption. Since 2010, Peruvians ranked corruption as one of the 
two most pressing problems in the country.16 Periodically, the scandals captured 
the main headlines of the national press, and the capital Lima repeatedly saw 
large social protests reclaiming an end to what was perceived as a generalized 
political phenomenon. Refecting the high social support of the reform agenda, 
Vizcarra relied on approval rates unseen in Peruvian history, reaching a peak 
of 80% in April 2020 (from 40% the year before (IEP, 2020). In 2019, 85% of 
respondents endorsed Vizcarra’s decision to dissolve the Congress (ibid.)). 
The two processes beneftted in particular from the support of organized 
action by non-governmental organizations dedicated to issues of political 
transparency. The most relevant of these organizations were in both countries 
the national chapters of Transparency International (called Proética in Peru) 
and international organizations (PNUD in Chile and IDEA International or 
Oxfam in Peru) as well as various national and local NGOs and think tanks. 
In Chile, the latter included the NGOs Fundación Ciudadanía Inteligente (Intel-
ligent Citizenry Foundation, 2009), Espacio Público (Public Space, 2012) and 
the Observatorio del Gasto Fiscal (Observatory of Fiscal Spending). In Peru, the 
NGO Transparencia (Transparency) and various smaller groups actively engaged 
in the process. 
These actors brought resources, expertise, contacts and legitimacy to the 
reform processes, and the reports and proposals they had already developed 




Towards new rules 149 
countries, the technical commissions not only maintained close and friendly 
relations with those actors, they also shared several key personnel.17 During 
the drafting of the reports civil organizations acted as brokers between society 
and the commissions by providing channels for feeding ideas into the reform 
agendas, which has led scholars to speak of the co-production of public policies 
(Maillet et al., 2018 for the case of Chile). The fact that these organizations were
generally perceived as trustworthy among ordinary Peruvians and Chileans also 
raised the stakes for opposition or outright veto. NGOs also provided mate-
rial resources to support the work of the technical commissions, who worked 
ad honorem and had only limited resources to run a small secretariat and pay a 
coordinator.18 
Finally, NGOs and civic organizations continued to monitor the reform 
agendas after they had been submitted to congress by combining classical lob-
byism with watchdog and outreach activities. Lobbying not only helped to 
generate support among those legislators principally open to promoting trans-
parency, but also allowed the NGOs to ensure a certain level of control over 
the process of policy formulation. In doing so, congressional maneuvers taking 
place behind closed doors with the aim of twisting or diluting the reform pro-
posals could be exposed to the public. 
On the other hand, outreach activities helped to mobilize public support 
and—more important—to sustain it in time. All of the organizations produced 
reports and information material that could be accessed publicly. They were also
very active in their use of media, both traditional ones and new digital ones. 
Regarding the latter, several internet platforms were established (partly before 
the reform processes started), amongst them in Chile the Observatorio Anti-cor-
ruption (Anti-corruption Observatory) run in consortium by Espacio Público and 
Ciudadanía Inteligente and the web platform integritywatch.cl, operated by Chile 
Transparente, where meetings and audiences of public ofce holders with private 
actors are registered.19 In Peru, the NGO Proética runs an Observatorio de Integri-
dad (Observatory of Integrity) and promotes veedorías ciudadanas, citizen groups, 
that monitor and inform on the performance of transparency initiatives in the 
country. In both countries, investigative journalists have set up virtual platforms 
that ofer detailed information on politicians involved in acts of corruption.20 
Concluding remarks: lessons learned 
This chapter has analyzed and compared reform initiatives towards political 
transparency in Chile and Peru. In both countries, political or grand corruption 
is a large problem. The disclosure of a whole series of mega scandals marked 
the beginning of political processes aiming at the adoption of new regulation 
for political transparency. Although in neither case were the ensuing transpar-
ency agendas adopted completely, the processes did lead to institutional change 
against the will of reluctant congresses. In other words, legislators were indeed 
pushed to regulate themselves. The analysis of the processes showed that in both 
countries the same mechanism of change was at play involving a combination of 
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pressure from the inside of governmental institutions as well as from the outside: 
a strategic coalition among presidents and civil society actors was able to build 
circumstances in which delegates could not aford to vote against the reform 
proposals—unless they were committed to an act of political suicide, as in fact 
they were in the case of Peru. 
The remainder of this concluding section is dedicated to two general refec-
tions regarding the conditions and factors promoting institutional change in 
resource economies where those in charge of political decisions are said to face 
strong incentives for impeding regulatory change. 
First, an entire academic tradition embodied in social movements studies or 
the contentious politics literature focuses on the role of collective pressure and 
social mobilizations in achieving political change. The latest resource boom 
in Latin America, which motivated an infnite number of local conficts over 
extractive projects, has inspired a great deal of scholarly interest in the topic. 
Studies have focused on internal dynamics of protest groups and to a minor 
extend explored the institutional legacies of these groups (among many Beb-
bington, 2012; Dietz & Engels, 2017). In the case of transparency politics in 
Chile and Peru, social discontent as expressed in mass mobilizations and pro-
test, although present, were not the driving force to introduce change. In both 
countries, prior scandals had elicited social mobilizations and outrage, without 
triggering reforms.21 Instead, the cases highlight the role of highly specialized 
civil society organizations acting as brokers between the executive, the legisla-
tive and society. 
Together with the press and the technical commissions, these groups con-
tributed to keeping the subject of political transparency on the public and 
political agendas by means of lobbyism and pressure. By using digital instru-
ments allowing for mass communication (connective action in terms of Bennett 
& Segerberg, 2012), they were able to expose voting behavior of legislatures on 
a permanent basis to the voters and lobby support for the agendas. Moreover, 
they contributed to the campaigns with expertise, infrastructure and other 
material resources. While the cases also stress the role of presidents as promoters 
of change, without the important support from civil society actors (and interna-
tional organizations) the reforms would probably not have materialized. Chile 
is a case in point: during her frst government (2006–2010), President Bachelet 
promoted a very similar probity agenda. Back then, specialized social actors 
would not work towards maintaining the president on track and providing a 
constant pressure on legislators. As a consequence, the reform agenda “died 
in Congress” (Arellano & Carvajal, 2015). In a general perspective, thus, the 
cases might recommend reformers (presidents, legislators or other politicians) 
to form strategic coalitions with these actors so together they can attack once 
windows of opportunities open up. 
The second refection revolves around the greater difculties of the Peruvian 
president to impose the reforms. While institutional change was ultimately 
accomplished in both cases, Vizcarra’s struggle with Congress turned into 
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diferences in form and intensity directs attention to the underlying institu-
tional fundament, i.e. the quality of democratic institutions and, consequently, 
the quality of decision makers. What is outstanding in the case of Chile is that 
after all the Chilean legislators played by the rules and responded to pressures 
for change, albeit unwillingly. Fair enough, since the Chilean reform agenda 
did not include constitutional reforms as the Peruvian did, the stake for adop-
tion of the proposals were lower in Chile. Furthermore, the urgency legislation 
provided the Chilean president with a powerful institutional vehicle to impose 
the reforms. 
These diferences between the two countries are the refection of long-term 
institutional developments since their independence in the 19th century (see 
Kurtz, 2013 for a detailed analysis). Based in an elite pact, the Chilean state 
evolved to a wide scope in terms of territorial control and a high capacity 
regarding public service delivery (Collier & Sater, 2012; Soifer, 2015). The 
high standards of public bureaucracy and bureaucrats in Chile are generally 
acknowledged (Orihuela, 2013; Polga-Hecimovich, 2019; Silva, 2009, 2016). 
Most importantly for processes of institutional change, since the end of the 
dictatorship of Pinochet in 1989, democracy is the only game in town. Chile 
possesses one of the most institutionalized and stable party systems in Latin 
America (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995). Although it has been criticized for 
sacrifcing representation for stability (Luna & Altman, 2011; Siavelis, 2016), 
it has contributed to the efcient functioning of governing institutions. Since 
the return to democracy, party politics have been organized in two large alli-
ances positioned on the left-right continuum. Driven by the need to avoid 
authoritarian setbacks, both conservative and progressive actors have learned to 
cooperate, and cross-party agreements became iterative supported by a set of 
informal institutions (Siavelis, 2006, 2016). Presidents can rely on their major-
ity coalitions and coalitions on their partners. As a consequence, reforms have 
been introduced as products of negotiations on a frequent basis (Sanchez, 2011). 
Although Chile is not alien to practices of clientelism and patrimonialism and 
outright corruption (as the cases show, see also Barozet et al., 2020), at the end 
of the day Chilean ofce holders display a high commitment to democratic 
institutions and the basic tenets of representative democracy. As the analysis has 
shown, confronted not only with internal but also with external pressure they 
voted for the transparency reforms, although reluctantly. 
In Peru, the institutional fundament and quality is of a whole diferent nature.
The infrastructural power of the Peruvian state in terms of scope and public capac-
ity is historically low (Kurtz, 2013). Although it has increased in recent decades, so
has the power of its social opponents (Dargent et al., 2017). The bureaucratic appa-
ratus is generally described as defcient (Polga-Hecimovich, 2019). Most impor-
tantly, the country’s scores for democratic quality are notoriously low (Bertelsmann
Stiftung, 2020). Democratic institutions do perform their functions, but are often
inefcient due to frictions among diferent state agencies, a lack of professionaliza-
tion of ofce holders and, of course, corruption. In particular, scholars point out
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political ideas and to hold delegates accountable according to programmatic lines.
The existing parties are barely rooted in society, which has motivated several schol-
ars to speak of Peru as a “democracy without parties” (Crabtree, 2010; Levitsky,
2013; Levitsky & Cameron, 2003; Tanaka, 2005). 
Parties tend to perform as electoral vehicles for individuals engaging in a
political career in order to access public resources and power. They form their
electoral bases by means of clientelist and patrimonialist practices (Muñoz,
2019). The detachment of parties from ideas and constituencies has dramatic
consequences for the type of representatives entering congress. The commit-
ment to democratic institutions and the responsiveness of many delegates to
public demands and needs is low and depends almost exclusively on individual
ethical standards. This type of delegate is not so easily pressurable into adopting
an unwanted regulation—as Vizcarra’s grim struggle has made clear. 
Moreover, the Peruvian party system features a high number of small parties 
that generally do not survive more than one election period. This multiplicity 
translates into fragmented legislatures and severely hinders the formation of 
stable coalitions. Decision-making, particularly in the case of proposals afecting 
power relations, is difcult under these conditions, even when social demand is 
high and presidents raise pressure from the executive. The Peruvian agenda for 
transparency targeted many of the problems associated with the dysfunctionality 
of the party system and the low quality of democracy only to be torpedoed by 
expressions of precisely these problems. This vicious cycle could only be broken 
by a ferce battle delivered by a coalition between the president and civil society, 
at the costs of years of political crisis and instability. 
The good news of the cases of transparency politics in Chile and Peru is 
that regulatory change is possible despite the expectations of the resource 
curse, even in the presence of adverse incentives. However, when assessing the 
opportunities of institutional change in resource economies, the cases stress the 
importance not only of a good regulation in place or efcient bureaucracies 
able to implement rules (Orihuela et al., 2021). The analysis also points out to 
the importance of the quality of the institutional fundament in place. In other 
words, resource economies can only be governed in a good way, when the very 
political fundament of the polity in question—the grounds on which those 
institutions that matter have to be negotiated—is of a good quality. This institu-
tional fundament constitutes an important antecedent condition that shapes the 
opportunities for and forms of institutional change. 
A fnal note of caution is called for here. As an ample political science litera-
ture reminds, the adoption of new rules does not automatically translate into 
them exerting the desired efect (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; Pressman & 
Wildavsky, 1984). Rules need to be enforced. While transparency politics in 
Chile and Peru have achieved an impressive formal change in recent years, there 
is a rocky road ahead regarding their implementation. Both reformers as well as 
scholars should be attentive to the future course of events in order to develop 
a deeper understanding of how institutional change in the feld of political 
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Notes 
1 I greatly appreciate the helpful comments of my colleagues Maritza Paredes, Markus 
Rauchecker and, especially, Hans-Jürgen Puhle. 
2 Amongst many others: Boschini et al. (2007); Karl (1997); Kolstad and Wiig (2009); 
Lederman and Maloney (2009); Mehlum et al. (2006); Robinson et al. (2006); Ross 
(1999, 2015); Sarmidi et al. (2014); Tornell and Lane (1999). 
3 For Peru, Quiroz calculated that between 1820 and 2000 collusion captured up to 40% 
of government spending and 3–4% of GDP growth per year (Quiroz, 2008). 
4 See Transparency International (2019); also other regular Latin American opinion polls, 
like LAPOP (Latin American Public Opinion Project) and Latinobarómetro, confrm this 
trend. See also Moreno in this volume. 
5 In Chile the public copper company Codelco and the Ministry of Public Work and 
Transport in the Caso Coimas and MOP-gate were involved in corruption scandals (Silva, 
2016). In Peru, the public oil company PetroPeru was charged with collusion in 2008, 
and a major case of embezzlement in the context of an earthquake disaster relief program 
was revealed, amongst many others. 
6 Employees of the Penta Holding Group and ofcials of the National Tax System together 
committed tax fraud by creating fake invoices. The payments for these invoices were 
directed to the political campaigns of party members of UDI. 
7 The company SOQUIMICH had issued false bills and receipts to get tax reductions and 
used fake invoices to transfer money to the party. 
8 Interviews with Commission members in Lima, April 2019 and in Santiago 2018. 
9 On Chilean presidents’ prerogatives for urgency legislation, see Vial et al. (2011). 
10 In fact, the speed of the reforms substantially reduced once urgency legislation was can-
celled (Interview with Commission member, Santiago de Chile, April 2018). 
11 Vizcarra proposed four reforms regarding the re-introduction of bi-camerality, the reor-
ganization of the justice system, the prohibition for immediate reelection of parliamen-
tarians and a new regulation of the fnancing of political organizations. The referendum 
endorsed all of the proposals with the exception of the re-introduction of bi-camerality. 
With this political tailwind from the citizenry, Vizcarra constituted the technical com-
mission in charge of drafting a wider reform agenda. 
12 The legislators not only refused to approve the reform of the judiciary, but they also 
proceeded to nominate new members of the constitutional court which not only openly 
contradicted the reform, but also envisioned the appointment of individuals with an 
alleged past of corruption. 
13 Since it was the second no-confdence resolution submitted during the same presidential 
term (the frst one took place in 2017 against Kuczinsky), the president was constitution-
ally endowed to dissolve Congress—which he did on September 30, 2019. 
14 The crisis included a fve-day interim presidency of right-wing Congressman Manuel 
Merino who had to resign due to social pressure. 
15 See www.t13.cl/noticia/politica/bachelet-alcanza-2017-su-mejor-cierre-ano-aprobacion. 
16 See Proética, Encuestas Nacionales sobre Percepciones de la Corrupción en el Peru, www. 
proetica.org.pe/contenido/encuesta-nacional-sobre-percepciones-de-la-corrupcion-en-
el-peru/ 
17 Eduardo Engel was the director of Espacio Público, and Marcela Rios is an ofcer from 
UNDP Chile. In Peru, Martin Tanaka and Paula Muñoz were board members of the 
NGO Transparencia. 
18 In Chile, UNDP and Espacio Público provided funds for material and staf. In Peru, the 
work of the commission was supported by the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation. 
19 See: http://integritywatch.cl/. Chile Transparente also opened a Centre for Legal Assistance in
cases of corruption (Centro de Asesoría Legal Anti-Corrupción), which provides free legal assis-
tance for victims of corruption or collusion, whistle-blowers, and witnesses of corruption
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20 For instance, in Peru the website memoriayciudadanía.org and the internet journal convoca. 
pe. In Chile, CIPER Chile (www.ciperchile.cl/) ofers information and analysis. 
21 On the other hand, there were also transparency reforms without social pressure, for 
instance under the presidency of Eduardo Frei (Olavarría-Gambi, 2016). 
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9 Between environmental 
subsystem change and 
extractive regime resilience 
Beyond the apparent development of 
Chilean environmental institutions 
(1990–2019) 
Antoine Maillet1 and Sebastián Carrasco 
Introduction 
Chile is not a typical case of resource curse. Since the Pinochet dictatorship 
ended, it has been praised for the quality of its institutions, particularly by 
investors (World Bank Group, 2019). Some even argue that it managed to 
overcome the curse (Haslam, 2016). However, these optimistic views have been 
confronted by critics of the growth-oriented model, who have increasingly 
mobilized against extractive projects since the end of the 1990s (Delamaza et al.,
2017). The opposition towards particular projects had cumulative efects that 
led to larger critique of the environmental policy and can be linked to policy 
change at the end of the 2010s (Sepúlveda & Villarroel, 2012). At the same 
time, this emerging environmental critical discourse and its consequences for 
policy implementation were met by growing discontent by the private sector, 
which began to see it as an obstacle to its own interests that they framed as 
national interests. 
The commodity boom took place in this setting where neither the private
sector nor environmentalists had a positive appraisal of Chilean environ-
mental institutions that have deemed variously as market-conforming (Tecklin
et al., 2011) or anti–private sector (Lira, 2017). This debate also frames our
approach to the questions of this book. To answer the question of whether
institutions that were developed and implemented did foster a greater dis-
tribution of the extractive sector’s gains and a stronger reduction of the
extractive sector’s costs, we have to establish whether environmental institu-
tions have obstructed or hindered extractive projects. To do so, we need a
theoretical framework that will allow us to tackle institution-building and
institutional change, going beyond formal modifcations that might mask
the continuity of inadequacies. In short, our main argument is that the dif-
ferent transformations of environmental institutions in Chile turn out to be
rather marginal modifcations that, despite advancing in certain aspects, do
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The structure of this chapter is as follows. In the frst place, we elaborate a 
theoretical framework based in the literature about policy change, especially in 
environmental politics. Then, we propose a narrative of the institutional path 
of environmental institutions in Chile and the determinants of their change, 
arguing that these transformations are only apparent. Later, we confront the 
narrative of an institutional path with the data on expenditure in environmental 
protection and investment in mining projects. This section shows that Chilean 
institutions have neither slowed down nor accelerated the dynamics of the com-
modity boom, and that the dynamic of change in the environmental subsystem 
is nested in a largely unchanged extractive regime. Finally, some conclusions 
are provided that contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of envi-
ronmental policies in Chile. 
This chapter is based on a large literature review about Chilean environmen-
tal policy since the 1990s, several case studies about specifc laws or conficts, 
and interviews with policymakers, private sector ofcials, environmentalists and 
academic experts. For the case studies, newspapers and other media (particularly
from Diario Financiero) and the story of law (historia de la ley) that the Chilean 
Congress publishes were valuable sources. Other government documents were 
also analyzed, such as reports that evaluate and analyze the implementation of 
environmental assessment instruments. Finally, we also used a database delivered 
by the Environmental Assessment Service (SEA), to analyze the evolution of 
mining projects in the country. 
Path dependence, tensions and apparent 
policy change in environmental policy 
The hallmark of historical institutionalism is the concept of path dependence 
(Mahoney, 2000). Its construction has been a major breakthrough in neo-insti-
tutionalist studies, as it has allowed to envision institutional processes as deeply 
structured by the past and perpetuated by the increasing returns the institutions 
produce (Pierson, 2004). However, it would be misleading to take it as nega-
tion of a possibility of change, as a concomitant literature on policy change has 
made clear. Instead, the observation of path dependence has motivated further 
developments in conceptualizing forms of change, building on incrementalism 
to create alternative categories to replacement such as layering, conversion or 
drift (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). Other authors have 
observed “hybridization” (Maillet & Rozas Bugueño, 2019). 
Layering in particular has been fruitfully used for environmental policy 
analysis in the case of Peru, where a process described as fragmented layering has 
happened (Orihuela & Paredes, 2017). Change came the form of new layers 
growing on formal environmental institutions that remained fragmented among
various public organizations. 
More important than what this process tells us about Peru’s environmental 
trajectory is the general fnding that formal and procedural changes such as 
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change. Since apparent change is relatively frequent, the literature has distin-
guished between adaptive and transformative change, based in the observation 
of neoliberal resilience (Madariaga, 2016). Opponents of change who face external
pressure may embrace or even propose (apparent) changes in order to preserve 
their dominant position. 
Understanding the concepts of policy subsystem and policy regime helps 
understand this diference. Our hypothesis is that apparent change is the 
outcome of a process of change in the subsystem level, and resilience in the 
regime. By switching from a subsystem to a regime perspective, we are better 
equipped to analyze the power issues at stake. Regime has been proposed in 
policy and governance analysis as a way to study the governing arrangements 
that tackle issues that span beyond subsystem boundaries (Jochim & May, 2010) 
or “dispersed problems that lack comprehensive eforts to address them” (May &
Jochim, 2013). A regime is characterized by a set of ideas, governing arrange-
ments and interests of stakeholders (ibid.). Regime analysis tends to address the 
level of problems, ideas, institutions and actors, while subsystem analysis tends 
to focus instead on the formal institutions. 
While regimes and subsystems often are analyzed at the national level,
multilevel analysis is particularly suited for environmental issues. They are
sometimes even framed strictly as global issues, with a focus on “world-level
organizations, understandings, and assumptions that specify the relationship
of human society to nature” (Meyer et al., 1997). They can also be looked
at from a local point of view where the focus is put on restricted areas,
where environmental damages and sufering are localized (Delamaza et al.,
2017). However, instead of exclusionary positions, the literature has mainly
adopted an interconnected perspective, manifest in the expression of glocal-
ization, that can be applied for example to issues such as mining conficts
(Paredes, 2016). 
Processes related to environmental public policies in particular cannot be 
reduced to either an isolated top-down or bottom-up succession of events, but 
have to be considered in their transnational aspects (Orihuela, 2014). Neverthe-
less, the national level remains prominent because that is where environmental 
rules, standards or organizations can be observed when they are built. In that 
case, the typical entry from a policy study perspective builds on a subsystem 
approach to public policy: “Policy subsystems are semi-autonomous subsets of 
a political system with particularized policies, processes, and politics tailored to 
their issues” (Heikkila et al., 2018). The creation of new organizations to deal 
with emerging issues, such as agencies or ministries, usually takes place within 
a tension between on the one side the urge for looking at the intersectoral or 
trans-sectoral2 dimensions of a problem, and on the other the specifc logic of 
sectorization, which operates in such a way that a problem might not be taken 
seriously until it has its own subsystem (Muller, 2009). 
This problem of the sectoral or intersectoral character of policies has
been studied for topics such as gender or ethnic discrimination (Halpern
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environmental policies. New organizations have been created around the
world, often in charge of intersectoral coordination, but with little power to
do so. In fact, they have dealt with a sectorization trap: confning the envi-
ronmental problem in a subsystem where the transversal dimension is lost,
or at least passes into the background. This whole process can also be read in
terms of power. As Pierson showed, power gets built in institutions (Pierson,
2015). Having a ministry—the formal component of a subsystem—does not
resolve the power issues. On the contrary, it might well hide it, for some
time at least, below the symbolic gain produced by the formal creation of
a new institution such as the environmental ministry. So, there might be
change, but it might be only apparent. 
To go beyond apparent change and grasp these power issues, we need a con-
cept able to consider the environmental issues as a transversal problem. To do so, 
the analytical answer lies in the concept of policy regime, an excellent alterna-
tive to tackle “boundary-spanning problems” (Jochim & May, 2010). In short, 
the main argument of this literature is that even apparently large institutional 
changes are not necessarily transformative. In the case of environmental policies,
this implies that even when there have been changes in formal institutions, in 
general these are actually only changes in the subsystem, because the regime 
(as understood by May & Jochim, 2013) continues to operate with the same 
set of ideas and interests of actors. More generally, this case adds to the fndings 
regarding the continuity and resilience that neoliberalism has had in Chile after 
the dictatorship (Madariaga, 2018). 
In the case at hand, going back to the problem-based regime analysis has 
important pay-ofs, as it allows us to recast the discussion of the emergence of 
the limitations of the environmental institutions into a discussion on the resil-
ience of the extractive regime.3 In both cases, we deal with the literature on 
policy change. We should at the same time look at why and how countries fol-
low global trends in how their environmental subsystem plays out, but also how 
this afects—or not—the more relevant game of the developmental regime; in 
the case of Chile, an extractive one. 
Apparent change: the trajectory and determinants of 
Chilean ecological modernization 
During the Pinochet dictatorship, the environment received scarce attention 
(Silva, 1996). With the return to democracy came a big push for environmental 
protection, which generated two waves of ecological modernization (Campos-
Medina, 2019). The frst one led to the Law 19300 of the environment, which 
created the National Corporation of Environment (CONAMA) and the Envi-
ronmental Impact Evaluation System (SEIA) in 1994, and the second to the 
creation of the Environment Ministry, the Superintendence of Environmental 
and environmental courts through several laws between 2010 and 2012. The 
design and implementation of these formal institutions are the product of the 
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Foundation of the environmental system: the creation of CONAMA and 
the system of environmental impact 
In 1992, President Patricio Aylwin sent a bill to create a new formal environ-
mental institution that was approved in 1994, a few days before he left ofce. 
The newly created CONAMA—which ranked lower than ministries—was 
charged with the task of defning environmental policy (Carruthers, 2001) and 
advocating for environmental issues in sectoral ministries (Barandiaran, 2016). 
The SEIA began to operate only three years later, after the implementing regu-
lations (reglamento) of the law fnally passed. 
Contradictory pressures are apparent in the design of this environmental 
system. The policy subsystem around CONAMA and SEIA was placed at a 
disadvantage compared to the subsystems that had long been consolidated under
the Ministry of the Economy and the Ministry of Public Works. The window of
opportunity for advancing in environmental issues was constituted by the post-
Pinochet democratic transition. An emerging ecologist movement participated 
with the democratic opposition and managed to set the topic in the transition 
agenda (Silva, 1996). Their cause was aided by the international context with 
the Río 1992 Summit, where the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change was approved. But the international dimension was above all 
present in Chile’s aspiration to become part of North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), which imposed environmental requirements as a condi-
tion for membership. These international pressures for environmental policy 
change were coming at the beginning of Chile’s strategy of international inte-
gration that the country pursues until today, in which environmental protection 
is merely instrumental. The lower priority on the substance of environmental 
policy as opposed to its optics also helps explain why the new system is part of 
a compromise between sectoral preoccupation and deeper regime orientations, 
which could share a short-time goal but not the same vision or goals. Indeed, 
the main objective of President Aylwin was economic growth (Silva, 1996), 
above environment, as he made clear in a speech he gave in 1992: 
Environmental conservation cannot be considered in a restrictive meaning. 
Our country requires to satisfy growing needs in housing, health, educa-
tion, energy, etc. This involves putting to work the resources that it counts 
on. Environmental protection cannot be considered in a trade-of with 
development, but as one of its components. 
(Aylwin, 1992, pp. 6–7, cited in Campos-Medina &
Larenas, 2012, translation by the authors) 
The priorities of the government, together with the drop in social mobiliza-
tion (Carruthers, 2001), led to a political accommodation, in which civil society 
demands were incorporated, but with no harm for business groups (Silva, 1996).
The concern for the environment had been institutionalized in a subsystem, but 
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The set of regulations following the frst one is a manifestation of institutional 
development of the subsector. Environmental evaluation and certifcation of 
new projects by the state progressively became a more sophisticated adminis-
trative process, as showed by Decree 95, which modifed the regulation of the 
SEIA. It established the defnitions of protected area, execution of project or activity
and modifcation of project or activity and technical specifcations of impact evalua-
tions, such as the formal steps of an evaluation, the components of a report, or 
the channels to hand information to public authorities. However, these guide-
lines did not prevent the emergence of new social conficts over extraction. 
Emerging conficts and a latent institutional crisis 
The general public became quickly aware that the creation of new organizations
and the institution of the evaluation process did not solve the environmental 
problems, as shown by the results of an opinion poll by the Centro de Estudios 
Públicos in 2000. When asked, “do you think that Chile is doing more than 
enough, the right efort, or too little”, more than 80% answered “too little” 
(Centro de Estudios Públicos, 2001). More important that public opinion polls, 
however, for the re-emergence of the environment on the public agenda was 
the major negative environmental impacts caused by projects that had success-
fully passed the evaluation process. 
The frst important environmental confict occurred during the Frei presi-
dency, which followed the Aylwin presidency in 1994. The construction of 
the hydroelectric plant “Ralco” in the Bío-Bío River, which would strongly 
afect Pehuenches communities, was approved in 1997, even though some of 
the public authorities had stated their opposition during the evaluation process 
(Carruthers & Rodríguez, 2009). The contestation of the project through pro-
tests and legal instruments followed until the plant went into operation, in 2004,
and even if it did not manage to stop it, it contributed highly to illuminating 
the issues of ethno-cultural and biodiversity losses, which in turn questioned 
the extractive orientation of the economic model (Risley, 2015). 
However, opinions that criticized the economic model were marginalized by 
became to be known as the Frei doctrine.4 President Frei publicly talked about 
“balancing the economic growth process of the country with environmental 
protection” (Frei, 2003) but at the same time promulgated a Presidential Direc-
tive that would lead to a pre-approval of all projects in the SEIA (González, 
2006). This inclination towards accepting new investments at any cost is well 
illustrated in other conficts such as La Farfana or the Black Swans. La Farfana is a 
water treatment plant in Maipú launched in 2003. The smell it emitted had not 
been mentioned during the evaluation process. The company was condemned 
for the damages it caused to more than 400 people (Farías & Aveggio, 2009). 
The Black Swans case that began in 2004 in Valdivia was a tipping point in 
the local environmental conficts. The spilling of residues by Forestal Arauco 
in the Cruces river triggered a dramatic decrease in the swan population from 
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in 1995 when the Celco-Arauco company sent a proposal to the SEIA. The 
COREMA (Comisión Regional del Medio Ambiente, responsible for the of-
cial environmental review) at frst rejected the project, worried by the pollution 
that could happen in the Cruces River. It was President Frei who put direct 
political pressure on the COREMA so that they would approve the environ-
mental permits. That is why the mobilization, local, national and international, 
targeted the environmental institutions as responsible for the situation. 
All these cases make clear the tension between a formal environmental sub-
system that gave few guarantees for environment and population protection, 
and a permanent push for more extractive investment. Thus, during this time, 
the protection of the environment was subject to the regime that was favored 
by political and economic actors. 
Apparent policy change and regime resilience: the second wave of 
ecological modernization 
In 2010, the most signifcant change in environment institutions since the 1990s
occurred with the enactment of Law 20417, which established the Environment
Ministry, the Environmental Assessment Service and the Superintendence of 
the Environment. Two years later, in 2012, Law 20600 establishing the Environ-
mental Courts was enacted. This legislation set up three new courts, distributed 
geographically in the North, Center and South of the country. These new 
institutions are the culmination of the redesign of the environmental subsector 
that began in 2008, when President Bachelet sent the bills that created them 
to Congress. 
In a general view, the transformation of the environmental system responds 
to a process of incremental change via sedimentation, in which various factors 
(Orihuela & Paredes, 2017) and various actors (Madariaga, 2018) have infu-
enced the growth of institutions gradually and diferentially. 
Figure 9.1 Two decades of environmental policy 
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In the frst place, the diferent social movements that began to be articulated 
since the 1990s created a transversal support for environmental protection and 
generated a crisis of legitimacy of the system. This was expressed mainly in a 
critique of the political role that CONAMA played in the approval of environ-
mentally damaging projects (Barandiaran, 2016). 
Secondly, there was also international pressure to generate changes in the 
system. In the 2000s, the OECD criticized environmental regulations in Chile 
for their weakness, which constituted a strong external demand to transform the
environmental system that existed in the country (Barandiaran, 2016; Tecklin 
et al., 2011). Specifcally, the OECD made recommendations to improve envi-
ronmental policy, which were a necessary condition for the country to become 
a member of the organization (Sepúlveda & Villarroel, 2012). 
Thirdly, there are domestic political factors that explain this transformation. 
In the 2005 presidential elections, very diferent presidential candidates com-
mitted themselves to an institutional change in the environmental feld. This 
concern for the environment was expressed in a transversal way by the difer-
ent political sectors, which gave an account of the relevance that the subject 
had acquired. Even Sebastián Piñera, who was the presidential candidate of the 
political right at that time, made environmental protection one of the main axes 
of his presidential program (Gamboa & Segovia, 2006). This way, the environ-
ment was established as an electorally relevant issue in domestic politics, which 
was undoubtedly essential for the subsequent reform of the system (Tecklin et al.,
2011). After winning the presidential election, President Michelle Bachelet 
renewed her commitment to the issue, leading the formulation of the new envi-
ronmental policy, which ultimately resulted in the establishment of the MMA 
(the Ministry of Environment), the SMA (the Superintendence of Environ-
ment) and the Environmental Courts. 
This analysis of formal changes in the environmental subsystem is, however, 
only one side of the story of Chilean environmental institutions. While these 
formal changes may be the most visible feature, they did not transform the 
extractive policy regime that persisted after these reforms. 
The persistence of the extractive policy regime 
To illustrate the persistence of the extractive policy regime—as opposed to 
apparent change in the environmental subsystem—we build on three strands of 
evidence: aggregated data of extractive projects in Chile, insights from specifc 
confict cases and budget evidence of the weak position of the environmental 
institutions in the Chilean state. 
Extractive projects in Chile: continuity in the policy regime 
The mining industry has become a key sector for investment of national and 
transnational capital. Given this, economic elites have developed “a new set 









166 Antoine Maillet and Sebastián Carrasco 
(Leiva, 2019, p. 145). In the territories, mining companies have established a 
capitalist domination at the local level, maintaining support through clientelism 
(Amengual, 2018) and even defeating the communities that oppose mining 
projects (Leiva, 2019). 
In this section, we present data about the evolution of the mining investment 
in Chile that allows us to argue about the continuity of the policy regime, 
despite the apparent institutional changes that developed in the subsystem. We 
do this analysis in two ways. On the one hand, we observe the decisions taken 
by the environmental authority regarding the diferent mining projects. On the 
other hand, we analyze the investment dynamics to which the sector has been 
subjected, with special emphasis on the wild fuctuations since the 1990s. 
The approval or rejection of investment projects depends on the assessment 
carried out by the Environmental Assessment Service (SEA). According to 
the Environment General Basis Law (Law 19300), this assessment “determines 
whether the environmental impact of an activity or project conforms to current 
regulations”. In general, this tool has two main objectives, one technical and 
one political. First, it seeks to prevent and/or mitigate the negative externalities 
of the projects under evaluation. Secondly, the environmental impact assessment
intends to limit environmental conficts, involving citizens in the early stages of 
the process (Sepúlveda, 2000). 
Figure 9.2 show the status of mining projects since the 1990s. As can be seen, only
a very marginal percentage have been rejected by environmental regulation (only
4%), while the majority of the projects have been approved. Overall, it can be deter-
mined that virtually all projects are approved, so the preventive role of environmental
assessment is questioned. At the same time, 17% of the projects have been withdrawn
by the project owners. This percentage is consistent with socio-territorial conficts,
where local actors have prevented investment projects to be carried out. 
Figure 9.3 shows mining investments in Chile. In the 1990s, the investment 
of the mining projects amounted to approximately 12,000MM$. Already in the 
Figure 9.2 Status of mining projects in Chile (1993–2019) 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on SEA data 
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Figure 9.3 Number of mining projects approved by year 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on SEA data 
2000s that number increased twice, reaching an amount close to 25,000MM$. 
Then that fgure continued to increase signifcantly—reaching more than 
35,000MM$ only between 2010 and 2014. However, the investment would 
have a sharp decline from 2014, maintaining a downward trend in recent years. 
Therefore, the data we present about investment in the mining industry shows 
that business dynamics have followed cyclical behavior patterns, at least in terms 
of investment, since the 1990s. In other contexts, changes in environmental 
institutions have had an impact on investment. In fact, some countries have 
directly sought to restrict mining activity—as in Ecuador—or even ban it—as 
in El Salvador (Spalding, 2018). In contrast, in Chile, despite changes in envi-
ronmental institutions, the industry has followed the dynamics of international 
economic forces. 
As can be seen in Figure 9.3, the number of approved mining projects has 
gone up and down over the decades, reaching its highest point during the 
frst government of President Sebastián Piñera (Figure 9.4), despite the new 
environmental institutions having already begun operations. This increase in 
investment follows the cycles of international commodity prices. 
Figure 9.4 illustrates well how the regulations have not reduced investments, 
despite threats from the industry to respond to new regulations by ending 
investments. Also, the political authorities have insistently promoted invest-
ment, delivering messages to global investors about the legal certainty prevail-
ing in Chile for the development of projects. As an example, in 2013 President 
Piñera, regarding the Pascua Lama project, pointed out that: “All Canadian 
investors can be sure that in Chile we have a democratic system and the rule of 
law is the one who will decide and make the decision on this investment” (EFE, 
2013 [translation by the authors]). 
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Figure 9.4 Investment amounts mining projects approved according to presidential term (in 
Chilean MM$) 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on SEA data 
In recent years, socio-territorial conficts have increased progressively in 
Chile, and conficts over large-scale mining have come to play a leading role 
(Delamaza et al., 2017). While some of these conficts have managed to block 
certain investment projects, the data presented in this section show that mining 
investment patterns are driven by extractive dynamics rooted in a context of 
global capitalism. 
Although this chapter does not go deeper into the role of frms, mining frms 
clearly are using various resources in developing countries to attempt to legiti-
mize themselves in communities (Amengual, 2018). In this sense, Chile has 
not been the exception (Leiva, 2019). Therefore, this general characterization 
of mining investment in Chile accounts for two phenomena. In the frst place, 
it points out the approach that the Chilean environmental institutions have 
taken, by consistently approving mining-based investment projects. Second, 
it states that investment dynamics respond to exogenous factors rather than to 
local political and administrative institutions, moving according to international 
shocks. Business groups as well have generated an active lobby in opposition 
to state regulations since the return to democracy (Madariaga, 2018). In the 
case of environmental regulation, despite the opposition of important social 
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a strong push at the subsystem level, especially with the window of opportunity 
that the OECD opened, there was also a strong resistance, at the regime level. 
Business power in Chile plays a strong role particularly in that it is not only 
strong in policy changes, but also strong in the implementation phase (Mail-
let & Carrasco, 2019). As the establishment of extractive regimes—based on 
the exploitation of natural resources—generates various conficting dynamics 
between the state, communities and companies (Falleti & Riofrancos, 2018), 
business groups also manage lobby strategies to reverse the decisions of admin-
istrative bodies within the framework of the environmental institutions. For 
example, some of the few cases where investment projects have been rejected 
have generated great consternation in the business community. On the subject 
of a recent case that was rejected by the state, the president of the National 
Society of Mining stated: 
Making investments becomes much more uncertain, because deep down 
in these projects, as one develops them, spending increases, and when it 
reaches the moment when the authority has to approve or not approve 
the resolution of environmental impact, if this is negative, everything that 
has been advanced is lost. Companies and investors, just to protect the 
investment they are making, try to do it in the most serious way possible, 
otherwise it would be a risky attitude. 
(Peña & Vergara, 2017 [translation by the authors]) 
This quote is typical of the discourse pervasive in business concerning the 
weight environmental regulation has on their projects, even though our data 
shows that these regulations are mainly business-friendly. 
Environmental policy under pressure: high-profle 
conficts versus general trend 
Several high-profle conficts reveal the ongoing tension between the environ-
mental subsector and the extractive regime in Chile. 
Protests over environmental issues intensifed under Sebastián Piñera’s presi-
dency, as typifed by the massive protests against the approval of a mega dam 
(Hidroaysén) in Chilean Patagonia for the production of hydroelectric energy 
(Silva, 2016, 2018). The protests began throughout diferent cities of Chile one 
day after the project had been approved by the regional COREMA for Coyhai-
que. Later on, they were articulated in an environmental campaign—Patagonia 
without Dams—that reached international dimensions and, fnally, motivated 
the Committee of Ministers to reject the project in 2014 (Schaefer, 2017). 
In that case, the political dimension of the decision was open, contrary to the 
alleged technical nature of the decision. 
Two cases show that the new environmental institutions remained
exposed to political pressure just after being launched. In August 2010,
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Barrancones, which, if built, would have been located a few kilometers
from the Pingüino de Humboldt natural reserve, in the fourth region of
the country. The government resolved the case at the time by intervening
directly in the process, asking the company for the relocation of the proj-
ect, even though it had just been approved through the SEIA. The political
intervention of the president is an extreme example of political meddling
in an environmental institution (Sepúlveda & Rojas, 2010). Technical and
professionalized institutions, decisions remained subject to complex social
and political dynamics. 
A recent relevant case is the Dominga mining project. On August 21,
2017, the Committee of Ministers, the appeal body of the environmental
institutions, rejected the Dominga mining project in the Coquimbo region.
The decision was based on insufcient mitigation measures and received votes
against the project from the ministers of the Environment, Public Health and
Agriculture, while those of Energy and Mining voted in favor and the min-
ister of Economy abstained. The proximity of this initiative to the Humboldt
Penguin National Reserve gave rise to serious objections by diferent envi-
ronmental groups over many years. In spite of this, the project was supported
by the economic ministers, since it meant a strong investment that would
bring important economic benefts for the area and the country (Madariaga,
2018). President Michelle Bachelet supported the minister of the Environ-
ment, which generated a crisis within the cabinet, resulting in the resignation
of the minister and the undersecretary of Finance, as well as of the minister
of Economy. 
Some see this episode as a turning point in the country’s environmental 
trajectory, because environmental concerns were privileged over investment 
and economic growth (Madariaga, 2018). However, it could also have been 
rather a short-term operation, motivated by the communicational objective 
of building a legacy for that presidency in environmental matters. Regard-
ing this situation, Hermann Von Mühlenbrock, the president of the business 
peak association Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (Federation of Chilean Industry, 
SOFOFA), stated that: 
I have always thought that investment projects should be rejected by tech-
nical observations, but when it is done through social refections and as 
those that were heard today by the authorities in charge of the vote on 
the Environmental Qualifcation Resolution, I would like to know who 
can explain to Chileans with few resources and with few job options, that 
they will remain the same and that this will remain their reality, due to the 
rejection of projects like Dominga that bring nothing but development to 
the country. 
(Paleo, 2017 [translation by the authors]) 
The confrontation between subsector regulation and regime aspiration are thus 
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Figure 9.5 Evolution of fscal expenditure in environmental protection (percentage and real 
values) 
Source: Authors based on Madariaga’s (2018) data 
Budget evidence of the weak position of environmental institutions 
As stated earlier, there is reasonable doubt that change in the environmental 
subsystem has been transformative. An analysis of public spending on the envi-
ronment supports this argument. Madariaga (2018) has observed that public 
spending has increased an average of 8.3% annually since 1990. It constitutes 
2% over the average increase in the national budget. However, the argument 
about the increase in environmental protection spending can be nuanced, as 
Figure 9.5 shows. 
The graph allows two readings—either enthusiastic or cautious. The positive 
view emphasizes the progressive increase in public spending on environmental 
protection from the return to democracy to the present day. On the other hand, 
its share of total public expenditure has remained at a low level (between 0.2% 
and 0.4%). Therefore, the main fndings based on the data analyzed is that the 
development of environmental spending in Chile has been rather marginal. 
This context coincides with a policy regime that has been maintained, notwith-
standing important formal institutional changes that have taken place in the last 
decade at the subsystem level. 
Conclusion 
Environmental policies in Chile were formulated with a free market approach, 
in which the exploitation of natural resources remained ideologically and 
politically consolidated, keeping the environmental institutions virtually
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environmental sector implemented during 2010 constitute for many a “lost 
opportunity” (Sepúlveda & Villarroel, 2012). Therefore, since progress has not 
been seen in the legitimization and democratization of environmental decisions,
socio-environmental conficts will continue to persist (Sepúlveda & Villarroel, 
2012). In this way, it is observed that diferent institutional problems related to 
the regulation of business activity persist. The limits of citizen participation6 and 
the technical weaknesses of regulatory instruments are a good example of that. 
Furthermore, it is possible to observe this failure not only in specifc political 
discussions between diferent high-level political actors and in their intervention
on projects with environmental impact, but also in areas such as social confict, 
and in the increase of socio-environmental conficts in Chile (Delamaza et al.,
2017). This observation verifes the argument raised in this chapter: while 
changes in policy subsystems develop, global patterns that promote economic 
growth rather than environmental protection are nevertheless maintained as 
well. This is what constitutes an apparent change in the context of the policy 
regime as opposed to a substantive change, where clear limits to extractive 
activities would be set and development alternatives would be explored. Even 
though there has been an ecological modernization in the country, it is not 
transformative of the policy regime, keeping the natural resources curse as a con-
stant feature. The new formal institutions themselves continue to reinforce 
the established extractive patterns and their impacts on the environment and 
territories. These fndings confrm what some have raised as the continuity of 
neoliberalism in Chile (Madariaga, 2018), although this time in the environ-
mental feld. 
While in Chile environmentalists may have won some battles, where the state 
fnally withdrew support for emblematic extractive projects, they have not won 
the war. This trajectory can best be understood as the product of a persistent 
policy regime that prevails over apparent changes in the environmental subsystem. 
Hence, the dynamics of environmental governance must be understood in its 
confrontation with the deeply resilient power of a longstanding project of eco-
nomic growth and a persistent extractive development regime. 
Notes 
1 This work was supported by National Agency for Research and Development [grant 
number ANID/FONDAP/15130009]; National Agency for Research and Development 
[grant number ANID/FONDAP/15110009]; and National Agency for Research and 
Development [grant number ANID/FONDECYTREGULAR/ 1180496]. Our thanks 
to Valentina Cariaga, Merry Hernández, Nicolás López and Francisco Martínez, all 
students from Public Administration at Universidad de Chile, for their valuable research 
assistance. Our appreciation to Bettina Schorr and Gerardo Damonte who helped us to 
improve the manuscript with their comments. 
2 In this work, we use alternatively as synonyms the term subsystem from the discourse 
mostly in the United States, and the term sector from the discourse mostly in Europe. 
3 Gellert has theorized the extractive regime based on the case of Indonesia (Gellert, 2010). 










Environmental subsystem change 173 
4 This term was coined by environmental activists critical of Frei’s stance on the environment-
versus-growth dilemma, as stated by environmental leader Sara Larraín (González, 2006). 
5 The fnal interpretation of this case requires some caution. A few weeks after the Com-
mittee of Ministers decision, the company appealed to the environmental court, which 
ruled that the process had to be brought back to an early stage, at the regional level, and 
the Supreme Court is at this time analyzing this decision. 
6 In projects with environmental impact, early participation is practiced voluntarily and usu-
ally turned into an instance for negotiation. Participation is loose and focused on driving 
forward companies’ projects rather than promoting democracy. There is little involvement 
of government ofcials in the process and little control over how well information are 
gathered and processed (Ocampo-Melgar et al., 2019) 
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10 Strengthening or weakening 
environmental institutions? 
Chile and the establishment and 
use of environmental courts in an 
extractive economy 
Violeta Rabi and Fernando Campos1 
Introduction 
The political assumption behind the resource curse or the paradox of plenty pro-
poses that rent-seeking or windfalls in national economies dependent on the 
extraction and export of natural resources may have a detrimental efect on the 
robustness of existing regulatory institutions; the implementation and consoli-
dation of institutional reforms; or even democratic quality in terms of trans-
parency and participation (Auty, 1993). While research has confrmed these 
efects, this chapter aims to reinterpret the resource curse’s political dimension 
(Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2008) and assess its applicability in cases that display 
a diferent institutional trajectory. To this end, our study explores the evolution 
and performance of the environmental institutions in Chile. 
As an extractive economy, Chile’s institutional evolution may suggest strength-
ening regulations, closer to what the ecological modernization theory proposes 
(Mol, 1997) or, as Bebbington (2010) states, a case where the extractive indus-
try contributes to modernization and development. In fact, over the last three 
decades (1993–2019), Chile has experienced social processes that may even be 
regarded as counterintuitive if seen from a resource curse perspective. Paral-
lel to the mining industry’s highest growth and the copper price boom, there 
have been signifcant institutional changes seeking to improve environmental 
policy instruments’ availability. Nevertheless, institutional strengthening has 
been put into question by implementing a market-enabling model rather than 
a market-regulation one (Tecklin et al., 2011) and by the lack of participatory 
institutions, similar to what has been seen in other Latin American countries 
(Falleti & Riofrancos, 2018). 
During the 1990s and 2000s, there was an unprecedented increase in foreign 
investment within the mining sector due to the return to democracy and the 
provision of legal stability to capital (Martínez & Díaz, 1997). Though the price 
of copper was not exceptionally high, its contribution to GDP rose to about 
10%, even during complex economic contexts such as the 1998 Asian fnancial 
crisis. Likewise, the mining super-cycle saw an increase in copper’s price from 
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(Álvarez et al., 2017). Thus, the price boom reinforced the extractive model and
the idea that Chile can only achieve development as a mining country. 
During the same period, the design and implementation of two major envi-
ronmental reforms were executed. The ofcial discourse proposed both of them
as measures that would provide a clear set of rules for investors (Olivares, 2010; 
Guilof, 2011). 
The frst transformation emerged as the result of the enactment of the 
Environmental Framework Act in 1994 and the entry into force of the Envi-
ronmental Impact Assessment System (EIAS) as a mandatory step for the imple-
mentation of projects in 1997 (Moraga, 2010; Ulianova & Estenssoro, 2012; 
Cordero et al., 2017). This reform was driven by the measures compelled in 
the 1992 Rio Convention. Hence, at the national level, international infu-
ence played a crucial role in the institutional transformations. The inclusion 
of compulsory public participation during the environmental impact assessment of 
particular projects, for instance, was a way to implement principle 10 of the 
Rio Convention, which demanded the right to public participation during 
decision-making processes conducted by the state. However, it was not until 
the second reform in 2010 that other aspects of this principle, such as access to 
information and environmental justice, came into play. 
Global and subnational factors drove this second reform. On the interna-
tional front, Chile’s accession to the OECD meant reconsidering a series of 
recommendations laid out in an environmental report from 2005 that recom-
mended strengthening the hierarchy of the environment sector at the state 
level (Sepúlveda & Rojas, 2010; CNID, 2017). Locally, the collective pressure 
exerted by massive socio-environmental movements refected the increasing 
public awareness about mega-project installation and its socio-environmental 
impacts (Pizarro, 2007; Sepúlveda & Rojas, 2010). The most relevant cases were
the protest against the construction of the Ralco hydroelectric plant in Mapu-
che territory in 1997, the Pascua Lama mining project in the Atacama Region 
and the pollution of a protected area of the Cruces River in Valdivia in 2004, 
and the emergence of national opposition to the construction of fve hydroelec-
tric plants in the Patagonia region as part of the Hydroaysén project in 2011. 
As a result of the last reform, the Ministry of the Environment replaced 
the National Commission for the Environment (Comisión Nacional de Medio 
Ambiente, CONAMA). Additionally, three new agencies were created: The 
Superintendence of the Environment (Superintendencia de Medio Ambiente, SE), 
the Environmental Courts (ECs, Cortes Ambientales) and the Environmental 
Assessment Service (EAS, Servicio de Evaluación Ambiental). These entities were 
launched in 2012 (Cordero, 2010; Guilof, 2010) to strengthen, oversee, and 
audit operations. The SE’s function was to ensure compliance with existing 
environmental management instruments, while the ECs enabled citizens to 
challenge state decisions if they were deemed inappropriate. 
Our research analyzes the operation of the ECs in Chile. Using these courts 
as a case study is highly relevant, as they may be understood from two opposite 
perspectives. On the one hand, they grant non-governmental actors access to 
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environmental justice. On the other hand, the ECs ofer project holders the 
possibility of challenging the state’s environmental decisions. By analyzing 
the ECs’ performance, we believe that the contradictions between the resource
curse interpretations and the ecological modernization approaches may be 
explained. To this end, the ECs are explored at two levels: institutional design 
and implementation. 
The results of this analysis suggest that institutional weakness and the slug-
gishness in the implementation of institutional reforms within extractive
economies are not always directly related to the high income generated from 
the sale of natural resources but are somewhat due to more complex interac-
tions between the performance of institutions and the social actors who use 
them. Indeed, institutional space may be regarded as a disputed territory whose 
dynamics may be addressed by the notion of institutional colonization, understood 
as social actors’ capacity to infuence institutional environments to introduce 
specifc practices and ideas (Boltanski, 2012). 
The chapter is divided into fve sections. The introduction is followed by a 
theoretical framework where the resource curse and the ecological moderniza-
tion institutional perspectives are presented. Afterwards, we develop the concept
of institutional colonization for Chile, where a convergence exists between the 
export-oriented boom and institutional development. The third section briefy 
describes the method employed and the main characteristics of the ECs. The 
fourth section shows the results of the study. It is divided into four parts: the origin
and institutional design of the ECs, the actors involved in the ECs, the cases 
heard in the ECs and the outcomes of the trials. The fnal section concludes 
and suggests further research possibilities. 
Chile: between the resource curse and ecological 
modernization perspectives 
There is a wealth of international literature on the paradox of plenty, which 
dates back to its emergence during the 1990s (Auty, 1993; Sachs et al., 1995). 
The analysis of these works reveals that eforts have been focused on explaining 
why the abundance of natural resources does not ensure countries’ economic 
development (Ross, 2015). In this approach, regulatory institutions, which are 
theoretically in charge of mobilizing public resources from extractive activities 
to national development, become—in the best-case scenario—insufcient or— 
in the worst-case scenario—corrupted (Olavarría, 2003). Likewise, this inability
to transfer public funds for the beneft of the population is not reversed during 
times of prosperity; on the contrary, it becomes an even more acute problem. 
Therefore, the political dimension behind the paradox of plenty may predict 
institutional weakening episodes during commodity super-cycles since state 
bureaucracies have less incentive to regulate and adopt instead a laissez-faire 
approach. 
On the other hand, and parallel to the research on the paradox of plenty,
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institutions observed in industrial processes within developed economies (Jän-
icke, 2017, 2020). The ecological modernization theory predicts and promotes
industrial and institutional transformation with a specifc focus on environ-
mental protection by linking investment and profts with cleaner industrial
processes. 
Even though the ecological modernization theory focuses on developed
or post-industrial countries (Mol & Sonnenfeld, 2014), it is difcult to argue
that a theory that explicitly addresses modernization processes and socio-
environmental demands can be self-restricted to a small group of states and,
therefore, to a small fraction of the world’s population. In this sense, it is
safe to say that most nations have transformed their institutional frameworks
according to a sustainability approach, based on technological improvement,
entrepreneurship promotion, and market-based solutions over the last three
decades (Foladori, 2005). In this context, institutional transformation is trig-
gered by the growing need and urgency to incorporate sustainable measures
into production and consumption models. From an ecological moderniza-
tion perspective, this means that companies and the states might reduce the
negative impacts generated by their productive activities and beneft from
impact reduction processes by putting adequate market incentives in place and
participating in multilateral negotiations to improve environmental condi-
tions worldwide, as part of the so-called international environmental governance
(Buttel, 2003). 
The utility of describing both theories is that they reveal two oppo-
site evaluations of institutional performance. Chile presents a challenge to
both understandings: its institutions have not been severely afected by the
resource curse, and the two waves of institutional modernization (described
in the introduction) have not been entirely oriented towards environmental
protection. 
Although the reforms of Chilean environmental institutions involved creat-
ing a series of procedures aimed at promoting public participation in invest-
ment decision-making processes and enabled access to environmental justice,
the analysis of how these so-called technical procedures actually work inevitably
leads us to a more critical position. Indeed, the same period in which envi-
ronmental institutions have been reformed showed an unprecedented increase
in extractive activities (Altieri & Rojas, 1999), the rise of socio-environmental
conficts (Delamaza et al., 2017), and the extreme cases of socio-environmen-
tal impacts in sacrifce areas2 (Bolados & Sánchez-Cuevas, 2017). 
Therefore, it can be argued that current institutional transformations have
not contributed to relieving pressure on the environment and local populations.
Dramatic cases such as the ownership of water rights, which are controlled by
powerful groups (Bauer, 2002; Larraín, 2007); the intensifcation of polluting
activities in already degraded territories (Cortés et al., 2016); and questionable
socio-environmental compensation methods in exchange for social consent (the
so-called social license) to operate mega-projects (Chile Transparente, 2018) are all
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The previous may sound contradictory under the assumption that the lack,
or weakening, of institutions is the main reason behind socio-environmental
issues. However, our study argues that existing regulatory systems foster
socio-environmental pressure on an important number of local communities
and ecosystems. Therefore, institutional frameworks should be examined to
explore the reasons behind the emergence of contemporary forms of socio-
environmental sufering (Auyero & Swistun, 2008, 2013), which exist not
only in the lack or weakening of regulatory institutions but also in their
implementation. We propose to analyze this dynamic drawing on the concept
of institutional colonization. 
This concept describes how institutional designs, created for socially agreed 
purposes and in line with legally discussed procedures, are jeopardized or 
destabilized by specifc groups who use them for their interests. In this sense, 
colonization processes should be explored in terms of institutional design and 
implementation. 
Following this concept, the ECs cannot be immediately associated with
institutional improvement due to greater access to environmental justice.
On the contrary, we argue that the legal system cannot be regarded only
as a guarantor of environmental justice. Instead, it can be understood as a
space intended to legitimize socio-environmental tensions resulting from
the multiple interests of diferent social groups. ECs provide a platform for
catalyzing socio-environmental conficts, and the concept of institutional
colonization represents the struggles between diferent powers converging
in this process. Hence, aspects such as the actors involved and the decisions
issued by the ECs are elements that contribute to the analysis of the perfor-
mance of these courts. 
Methodology 
The study is based on secondary information, systematized and analyzed to 
explore the emergence and operation of the ECs in Chile. The history of Acts 
No. 20.417 and 20.6003 enabled us to describe the social conditions under 
which the new institutional framework was designed. Furthermore, the analysis 
of legal cases considered by the ECs provided detailed information on who was 
involved in litigation and how the courts reached their decisions. This data was 
obtained from an inspection of electronic fles on the ECs’ website and recorded 
and organized in a qualitative database.4 Further information was obtained from 
state organizations through transparency requests. 
ECs are specialized legal bodies mostly in charge of ruling on contentious 
administrative cases; they oversee compliance with normative procedures. 
Since, in terms of competence, legal claims are the center of ECs, our research 
will focus on them. Legal claims5 accounted for 77.3% of total cases (184) and 
triple the number of environmental damage claims. In this way, the resolution 
of contentious administrative issues was the subject of most of the 238 cases 
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Table 10.1 Total cases processed by the environmental courts (ECs) 
Year Claims of Legal claims Total 
environmental 
damage 
2013 7 20 27 
2014 10 46 56 
2015 15 45 60 
2016 22 73 95 
Total 54 184 238 
Source: Database compiled by the authors with data from EC 2013–2016, available in the websites of 
the three courts: http://2ta.lexsoft.cl/2ta/search?proc=4 and https://causas.3ta.cl/. 
Types of legal claims recognized by the ECs are listed as follows in Act No. 
20.600:6 
No. 1: Cases against executive orders establishing primary or secondary
regulations on environmental quality and emission standards, declaring
latent, or saturated areas and establishing prevention or decontamination
plans (Article 17, subparagraph 1); 
No. 3: Cases against resolutions issued by the Superintendence of the Envi-
ronment if they do not comply with legislation, regulations or other
relevant legal provisions, as well as against the imposition of fnes (Article
17, subparagraph 3); 
No. 5: Against resolutions rejecting or establishing conditions or require-
ments on Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) or Environmental
Impact Assessments (EIAs) or rejecting review requests regarding Envi-
ronmental Assessment Authorization (Resolución de Califcación Ambiental, 
RCA in Spanish) (Article 17, subparagraph 5); 
No. 6: Against the fact of disregarding the observations made by citizens
during the mandatory public participation process of the environmental
impact assessment process (Article 17, subparagraph 6); 
No. 7: Against administrative actions taken by ministries or public services
regarding the enforcement or implementation of quality and emission
standards and prevention and decontamination plans if they contradict the
law, rules or objectives of the instruments mentioned above (Article 17,
subparagraph 7); and 
No. 8: Against resolutions determining the invalidation of environmental 
administrative procedures (Article 17, subparagraph 8). 
For the study, the diferent users identifed as claimants are: 
Project holders, which are divided into private companies, public com-
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II Indigenous communities; 
III Civil society grassroots organizations, such as neighborhood councils, 
trade associations, and environmentalist organizations; 
IV Persons who go to court either individually or collectively and do not 
fall into previous categories due to the temporary nature of their orga-
nizations, which are associated with specifc interests; 
V Companies that do not own disputed projects; 
VI Democratically elected representatives, such as council ofcials, members 
of Congress and regional councilpersons. 
4. Results 
Origins and operation of the ECs 
Initially, the ECs were not considered part of the 2010 environmental institu-
tional reform. They emerged during parliamentary discussions when right-wing
politicians expressed their distrust of the extensive vigilance and sanctioning 
powers of the new Superintendence. For various reasons, the idea of creating 
the ECs was endorsed by environmental NGOs, as they recognized the need 
to have adequate access to justice for socio-environmental issues. Therefore, to 
adopt Act No. 20.417, the executive and members of the parliament signed a 
memorandum of understanding to create a specialized environmental jurisdic-
tion under the Supreme Court’s direct control (Plumer, 2013). 
In line with the previous, the Act No. 20.600 of 2012 created the ECs per 
the following four considerations: judicial control over decisions issued by envi-
ronmental administrative authorities; control should be handled by specialist 
rather than generalist judges; these courts should be composed of expert staf 
in legal and technical areas; given their specialized and unique nature, these 
courts should issue predictable decisions, thus providing legal certainty for all 
parties involved. 
Hence, the parliamentary negotiations acknowledged the idea that the pow-
ers of the ECs would not be restricted to addressing decisions issued by the 
Superintendence of Environment but also expanded to anything regulated by 
the Environmental Act (Act No. 19.300), which would allow access to envi-
ronmental justice in a wide range of matters (Library of the Chilean National 
Congress, 2010). However, despite the expansion of the matters for which it 
is competent, the administrative litigation ECs’ scope produces a bias towards 
procedural reviews. Indeed, the ECs focus on settling the legality of applying 
environmental management instruments, regulations and administrative actions 
associated with them. In other words, the primary role of the ECs is to assess 
whether authorities have infringed the procedures established by law, dealing 
with claims or objections regarding the legality of actions or sanctions emanat-
ing from the administration (Bermúdez, 2016). Unregulated natural elements 
by Act No. 19.300, such as land planning, water, or forest resources, do not fall 
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Furthermore, only a restricted category of actors can appeal to the ECs. In this
respect, Moraga (2012) explains that the Act’s fnal text was more restrictive than
the original proposal. She argues that reasons for admission are always connected
to specifc actors. For example, only citizens who have participated in the pub-
lic consultation during the environmental impact assessment can present a legal
claim against the accuracy or sufciency of the environmental assessment agency’s
response. The previously mentioned implies that citizens who did not have the
chance to participate in this previous instance are prevented for this reason from
using the court even if they consider that their interests have not been guaranteed. 
In sum, the parliamentary negotiations review shows that the ECs were 
created for counterbalancing the powers granted to the SE. Ultimately, the 
fnal design of the ECs focused on the formal monitoring of procedures aimed 
at ensuring the regular operation of existing environmental management 
instruments-regulations, plans, environmental assessment—rather than on the 
provision of legal tools to ensure environmental protection as an end in itself. 
Additionally, the instruments addressed by the ECs explicitly restrain the array 
of actors who may use them in specifc cases, limiting the access and type of 
environmental justice to one that is bounded and procedural. 
Who takes cases to ECs? 
This section analyzes which kind of parties have appealed to the ECs to resolve
environmental controversies. The data shows that claims have been fled in the
frst place by private companies and natural persons (see Table 10.2). When
taking the project holder category (adding private and public companies and state
bodies) and the non–project holder category (the rest of the categories described
in Table 10.2) as a whole, both turn to the courts to an equal extent, 92 cases
each. Despite this, the positions of these two groups are not necessarily the same.
In the case of project holders, they emerge as actors with the specifc interest of
ensuring implementation of their investment projects. This is not the case for
the rest of the users since the non–project holder category encompasses diferent
interests and positions. 
While indigenous communities and environmental organizations aim at
defending local territories and specifc ecosystem and cultural conditions,
grassroots organizations turn to courts for a variety of concerns, ranging from
the protection of the environment or specifc resources (such as water) to the
protection of economic activities (as in the case of fshing associations). The
non–project holder category also includes representatives from other than the
project holder companies who are afected by the implementation of invest-
ments. This is the case, for instance, with agricultural companies fling claims
against mining companies. Finally, it is challenging to identify natural persons’ 
interests, ranging from ecological or quality of life concerns to economic
interests. 
Another form used to categorize the type of users is the distinction between 
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Table 10.2 Number of legal claims by type of user 
Type of user/type of action Legal claims Total 









Other Complaining Company 
Project Holder (State Company) 
Socio-Environmental Organization 
Representative of Popular Election 




















Source: Database compiled by the authors with data from EC 2013–2016 (references in Table 10.1). 
Note: The total considers cases both closed and pending. 
collective and individual claims. There are 37 claims fled by indigenous com-
munities, grassroots organizations, and environmentalist organizations (account-
ing for 20% of total claims) against the 44 claims fled by natural persons and 
other complaining companies (24% of total claims). There are also claims fled 
by public authorities, representing 5% of the total claims (see Table 10.2). 
The claims fled to the ECs can also be classifed according to the projects’ 
distribution among economic sectors. The majority of them are associated
with three: mining, energy and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH).
These sectors represent 24%, 22%, and 14% of the total number of cases fled,
respectively, which accounts for 60% of the country’s total legal claims (see
Table 10.3). In the two frst categories, claims were presented by holders and
non-holders of projects. Claims regarding the WASH sector are fled mostly
by project holders. 
As a general tendency, claims are fled by project holders to allow continuation
of their investments. This suggests that most of the claims fled in the ECs are
not intended to stop the implementation of projects, but rather to go ahead with
them. Claims fled in equal numbers by project holders and non–project holders
were only seen in specifc economic sectors, especially in the case of energy and
mining mega-projects that, according to the literature, are the sectors most prone
to the emergence of socio-environmental conficts (INDH, 2015). 
Which cases are heard in the ECs? 
The law stipulates that cases handled by the ECs are limited by two consid-
erations: they can only handle claims that fall under the reasons stipulated by 
article 17 of Act No. 20.600, and only those with legal standing authorized by 
law can participate in these legal proceedings. 
  Table 10.3 Legal claims by type of user and economic sector 
Type of user/economic Agriculture and Energy Forestry Industry Real Estate Mining Public Fish Land WASH Other Total 
sector Livestock Works Farming Planning 
Indigenous Community 0 3 3 0 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 12 
Municipality 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 
Grassroots Organization 1 6 0 1 5 4 0 1 2 0 0 20 
Social Environmental 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Organization
Other Complaining 1 3 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 7 
Company 
Natural Persons 0 10 2 0 4 10 5 2 0 2 0 37 
Representative by 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 
Popular Election 
Project Holder (State 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 6 
Company) 
Project Holder (Private 8 9 0 7 8 22 1 3 0 20 4 82 
Company) 
Project Holder (State 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 4 
Body)
Total 10 40 5 9 19 44 12 8 2 25 10 184 
Source: Database compiled by the authors with data from EC 2013–2016 (references in Table 10.1). 
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We divided the claims fled into three categories: claimant profle, the institu-
tion that was the subject of the claim, and reason for admission established by 
law (see Table 10.4). In general terms, with 95 and 72 cases each, the Superin-
tendence of the Environment (SE) and the Environmental Assessment Service 
(EAS) account for the most signifcant number of legal actions taken against 
public entities (51% and 39% of total claims, respectively). While project holders
from private companies only fled claims against the SE, legal actions against the 
EAS were taken by project holders, grassroots organizations, and natural people. 
Regarding the grounds for making claims, out of 179 cases, reasons related 
to review the decisions made by the Superintendence of the Environment,
No. 3 (87 cases) stands out as the primary motive. These claims are fled mainly 
by project holders who request a revision of the interim measures or sanctions 
imposed on them. On the other hand, non–project holders focus their claims 
on complaints, approval of compliance plans, and, to a lesser extent, sanctions. 
Though both project holders and non–project holders fle requests for sanc-
tions, the latter used this procedure when there was disagreement regarding the 
magnitude of the fnes imposed, such as on the Pascua Lama and Caserones 
mining projects and the Bocamina thermoelectric project, arguing that they 
were too low. 
Reasons related to invalidation of the procedures (No. 8) are the second-
most-used motive in legal claims, concentrating 46 cases. Although there are 14 
cases where project holders addressed invalidation, this reason is mainly used by 
natural persons and grassroots organizations when fling claims against the EAS 
(12 and 9 cases each, respectively). On aggregate, this reason is used mainly by 
non–project holders (67% of total claims), of which 15 came from organized 
civil societies, 13 from non-organized civil societies, and four from local gov-
ernment representatives (regional councils or municipalities). 
Reason No. 6 refers to claims based on the observation of faws detected by 
citizens during the public participation process. All of these claims challenge 
environmental assessments favorable for the companies. It is worth highlighting 
that reason No. 6 is less frequently used than the invalidation No. 8 (32 cases 
vs. 15 cases), as the former requires the submission of observations during the 
stages of public participation. This conditioning factor restricts the broadening 
of access to environmental justice. 
In the context of restrictive rules to access to ECs, our analysis suggests that 
invalidation is the primary tool used by civil society to prevent projects from 
being authorized. This instrument is used since it is the only possibility that 
allows users to take action about issues that have not been included in the envi-
ronmental impact assessment. It is, therefore, safe to say that members of the 
civil society interested in using the ECs should base their claims on invalidation 
grounds, having to demonstrate the occurrence of illegality during the process. 
This may distort the type of cases handled by the ECs, as the institutional set-
ting requires them to look for a normative breach to obtain access to the ECs. 
Lastly, reason No. 5 refers to claims against unfavorable or the conditional 
approval of the environmental impact. It is not surprising that project holders 
 
 Table 10.4 Legal claims by type of claimant, respondent, and reasons from Article 17, 2013–2016 
Claimant [respondent]/Article 17 No. 1 No. 3 No. 5 No. 6 No. 7 No. 8 N/E Total % 
Indigenous Community 0 3 1 2 0 4 2 12 6.7% 
EAS 0 0 1 2 0 4 2 9 5 % 
ES 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 1.7% 
Municipality 3 0 2 0 0 2 0 7 3.9% 
Ministry of the Environment 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1.7% 
EAS 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 4 2.2% 
Grassroots Organization 1 7 0 1 1 9 1 20 11 % 
Ministry of the Environment 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.5% 
Organ with Environmental 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.5% 
Competence
EAS 0 0 0 1 1 8 0 10 5.6% 
ES 0 7 0 0 0 0 1 8 4.4% 
Socio-Environmental 0 1 0 2 0 2 0 5 2.6% 
Organization
Ministry of the Environment 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.5% 
EAS 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 3 1.6% 
ES 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.5% 
Other Complaining Company 0 5 0 1 0 1 0 7 3.9% 
EAS 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 1.1% 
ES 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 2.8% 









Ministry of the Environment 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 1.7% 
Organ with Environmental 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.5% 
Competence
EAS 0 0 2 8 0 10 1 21 11.7% 
ES 0 11 0 1 0 0 0 12 6.7% 
Representative by Popular 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 4 2.2% 
Election
EAS 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 1.1% 
ES 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 1.1% 
Project Holder (State 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 6 3,3% 
Company) 
Organ with Environmental 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 1.7% 
Competence
EAS 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.5% 
ES 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 1.1% 
Project Holder (Private 2 52 9 0 1 11 3 78 43.6% 
Company) 
Ministry of the Environment 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1.1% 
Organ with Environmental 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 1.1% 
Competence
EAS 0 0 9 0 1 5 1 16 8.9% 
ES 0 52 0 0 0 4 2 58 32.5% 
Project Holder (Organ of the 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 2.2% 
State)
EAS 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 2.2% 
Total 8 87 14 15 2 46 7 179 100 % 
Source: Database compiled by the authors with data from EC 2013–2016 (references in Table 10.1). 
Note: The total considers cases both closed and pending, f ve legal claims included under the scope of Act No. 20.473 have been excluded from the database. 
Note: Reason No. 1 refers to claims against environmental norms; No. 3 refers to claims against procedures conducted by the Superintendence of the Environment (SE); No. 5, against
procedures conducted by the Environment Assessment Service (EAS); No. 6, against the procedures related to citizen observations to projects; No. 7, against decisions made 




 190 Violeta Rabi and Fernando Campos 
fle almost all claims. However, this reason may also be used to request the revi-
sion of EIAs. In this case, claims may be fled by those directly afected by EIAs 
when the variables under assessment and monitoring have substantially changed 
once projects are already underway. In this last case, reason No. 5 is used to 
oppose investment projects. This has happened fve times through claims fled 
by indigenous communities, local city councils and natural persons. 
According to our results, there are restrictions in the institutional design of 
ECs that hamper access to justice for most communities. This problem becomes 
evident in our fnding that organized communities represent only 21% of total 
claims. Likewise, only a limited number of complaints are fled by non–project 
holders against institutional entities for ignoring citizens’ observations. As a 
whole, these cases and invalidation actions fled by the communities account for 
26% of total claims. By contrast, claims presented by project holders represent 
49% of total cases. 
Most of the claims are fled by project holders, meaning that claims refer to 
projects already underway rather than projects under assessment. In this sense, 
the image being spread that civil society is halting projects through the use of the 
legal system is not entirely fair. The performance of the ECs shows that institu-
tional rules privilege project holders to press their claims in court, while other 
citizens face several high barriers. The latter reinforces a structural asymmetry 
upheld by the institutional design, suggesting that the ECs are best understood 
as serving as a counterbalance to the SE. 
How do the ECs resolve disputes? 
In this section, we identify how the ECs resolved cases. From the 184 claims 
considered here, 141 were completed by the end of 2017. Within this sample, 
106 of these cases received a fnal judgment issued by the ECs. From this fgure, 
52 cases (49% of total claims) concluded with a decision handed down by the 
ECs, and 54 cases (51% of total claims) fnalized with a ruling issued by the 
Supreme Court. This means more than half (54) of all cases completed in the 
ECs (106) were challenged by a cassation appeal, moving from a specialized 
court to a generalist one. Thirty-fve cases concluded without a decision, most 
of them because they were deemed inadmissible by the court, or the claimants 
withdrew them. 
At ECs, most of the 106 cases concluded were rejected (see Table 10.5); in 
other words, claimants lost at trial. This means that, regardless of the type of 
claimant, most of them received an unfavorable ruling. Out of the 69 claims 
rejected by the ECs, 38 were fled by project holders, and non–project holders 
fled 31. As for the 18 claims approved by the ECs, both were fled equally by 
project holders and non–project holders. 
It is worth noting that all claims made by indigenous communities, envi-
ronmental social organizations and other complaining companies have been 
rejected. Regarding organized civil society, only two claims out of 18 were sup-
ported by the ECs; this contrasts with the nine claims won by project holders. 
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Table 10.5 Claims by type of resolution 
Outcome of the cases in the ECs Frequency % 
Allowed 18 16.8% 
Municipality 2 11.1% 
Grassroots Organization 2 11.1% 
Natural Persons 5 27.8% 
Project Holder—State 1 5.6% 
Company 
Project Holder—Private 8 44.4% 
Company 
Allowed in Part 20 18.7% 
Indigenous Community 1 5.0% 
Municipality 1 5.0% 
Grassroots Organization 4 20.0% 
Other Complaining 1 5.0% 
Company 
Natural Persons 3 15.0% 
Project Holder—Private 10 50.0% 
Company 
Rejected 69 64.5% 
Indigenous Community 7 10.1% 
Municipality 1 1.4% 
Grassroots Organization 4 5.8% 
Socio-Environmental 2 2.9% 
Organization 
Other Complaining 6 8.7% 
Company 
Natural Persons 10 14.5% 
Representative by Popular 1 1.4% 
Election 
Project Holder—State 2 2.9% 
Company 
Project Holder—Private 33 47.8% 
Company 
Project Holder—State Body 3 4.3% 
Total 106 100.0% 
Source: Database compiled by the authors with data from EC 2013–2016 (references in Table 10.1). 
Note: The total considers cases closed. 
As for project holders, only 9 out of the 57 cases were approved by the ECs, 
and 38 were rejected. This means that most project holders lost at trial in ECs. 
However, they challenged the rejection of 14 claims, accounting for 36% of 
total cases. Once a cassation appeal was declared admissible by the Supreme 
Court, the number of successful claims doubled from 9 to 18. Therefore, it 
could be inferred the Supreme Court tends to accept cases brought by project 
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In the organized civil society, only two claims were approved by the ECs, 
with 12 claims being rejected and fve claims being allowed partially. Likewise, 
75% of the rejected claims (9 cases) were challenged, but only one succeeded in 
the Supreme Court. When civil society claimants won at the ECs, these verdicts
were appealed in the Supreme Court, with one of them being revoked. In total, 
civil society claimants won two cases and partially won another two cases. The 
comparison between these results and those received by project holders reveals 
a considerable gap: 18 successful cases against two successful cases. 
Conclusion 
The combination of descriptive and institutional analysis conducted throughout
this study reveals that the rejection of projects resulting from non–project hold-
ers’ claims before the ECs is a sporadic event. 
It is likewise worth noting that, given the contentious administrative nature
of this court, the only decision they can issue favoring non–project claimants
is to reconsider cases from the moment that a procedural error took place.
For instance, if invalidation is issued against an environmental assessment
resolution, the court may order a reassessment of the project, but it may not
ban the project’s implementation in question. In this sense, it can be argued
that neither the ECs nor the Supreme Court are institutions that allow civil
society to control environmental assessment procedures. As for the Supreme
Court’s role, 8 out of 13 claims fled by non–project holders and rejected by
the ECs were challenged by claimants, of which only two were allowed by the
supreme tribunal. In practice, this resulted in two investment projects coming
to a halt: the Achibueno hydroelectric plant, which was abandoned, and the
salmon farms in Calcurrupe. 
Much of the discussion around extractive economies’ regulatory framework 
is guided by straightforward explanations on how state transformations intended
to strengthen or weaken institutions. This chapter analyzed the design and oper-
ation of the ECs in Chile to illustrate how the performance of novel regulatory 
institutions can become detached from their fundamental normative values: in 
this case, ensuring and expanding access to environmental justice. This situa-
tion led us to propose the notion of institutional colonization to describe that the 
design and implementation of a regulatory institution are afected in its scope 
by the emergence of other orientations. Therefore, institutional colonization 
implies a redefnition of institutional goals in ECs, narrowing its mission. 
It is important to point out that institutional colonization does not mean that 
social actors take total control of regulatory frameworks. Institutions do not 
become entirely instrumental or serve just one specifc interest. As shown in this
study, institutions are felds where diferent social interests enter into confict, 
which reinforce the ideas held by institutional analysis (Powell & DiMaggio, 
1991; Boltanski, 2012). Therefore, institutions became factors that activate 
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In this regard, our study analyzed two diferent levels to describe institutional 
colonization: the design of the institutional framework and its factual operation. 
Both show how specifc actors’ interests permeate the institutions, moving them
to decide in specifc ways. At the design level, it is essential to highlight the 
supervision the ECs undertake on the Superintendence of the Environment. 
This institutional counterbalance role is fundamental when it comes to analyzing 
the operation of the ECs. According to the results of this study, most of the 
claims and successful cases are related to project holders who challenged the 
SE’s decisions unfavorable to them. 
The design of rules for fling legal claims before the ECs reveals a restric-
tive feature in terms of the issues that can be revised by these courts and who 
can access them. Related to the contents, ECs are mainly focused on existing 
environmental management instruments, showing a bias towards procedural 
rather than substantive aspects. According to some groups, the idea of expand-
ing the powers of the ECs towards sectorial regulations is seen as an alternative 
in achieving institutional development, since one of their main weaknesses is 
the excessive formality in the handling of cases, disregarding values such as 
environmental quality and protection. 
The focus on procedural justice implies that communities interested in access 
to these courts have to translate their challenges into cases of formal illegality 
in order to ft into the existing rules that organize the operation of ECs. This 
context could explain why invalidation is the most popular tool to access ECs 
among organized civil society. Another acknowledged institutional barrier is 
the lack of efective legal and technical guidance for fling claims against public 
services. It is also important to give attention to the fact that legal actions are 
taken because there is no other process to engage in, and this one involves long 
bureaucratic procedures and waiting times. 
The powerful voices criticizing the excessive judicialization of investment
projects due to socio-environmental considerations done by communities that
are against them do not recognize the shallow rate of success for the civil society,
environmentalist groups or indigenous communities when compared to project
holders. The latter is true both at the ECs and Supreme Court. In this sense,
despite all major Chilean business associations having spread the hypothesis that
the continued obstruction to the construction of large projects has stifed private
investment and economic growth through court proceedings, there is no evi-
dence from the ECs to support this claim. On the contrary, use of the legal system
to prevent projects from being implemented seldom accomplishes this goal, and
instead merely increases the time and resources required for their construction. 
In conclusion, creating new environmental institutions, such as the one 
designed in the Chilean environmental reform, is not necessarily enough to 
assume direct institutional strengthening. This depends on how instruments 
and procedures are planned, and more importantly, on how diferent actors use 
the institution. 
Future studies may explore three research lines: frst, in order to continue to 
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revision of socio-environmental cases issued at ordinary courts; second, the 
motivations and strategies deployed by relevant social actors in the ECs; and 
third, the content of the decisions issued by the ECs. This latter line of research 
would allow us to understand the type of arguments discussed in the courts and 
how specifc substantive discussions are transformed by being addressed from 
formal perspectives, only to make discussions ft within the existing institutional 
frames. Additionally, the systematization of data on the limitations in access to 
information and comparisons with other Latin American experiences may shed 
light on the particular nature of the Chilean case and the potential use of the 
institutional colonization concept in other regulatory contexts. 
Notes 
1 This study was supported by the Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Científco y Tecnológico 
(National Fund for Scientifc and Technological Development), Fondecyt Iniciación, 
Chile, Grant No. 11160601, and it is based on the study “Derribando mitos: propuestas 
para mejorar el acceso a la justicia ambiental”, conducted by Fundación Espacio Público with 
funds from the Embassy of Switzerland in Chile. 
2 Sacrifce areas are places that have been historically impaired by heavy environmental dam-
age, often through the concentration of locally unwanted land uses. Usually, these zones 
are located in low-income and vulnerable communities. 
3 The Ministry of the Environment, the Environmental Assessment Service, and the Envi-
ronment’s Superintendence were established by Act No. 20417. The ECs were established 
by Act No. 20.600, which ordered the creation and implementation of three environmen-
tal courts in three supra-regional areas: the North, based in Antofagasta; the Center, based 
in Santiago; and the South, based in Valdivia. 
4 All cases were individually registered and identifed regardless of whether they referred to 
the same project or grouped for further deliberation. 
5 Legal claims aim to revise administrative rules and procedures of the environmental public 
administration. Therefore, the ECs are in charge of determining the legality of measures 
taken by authorities. 
6 ECs can also handle other matters: environmental damage (article 17, subparagraph 2) and 
authorization of provisional measures proposed by the Superintendence of the Environ-
ment (article 17, subparagraph 4). These are not analyzed in this study. 
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11 New institutions, old practices 
The weakening of new environmental 
control institutions in Peru 
Maritza Paredes and Lorena Figueroa 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to explain the emergence and implementation of 
new environmental institutions in Peru in the most recent commodity boom 
cycle. More specifcally, it seeks to answer why, in spite of these changes, the 
country is still reproducing a pattern of weak environmental institutions. The 
paper focuses on environmental control institutions, such as the Agency for Envi-
ronmental Assessment and Enforcement (Organización de Evaluación y Fiscalización 
Ambiental, OEFA). This agency has been gravely damaged in the frst decade 
of its operation, and today it faces serious challenges for achieving its goals. 
Meanwhile, in a recently published report, the Ombudsman’s Ofce declared 
that 9,000 Peruvians have been exposed to heavy metals and polluting chemicals
resulting from the waste of extractive industries in Peru.1 
A growing literature explains the emergence of new environmental rules in 
the previous decade in Peru (Orihuela & Paredes, 2017; Granados, 2016; Ori-
huela, 2014). In 2008, the government of Alan García approved new environ-
mental legislation whose main change was to dismantle the previous fragmented
cross-sectoral system. Previous rules dictated that each productive sector had 
an environmental ofce and was also responsible for regulating the quality of 
the environment in its own sector (Pulgar-Vidal, 2008). In the case of mining, 
for example, a specialized ofce called the Direction of Mining Environmental 
Management (Orihuela & Paredes, 2017; Granados, 2016) carried out this 
responsibility within the Ministry of Mining and Energy (Ministerio de Energía y 
Minas, MINEM). It had little autonomy and resources. This cross-sectoral sys-
tem was consolidated in the 1990s by the Fujimori government, which sought 
to favor the promotion of private investments in the exploitation of natural 
resources (Orihuela & Paredes, 2017). 
The creation of the Ministry of the Environment (Ministerio del Ambiente, 
MINAM) in 2008 brought the promise of a centralized, autonomous and 
technical system of environmental governance.2 New rules were promulgated, 
including the creation of a technical organization to handle the control of 
environmental quality: the OEFA. The creation of the OEFA was thought to 
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interference, in particular in light of the doubts cast by communities impacted 
by mining regarding the MINEM’s independence in making environmental 
decisions (Pulgar-Vidal, 2008; Lanegra, 2015). 
Given these institutional innovations, one could argue that Peru’s new envi-
ronmental governance is a departure from the resource curse. This chapter argues 
that, unfortunately, this is not the case: there are new carafes, but the wine is 
still quite old. New formal institutions represent progress in the right direction 
to reduce environmental inequalities in the context of extractive exploitation. 
However, if daily activities and practices in organizations often have very little 
to do with the goal of the new formal institutions, these end up being “myth 
and ceremony” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This chapter explains why isomorphic
institutional change has produced limited results in the context of extractive 
environmental governance in Peru, and how the natural resource curse subtly 
persists in a more acceptable institutional scheme. 
The argument puts forward two mechanisms. First, the forging of isomorphic
institutional change often does not dismantle old and informal practices embed-
ded in the governance of extractive industries, such as the infuence of the 
mining and oil industry on the public sector. These practices survive and persist 
in spite of the new formal institutions, undermining them from the start and 
throughout their formation. Second, the formation of isomorphic institutional 
change can be assisted by the action of social movements or the mobilization 
of communities. Nonetheless, the process of creation of new institutions does 
not necessarily articulate social bases in a signifcant way that would allow the 
development of ownership over these new rules. Actors involved in the creation 
of these rules are often professional elites associated by epistemic values and 
beliefs (Orihuela & Granados, 2021). The study provides empirical informa-
tion to show how old practices, uncontested by social forces, undermine the 
coercive capacity and the shared beneft of new institutions. In the eyes of the 
people, these new rules are more of the same and are quickly discredited, repeating
the pattern of weak institutions in Peru. 
This chapter developed a case study in 2019 based on the revision of ofcial 
documents, the media and interviews conducted between 2016 and 2018. Sec-
tion 2 summarizes the institutional change in Peru in relation to environmental 
control. Section 3 develops the explanatory argument by showing evidence of 
the old practices that are maintained despite the new rules and how they under-
mine the capabilities and legitimacy of the new institutions. Finally, Section 4 
concludes with some refections. 
Institutional change and environmental 
protection in Peru: the OEFA 
This chapter addresses the institutional transformation of the rules of the game
(North, 1990) in the environmental sector in the new commodity boom 
cycle. The analysis focuses on institutions for the protection of the environ-
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Both activities taken together have represented in the last decade about 70% of 
national exports.3 
Institutional changes consisted in the transition from a cross-sectoral system 
in operation since the 1960s to a centralized one, with the creation of the 
MINAM. The main problem with the old rules was the lack of autonomy. 
Environmental control of each type of industry was the purview of the same 
government sector in charge of promoting that particular industry. Thus, the 
MINEM was in charge of both promoting mining and hydrocarbons activities 
in the country as well as responsible for environmental protection in the sec-
tor. In addition to the problem of autonomy, environmental agencies within 
the ministries developed very diferent legislative bodies and capacities, making 
coordination between sectors problematic and generating confusion among the 
diferent state actors and society (Charpentier & Hidalgo, 1999, p. 164). This 
old system was highly criticized by experts and communities that mobilized 
against extractive industries throughout the decade (Lanegra & Hurtado, 2013). 
Orihuela and Paredes (2017) suggest that during this period environmental 
protection rules evolved gradually by layers.4 The mining sector incorporated 
important environmental institutional expansions in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
An important milestone was the incorporation of the environmental impact 
assessment in mining in 1993.5 In addition, the MINEM, with the techni-
cal assistance of the Canadian Cooperation and the fnancial support of the 
World Bank, modernized the laws regulating concessions, licenses, exploration, 
exploitation and extraction in the sector (Pulgar-Vidal, 2008; World Bank, 
2007).6 These legislative improvements, unfortunately, did not have efective 
consequences on the capabilities and actions of the unit in charge of environ-
mental protection within the MINEM. The Mining Environmental Manage-
ment Agency had limited human and budgetary resources and carried out its 
assignments from the desk (World Bank, 2007). This means that documentation 
presented by extractive companies was revised with little sense of the reality of 
the terrain. 
The escalation of mining conficts, with a peak in 2008, partly illustrates the 
discontent of communities with these environmental rules. However, both the 
industry and the MINEM resisted until the end to give up its environmental 
authority in order to build a centralized and external agency. Peru and Chile 
were laggards in the institutional transition to the ministry system. This transi-
tion had already taken place everywhere else in Latin America a decade before. 
It was only under intense international pressure that the new environmental 
rules took their fnal form, a centralized and technical authority, the Ministry of 
the Environment. The emergence of the MINAM took place, paradoxically, in 
one of the most conservative governments since the Fujimori government. Alan
García (2006–2011) was an open advocate of the expansion of the frontier for 
the exploitation of natural resources, in particular in the Amazon. His govern-
ment faced one of the strongest conficts of the new century with indigenous 
populations in the Amazon.7 New rules emerged despite the opposition of 
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crucial role in the context of fnancial negotiation of bilateral and international 
agreements with the government, in particular the Free Trade Agreement with the 
United States (PTPA) and a second fnancial loan from the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank (IDB) for stage 2 of the Camisea project (Orihuela & Paredes, 2017,
Lanegra, 2015). In this process, the literature has highlighted the convergence 
of agendas of transnational actors with local allies and entrepreneurs, who knew 
how to take advantage of local political opportunities to efectively collaborate 
with these transnational agendas (Orihuela & Paredes, 2017; Orihuela, 2014). 
The interesting thing about the Peruvian case is that these institutional 
changes arrived despite the opposition and infuence of the extractive indus-
tries. Thus, Peruvian institutional change responded much more to a difusion 
of change supported by the transnational connection of actors in the environ-
mental feld and in multilateral organizations that managed to apply sufcient 
pressure on the government (Tarrow, 1998; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). 
Some of the social conficts, whose protests escalated signifcantly to the 
international level, contributed to place the controversies surrounding the envi-
ronmental control system in Peru under international scrutiny. For example, 
the World Bank and then the Inter-American Development Bank came under 
heavy pressure from transnational activists to use their infuence on the Peruvian
government to transform environmental institutions. Thus, the old formal rules 
were attacked and progressively lost legitimacy (Pulgar-Vidal, 2008) among 
the actors in the environmental feld. As mentioned before, Peru was late in 
responding to the new demands and pressures that governments throughout the 
region were subject to. By then, most of the countries in Latin America had 
already progressively moved towards a centralized and leading authority, that is, 
to a Ministry of the Environment (Orihuela, 2014). 
In the context of the fnancial loan negotiation for the second stage of the 
Camisea gas project and the FTA negotiations with the United States, mul-
tilateral agencies strongly infuenced the change that the state had to make, 
in environmental matters, if it wanted to continue being their fnancial and 
commercial partner (Lanegra, 2015). Thus, the institutional transformation 
of environmental control in Peru must be understood more as a consequence 
of the global difusion of new norms in a highly rationalized and global feld, 
such as the environmental feld (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), than a nationwide 
pushed institutional reform. The MINAM was strategically inaugurated on May
31, 2008 at a Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union (LAC-
EU) summit, where the participating governments adopted the Declaration of 
Lima, which put great emphasis on environmental problems (Larsen, 2010). 
However, a decade later, the new rules and the OEFA show serious difcul-
ties in achieving their objectives, as this chapter demonstrates with diferent 
data. Nonetheless, the most emblematic case illustrating the failure of the rules 
to protect the environment are the numerous oil spills of the North Peruvian 
Pipeline (ONP). This pipeline crosses through Loreto, Amazonas, Cajamarca 
and Piura for more than 850 kilometers and was built in 1977. Numerous spills 
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of indigenous communities. Several professionals and experts, including the 
former Minister of the Environment, Manuel Pulgar-Vidal, argued that the 
spills were due to the lack of maintenance and corrosion of infrastructure as 
old as the pipeline. 
Isomorphic institutional changes and the persistent 
resource curse 
This chapter seeks to problematize the consequences of isomorphic institu-
tional change. In contexts such as those in much of the developing world,
strong formal institutions are the exception and not the rule, and the power of
formal institutions should not be taken for granted (Murillo & Levitsky, 2013).
Although new environmental institutions emerged in Peru in the last resource
boom cycle due to isomorphism, they now sufer from weak enforcement
capacity and, in the eyes of the people, have lost legitimacy and the shared
meaning of its mission. Enforcement refers to the degree to which these laws
are complied with in practice (Murillo & Levitsky, 2013). When all relevant
actors in the extractive sector in the territory routinely comply with these
laws or face a high risk of punishment, then enforcement is high; when this is
not the case, enforcement is low. In addition, many scholars have stressed the
centrality of the cultural-cognitive elements of institutions, or, as Scott puts
it, “the shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and the
frames through which meaning is made” (2008, p. 57). Thus, an institution is
stronger if it achieves signifcant “sedimentation of meaning” of its mission.
This means that compliance to its rules follows from routines that are taken for
granted, because they develop an (otherwise inconceivable) common under-
standing and cultural frame of their actions and the particular actors associated
to them (Scott, 2008). 
This chapter argues that two mechanisms are weakening institutional reform. 
The frst mechanism is that isomorphic institutional change does not neces-
sarily dismantle old practices, which undermine enforcement capacity and 
the sedimentation of a shared meaning of the mission of the institution. Old 
practices survive the new institutions in informal and embedded practices in 
the sector, rooted in “the way we do these things” (Scott, 2008, p. 58). They 
do not threaten the formal stability of institutions (Murillo & Levitsky, 2013), 
as they are lawfully in force, but sabotage the enforcement power of new rules 
and their legitimacy among the public. The chapter shows in the following sec-
tion how the infuence of the industry over the state, mainly over the MINEM, 
remained an old practice and undermined the regulative (enforcement) and 
cultural (legitimacy) power of the OEFA. 
The persistence of these old practices, in this case of the mining industry, has 
important consequences regarding the weakening of new institutions to protect 
the environment in the context of the new extractive industries boom cycle. 
The analysis seeks to highlight that the defcit of institutions such as the OEFA 
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lack of administrative capacity, but mainly because of “the ability of the actors to
avoid the application, in direct violation of the (de facto) rules” (Murillo & Lev-
itsky, 2013, p. 100). Isomorphic institutional change does not necessarily alter 
previous power arrangements, which explains the inconsistency or decoupling 
(Meyer et al., 1997), between the formal processes of rulemaking and those 
who possess de facto power. In Meyer & Rowan’s (1977) words, the new rules 
may change their form and acquire an ofcial preponderance, but, as we have 
noted, they are “myth and ceremony”. 
The second mechanism is that isomorphic institutional change does not 
necessarily articulate broad social support around these new rules once created. 
Many scholars have stressed the important role of professional elites in translat-
ing and disseminate new rules (Powell & Dimaggio, 1991). These professionals 
are embedded in epistemic (Haas, 1992) and transnational networks of activism 
(Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Many times, these professionals gain power by occupy-
ing crucial positions in the government. However, the power of these profes-
sionals is unstable. Sometimes their opinion can transcend to the media due to 
their expertise, but they do not articulate political power or social movements 
to rally in support of the new rules. 
In the particular context of Peru, extractive industries have been associated 
with hundreds of conficts, which represent close to the 70% of all social con-
ficts, according to the Ombudsman’s Ofce. However, these conficts were 
glocalized mobilizations (Paredes, 2016). This means that local protests have scaled 
up into global platforms and communities have reached international alliances 
to defend their demands. However, at the national level, these conficts have 
remained disarticulated (Paredes, 2016). Thus, they open opportunities for 
institutional change by accentuating crucial institutional agendas, and placing 
pressures on international actors that strike back on national governments (Keck
& Sikkink, 1998). Nonetheless, once institutional changes occur, and new rules 
face opposition, there is a lack of articulated social support to avoid the assault of 
still-powerful actors that can use informal practices to undermine the enforce-
ment and legitimacy of the new institutions. 
Table 11.1 summarizes the empirical evidence presented in the chapter. 
The frst four sections explain in chronological order the efects of the frst 
mechanism to weaken the power of OEFA: mission reduction frst sapped its 
enforcement power, then later its sanctioning power, and ultimately damaged 
the meaning of its mission through divisive accusations that environmental 
regulation was obstructing investment, which set up a false dilemma between 
sanctions and incentives. As a result, OEFA ended up with a lack of credibility 
among communities and with the public in general. 
Finally, Section 5 explains how in mechanism 2, local conficts were impor-
tant to open opportunities for the expansion of institutions, and how many were
even crucial in emphasizing some institutional issues in the global and national 
agenda. However, there was nonetheless a lack of articulation of a social base to 
defend the new rules after their creation in a context of signifcant opposition 
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Table 11.1 The weakening of environmental institutions to protect the environment in Peru 
Mechanisms Enforcement capacities Common sense of its mission 
1) New institutions do not 
replace old practices: the 
infuence of the extractive 
industry on the public sector 
2) Institutional change 
without social mobilization 
Mission reduction Distortion of the institution’s 
objective: “Tramitology” andThe weakening of sanction 
the false dilemma between instruments. 
a sanction and an incentive 
approach 
Local conficts opened opportunities for the expansion of 
institutions. 
Lack of articulation of a social base to defend the new rules 
Source: Own elaboration 
Old practices and the weakening of the OEFA’s power 
In order to create the new environmental rules, the government of Alan García 
formed a commission led by a well-known and recognized environmental pro-
fessional, José Brack,8 which also included 12 other environmental specialists.9 
Most of them knew each other and had discussed over the years the problems 
of Peruvian environmental institutions. Some had been extremely critical of the 
previous cross-sectoral model (Aldana, 2013). A crucial organization that artic-
ulated these professionals was a legal NGO, the Peruvian Society of Environmental 
Law (Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental, SPDA), which had many ties to 
other international organizations in the environment feld. The leader of SPDA 
was Manuel Pulgar-Vidal, who had manifested on multiple occasions that the 
previous institutional system of supervision was inadequate (Pulgar-Vidal, 
2008). Thus, the government’s call to elaborate the Law of the Ministry of the 
Environment was a unique opportunity for these professionals to dismantle the 
previous model and move on to a centralized and more autonomous one. 
Narrowing its mission from the beginning 
The National Society of Mining, Petroleum and Energy (Sociedad Nacional de Minería,
Petróleo y Energía, SNMPE) and the MINEM together became the main opposi-
tion to this commission. They entered into direct confict with the commission 
by resisting the application of the new rules to the mining and energy sectors. 
They agreed with the creation of a Ministry of the Environment but opposed its 
authority over their sectors. While not able to avoid the application of the new 
rules entirely, the SNMPE and the MINEM opposition did manage to reduce 
the power and coherence of the overall system by narrowing the mission of the 
newly created regulatory agency, the OEFA. 
The Brack Commission had proposed the creation of an agency of super-
vision and control as a specialized technical agency with authority over all 
sectors.10 This agency would have, among other functions, the responsibil-
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impact assessments; and environmental audits, carrying out the supervision and 
enforcement of environmental standards across the sectors. The industry and 
the MINEM voiced strong disagreements with the Brack Commission over 
this proposal. 
When the commission began its work, there were already rumors that the 
new environmental authority would not have authority over mining and hydro-
carbons.11 These rumors were made public with statements from MINEM 
authorities. Alongside declarations from the Prime Minister that “mining issues 
would be left to the Supervising Organism for Investments in Energy and 
Mining (OSINERGMIN)”, the Minister of Energy and Mines, Juan Valdivia, 
openly declared that “the creation of a new agency to protect the environment 
in the sector of mining and energy within the MINAM would be unnecessary, 
due to the existence of a similar agency already operating in the MINEM, the 
OSINERGMIN” (Balbi, 2008). 
However, there was a consensus among experts and international representa-
tives that the whole point of the reform was to make the system more autono-
mous. For Pulgar-Vidal, member of the Brack Commission, creating a new 
agency without authority over some sectors, in particular the most important, 
was “nonsense”.12 Even the newspaper El Comercio (2008), known for its con-
servative editorial line, produced a report expressing that there was a consensus 
among professionals and experts on the need for a centralized agency with 
authority over all sectors: “the new ministry should absorb the supervisory role 
of the sectors, especially regarding mining, energy projects and other extractive 
activities”. 
The OEFA fnally achieved authority over all sectors, but in the negotiation 
process lost half of its proposed functions. With this, the new system of rules 
lost much of the coherence that the initial proposal had planned. This consisted 
in a single body that would grant the permits that would then supervise and 
control that the economic agents comply with the conditions with which those 
environmental permits were granted. In the negotiation, however, these two 
important functions ended up separated, when the new agency, the OEFA, lost 
its authority in granting environmental permits. The MINAM and the OEFA 
were both created by Legislative Decree 1013, but the OEFA ended up with 
much less authority than the one initially envisioned by the Brack Commission 
(Granados, 2016). 
Environmental permits and the carrying out of environmental impact assess-
ments remained in the hands of the MINEM until 2015, the year in which all 
new requests were processed by the National Environmental Certifcation Service
(Servicio Nacional de Certifcación Ambiental, SENACE). All unresolved requests 
before 1995 remained under the authority of the MINEM. SENACE only 
emerged because of the pressure of international organizations to ensure that 
the Peruvian State comply with the commitments of the reform. Environ-
mental permits were to be centralized in a single agency, but the MINEM 
resisted until the end, arguing that the creation of this additional agency was 




206 Maritza Paredes and Lorena Figueroa 
“there were already mechanisms that could be reinforced” inside the MINEM 
(Carlos Aranda, president of the Committee of Environmental Afairs of the 
SNMPE).13 
Thus, in practical terms, SENACE defnes the OEFA’s scope of authority, as 
it is SENACE that indicates, by an administrative instrument, what the OEFA 
must inspect.14 In addition, the MINEM achieved during the negotiation that 
the OSINERGMIN, the control agency within the MINEM, retain the super-
vision of technical aspects and of the security of the infrastructure of companies 
(machinery, transport pipelines etc.). The OEFA is responsible for supervising 
and sanctioning the impact of companies on natural bodies (water, air, soil), 
according to fxed environmental standards.15 However, it cannot control or 
sanction the infrastructural problems that are the cause of these impacts. For 
example, the North Peruvian Pipeline had various dangerous spills in the previous 
years in the Amazon, with serious impacts for indigenous communities. The 
OEFA can assess the presence of heavy metals in the water and punish PetroPeru
for these spills, but cannot take any action regarding the repair or renewal of 
infrastructure of the pipeline, because this is OSINGERMIN’s purview. 
To sum up, the formative stage of environmental control was infuenced by 
the new centralized models of environmental management, internationally 
spread, but also by the opposition of the industry whose infuence over the 
MINEM had not been unsettled. Despite all these limitations, the creation of 
the OEFA has meant a radical change for Peru, which nonetheless still has a 
long way to go in fulflling its promise. 
Taking the OEFA’s enforcement power 
The industry quickly challenged the new rules following the activation of the 
OEFA in 2010. An important frst step was that the OEFA changed from the 
system of outsourcing used by OSINGERMIN (hiring external companies 
and themselves doing desk inspection) to supervisions carried on by its own 
personnel and with increasing visits to the feld. Greater fnancial capacity due 
to the establishment of a “Contribution for Regulation” (Aporte por Regulación, 
APR) in 2014 enhanced the supervision of activities.16 The APR established 
that extractive companies pay a percentage of their profts, not more than 1%, 
to fnance the supervisory work carried out by the OEFA. Although the law 
allows for a maximum percentage of 1%, the OEFA has only charged a maxi-
mum of 0.15% of the annual sales of each company, after the deduction of sev-
eral taxes.17 The APR constitutes between 70% and 80% of the agency’s budget. 
By 2014, the OEFA’s sanctioning capacity became highly visible. The 
enforcement of environmental standards in the extractive sector started some 
years ago with the creation of the OSINERGMIN in 2008 (Orihuela & Pare-
des, 2017). However, since 2014, the number of sanctions and fnes imposed by 
the OEFA has risen steeply. Autonomy came with transparency in the numbers: 
sanctions grew from 150 in 2011 to 645 in 2012, and to 1,486 in 2013. In a 





New institutions, old practices 207 
most infringements in the extractive sector between 2008 and 2014, the 30 larg-
est ofenders in the mining sector paid around $56 million in fnes, while only 
three ofenders in the hydrocarbons sector paid around $27 million in fnes. 
Pollution generated by these industries was always well known among the 
public, but never before measured. The industry frequently denied the exis-
tence of this contamination, particularly in the mining sector. Since the 2000s, 
companies tried to reinforce the idea of New Mining, a clean break with the 
extractive industry’s dirty past in the country, and ofered a new friendly rela-
tionship with the environment and local communities (Li, 2015). The discus-
sion of enforcement of environmental sanctions and fnes by an ofcial state 
agency in the media was without precedent in Peru.18 The former director of 
the OEFA, Hugo Gómez, said in an interview: “it was the frst time in Peru 
that an industry as strong as the mining industry complained about excessive 
environmental control and regulation. . . . [W]hat happened is that there was 
no control whatsoever before”.19 
The industry reacted by pushing the government of Ollanta Humala to 
reduce the OEFA’s authority. On one hand, in June 2014, a group of min-
ing companies decided to sue the OEFA because of the APR payment, as it 
was the main source of the OEFA’s resources for supervision.20 The MINEM 
claimed that ideological positions were emerging to oppose private investment 
in the name of environmental protection (Ernesto Soto Chávez, advisor to 
MINEM).21 The Judiciary has ratifed the APR payment several times since 
2015; however, companies have appealed each time. The Constitutional Tri-
bunal, Peru’s highest judicial authority, made a fnal decision in 2019, stating 
that the OEFA could continue charging the APR.22 
On the other hand, the industry’s opposition to the OEFA’s power of 
enforcement materialized with the promulgation of Law 30230,23 known as the 
frst paquetazo ambiental. The law restricted the OEFA’s sanctioning power for 
two years. It could only issue exceptional sanctioning procedures and corrective 
measures. In addition, fnes previously issued by the OEFA were reduced by 
50%.24 Finally, the approval of the Environmental Quality Standards (Estandares 
de Calidad Ambiental, ECA) and Maximum Permissible Limits (Límites Máximos 
Permisivos, LMP), with which fnes are determined, would no longer only be 
the purview of the environmental sector (the MINAM) but also of “each sector 
involved”, for instance the MINEM for mining and hydrocarbons (Araujo et al.,
2015). With these measures, the state exempted the mining and hydrocarbons 
industry from up to $20 million in fnes for environmental infractions that had 
been ratifed by the courts and even consented to by the companies themselves 
(Valle & Castro, 2015). 
Figure 11.1 shows the decline in OEFA’s enforcement power after the paqu-
etazo ambiental. The industry openly supported these measures. The president 
of CONFIEP, the National Confederation of Private Business Institutions, 
Alfonso García Miró, said that regulatory bodies, including the OEFA, were 
not acting neutrally but were rather unfairly sanctioning companies: “They have
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Figure 11.1 Fines collected by the OEFA, 2011–2017 
Source: OEFA 2017. 
penalties that cause cost overruns for companies”.25 Furthermore, García Miró 
pointed out that he agreed with the new law, although he was not satisfed 
because it was “a shy step”. However, at least it made the OEFA “correct its 
excesses that slow down economic investment”.26 
Distorting the shared meaning of the OEFA’s mission 
The opposition of the business associations did not only succeed in weakening 
the OEFA’s enforcement capacity. This also contributed in diminishing the 
shared meaning of the OEFA’s purpose. On the one hand, several declarations 
were made by business sector representatives in the media in defense of eliminat-
ing the red tape (tramitología) that surrounds and hinders private investment in the
extractive sector. This has gradually contributed to undermining the original 
meaning of the institution. In 2012, Alonso García Miró, the aforementioned 
president of CONFIEP, declared: “there is a large stock of private investment 
projects paralyzed by administrative issues. There are energy, oil, mining and 
industrial projects paralyzed by lack of authorizations, permits” (Perú21, 2012). 
In response, the state responded with a series of initiatives to fnish and make 
environmental regulation processes more fexible (Durand, 2016). In 2014, 
Minister Eleodoro Mayorga of the MINEM supported the petition and main-
tained that new environmental regulation was being prepared in his ministry 
in order to deal “organically with the red tape and part of the bureaucracy that 
impedes private investment” (Quispe & Cárdenas, 2018). These regulations 
would be the reforms included in Law 30230 and the New Hydrocarbons 
Law, which would cause, months later, the Cornejo Leaks scandal.27 The leaks 
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persists in environmental administration in Peru. The news site Ojo Público ran 
an independent investigation that revealed a series of conversations between 
the minister of the MINEM, Eleodoro Mayorga, and of the MINAM, Manuel 
Pulgar-Vidal, in which they admit that the initiative to modify the Hydrocar-
bons Law to eliminate the requirement of environmental impact assessments 
within the sector was drafted by the oil company Karoon. Karoon acted as a 
consultant at the request of Minister Mayorga, tasked with justifying a favorable 
law for private oil companies (Mejía, 2014). According to the leaks, Minister 
Mayorga sustained that “the companies and their technicians are those that can 
better explain what the operations and their impacts are” (Durand, 2016, p. 66). 
Furthermore, interviews with OEFA ofcials indicate that they sought to 
adapt to these losses of power. OEFA Board of Directors Resolution 040-
2014-OEFA/CD changed the environmental control regime from fnes to an 
incentive system. Likewise, OEFA executives built a narrative that highlighted 
the important of incentives and was critical of fnes and to the previous over-
regulatory nature of the OEFA. Hugo Gómez pointed out that “emphasizing 
environmental protection, through corrective measures, is consistent with the 
OEFA’s role in contributing to the continuous improvement of environmental 
performance”.28 
The choice between incentives and fnes is a false dilemma, because institu-
tions use both enforcing and promotion mechanisms to be strong (Ruesche-
meyer, 2009). The result of the paquetazo ambiental was the weakening of the 
OEFA and the subsequent rapid rise of infractions in the sector. In 2016, the new
director of the OEFA declared that Law 30230 did not help to reduce environ-
mental infractions. On the contrary, there were more incentives to be an ofender
because of the lower cost of incurring in a liability.29 In the same report, the 
OEFA presents alarming data, with the percentages of unpaid fnes and regula-
tory violations increasing from 24% to 71% in hydrocarbons and from 10% to 
37% in mining. 
The delicate situation of the OEFA after the paquetazo law 
The mining and hydrocarbons industry’s infuence has also gradually extended 
to the OEFA through a series of revolving doors. These are mechanisms 
through which professionals with long trajectories in the extractive sector 
occupy high-level positions in the regulatory agency. In 2018, the virtual 
platform for investigative journalism Convoca presented data describing this 
movement of high-level employees between the private and public sectors, 
including in the OEFA (Quispe & Cárdenas, 2018). For instance, it showed 
that the OEFA in 2014 hired as coordinator of the Direction of Environmental 
Supervision in Mining a professional who worked 15 years as a high-level ofce 
at the Buenaventura mining company. Buenaventura had an accumulated num-
ber of 74 sanctioning processes between 2008 and 2018 (Quispe & Cárdenas, 
2018), and was, according to the same study, one of the main benefciaries of the
environmental paquetazo law in 2014 that exempted the company from a large 
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part of its fnes. A similar situation was demonstrated for two other supervisors 
(Quispe & Cárdenas, 2018). 
The extractive sector continued to press for reductions in the enforcement 
and regulatory power of environmental institutions. On example of this is a bill 
still in debate to modify the Organic Hydrocarbons Law (Law 26221).30 This 
bill seeks to bring back environmental assessments and supervision from the 
National System of Environmental Impact Assessment (Servicio de Evaluación de 
Impacto Ambiental, SEIA) and SENACE to the MINEM and PetroPeru (Coop-
erAcción, 2018). The bill aims to make environmental regulation more fexible 
and, for instance, gives PetroPeru powers to prepare required environmental 
baselines (Centro para el Desarrollo del Indígena Amazónico, 2018). Finally, 
the bill extends oil concessions to up to 80 years, and eliminates hydrocarbons 
companies’ obligation to contribute to the National Environment Fund (Fondo 
Nacional de Medio Ambiente, FONAM). This fund currently serves to remedy 
environmental liabilities and sites impacted by this activity. 
Since its creation, the OEFA has tried to appeal to the public by employ-
ing a host of participatory mechanisms (Paliza, 2017). For instance, it created 
a Participatory Environmental Monitoring Program and guided visits to Early 
Environmental Assessments (Evaluación Ambiental Temprana, EAT). The OEFA 
has also opened decentralized ofces in an efort to disseminate its presence 
nationwide.31 However, no efort has been successful in neutralizing the grow-
ing harm to its reputation. While this chapter ofers a national perspective on 
the OEFA, a close-up of one of the OEFA’s decentralized ofces in a mining 
area, for example in Espinar, Cusco, shows a process of discredit among the 
population. The Espinar ofce was announced with great enthusiasm by civil 
society organizations in Espinar, and local communities were highly optimistic 
that their presence would guarantee better and more transparent information 
regarding the quality of the environment (CooperAcción, 2015). However, 
four years after its creation in 2015, people believe the ofce serves no purpose. 
After the emergence of serious controversies regarding pollution in the area, 
the OEFA has been unable to ofer solutions or better information. The fol-
lowing testimony registers the disappointment in the work done so far by the 
OEFA in Espinar: 
About the OEFA, they tell us that the “OEFA is the mine’s right hand”. 
Likewise, for them, the “ANA (National Authority of Water), the OEFA 
and the company live together”. The distrust towards these institutions is 
based, mainly, on the lack of support and attention that they receive regard-
ing their claims of pollution: If you put forward a complaint, they tell you 
nothing can be done. 
(Espinar, June 29, 2019) 
A crucial problem is that the OEFA has insufcient technical equipment in its 
laboratories, and lacks modern technical support to systematize and integrate 
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The results of a survey conducted in 2017 in selected areas by the OEFA are 
therefore not all that surprising. Only 21% of those consulted knew the OEFA, 
and of those only 19% had any knowledge of the existence of decentralized 
ofces. Moreover, among those who did have knowledge of the OEFA, an 
overwhelming 72% considered that it had not improved the protection of the 
environment since its creation (OEFA, 2020). The OEFA’s situation is currently
delicate after all these years of modifcations. 
Isomorphic institutional changes and 
the lack of social support 
The isomorphic institutional change process has failed to articulate a social
base with a common narrative in defense of autonomous and more efec-
tive environmental institutions. In Peru, economic growth generated by the
expansion of extractive industries went hand in hand with a steep increase in
socio-environmental conficts (Paredes & de la Puente, 2014), as shown in
Figure 11.2. 
Many researchers coincide in associating these conficts with distribution 
budget problems and environmental unrest associated with extractive activity 
Figure 11.2 Conficts in Peru (environmental, mining and hydrocarbons, 2007–2018) 
Source: Paredes (2019) based on the Ombudsman’s Ofce annual reports (2007–2017). 
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(Orihuela & Paredes, 2017). One of the main demands of these conficts was the
need for a transparent institutional reform of environmental protections. Some 
of these socio-environmental conficts were crucial in putting the modifcation 
of environmental institutions on the national agenda. 
The massive social mobilization in Tambogrande, Piura, in rejection of a 
mining project that threatened the agricultural character of the area, was one 
such confict. This mobilization in the Tambogrande valley had important 
consequences in the enforcement of environmental regulation policy, mainly 
in the modifcation and improvement of the environmental impact assessments 
(de Echave, 2013). Similarly, the opposition to the Conga mining project in 
Cajamarca and the Tía María mining project in Arequipa raised questions 
about environmental impact assessments, and both opened an important
political space for the creation of SENACE (CooperAcción, 2012). However, 
none of these social mobilizations produced sustained articulated movements 
at the regional or national level that could support the consolidation of new 
environmental institutions once they are in place. In fact, no important social 
base emerged to defend the OEFA against the successive eforts to weaken it. 
Conficts in Peru are like an archipelago of mobilizations. Each island in the 
archipelago is individually connected to transnational actors, mining companies,
the central state and networks of transnational activism, while being very much 
disarticulated at the national level (Paredes, 2016). 
The many scandals surrounding the infuence of the industry over the 
public sector was followed by very little mobilization, limited to media net-
works, NGOs (such as Red Muqui, Servindi etc.) and independent journalism 
(Ojo Público, Convoca). No large mobilization followed the diferent instances 
in which OEFA was undermined and did not use its power. Regarding the 
controversy around the APR, the government has opted for silence. With the 
exception of the OEFA’s current president, no state representative, neither 
from the MINAM nor from the Ministry of Justice, has made declarations in 
defense of the OEFA (Ruiz, 2017). Some NGOs have again initiated internet 
campaigns, such as the Red Muqui (2019) or SPDA (2019), but there has been 
no articulated support or activism. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have tried to explain why isomorphic institutional changes in
environmental control in Peru produced weak institutions. This chapter argues 
that the new rules regarding environmental control are a positive expansion in 
the governance of extractive industries in Peru. However, the chapter seeks to 
problematize their efectiveness in practice and implementation. 
The main problem that arises regarding isomorphic institutional change is 
that it does not undermine the political power existing underneath the old rules.
Old power arrangements survive embedded in informal practices that persist 
and undermine new institutions. The alliance between the extractive industry 
























New institutions, old practices 213 
OEFA throughout the past years. In addition, this alliance serves to shape the 
public discussion in a way that distorts the shared meaning of the mission of the 
new institutions and their legitimacy. 
Another important part of the argument is that this type of isomorphic 
change in Peru has not required the articulation of social bases at the national 
level than can defend the new rules. Institutional reform articulates groups of 
elite entrepreneurial professionals, who, throughout the persistent weakening 
of the institutions, can seldom do very much to defend their own creation. 
Mobilizations are locally situated and with a lot of international resonance, but 
there has been signifcant articulation into a national social movement whose 
objective would be the strengthening of the environment institutions. 
Thus, this chapter highlights the role of social mobilization in institutional
change as crucial in a context where there is a strong opposition from part of
the industry to build strong environmental governance. However, isomorphic
institutional change does not seem to trigger that mobilization. It remains
important to analyze more deeply the role that territorial and ecological
conficts and their capacity to accumulate and articulate play in guaranteeing
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Analyzing the enforcement of 
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Andean countries have long based their economies on the export of their 
natural resources. Nevertheless, the income generated through the rents from 
resource extraction has historically not translated into the improvement of the 
life quality and well-being for their wider population. On the contrary, natural 
resource extraction in the Andean countries went along with signifcant eco-
logical degradation, violent conficts, high poverty rates, social inequalities, and 
the dispossession of local communities. Historically, only a narrow group of 
elites has benefted from resource rents. Academic and policy literature com-
monly explain the reasons for this with a phenomenon called the resource curse,
“the perverse efects of a country’s natural resource wealth on its economic, 
social, or political well-being” (Ross, 2015, p. 240). Countries that depend on 
resource extraction lack the institutions necessary to avoid such adverse efects. 
The building of such institutions is hindered because “[r]esource cursed gov-
ernments tend to manage natural resources opportunistically rather than stra-
tegically. Resource depletion, therefore, tends not to serve the public interest 
and instead consolidates wealth among a very narrow class of bureaucrats and 
managers” (Sovacool, 2010, p. 229). Resource-cursed countries are thus stuck 
in a vicious cycle: building public institutions that would put a check on elites 
in power would need to rely on precisely those public institutions that were 
previously built to serve primarily the interests of those same elites. 
Two developments at the onset of the 21st century gave a new stimulus to 
the question of whether natural resource extraction can help countries to transi-
tion toward a more socially and ecologically just economy—a post-extractivist 
economy that has overcome the adverse efects of the resource curse. First, an 
increase in global prices for raw materials led to a new resource boom from 
early 2000 onward to approximately 2014. Secondly, some countries in Latin 
America that experienced a Left Turn sought to establish a post-neoliberal devel-
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problems that the neoliberal development model had caused. They oriented 
this post-neoliberal development model around the slogan extracting for escap-
ing extractivism, which entailed the (re)-nationalization of natural resources to 
invest the revenues gained in welfare programs, poverty reduction, education, 
health, economic diversifcation, and environmental protection. Accordingly, 
these progressive governments established several institutional innovations in 
governing the extractive sector that would guarantee a more socially and eco-
logically just distribution of the benefts and costs of resource extraction. These 
institutional innovations were often pushed for by social, environmental, and 
indigenous movements and aimed at solving the problems typically associated 
with resource extraction, and thus at escaping the resource curse. Designed to 
prevent and fully repair environmental and social damages, these institutional 
innovations were meant to contribute as a frst step to a transition toward a 
post-extractivist economy. 
However, the initial optimism that these progressive governments could help 
advance real transformation toward socially and ecologically more just econo-
mies soon vanished. The expansion of extraction led to even more dependence 
on resource extraction, socio-ecological conficts, and dispossession of commu-
nal lands; corruption scandals surfaced, and falling global prices for raw materials
diminished the capacity of government expenditures. Scholars have examined 
why the problems associated with the resource curse led, once more, to adverse 
outcomes, concentrating their analysis on social and economic policies. There 
is comparatively little analysis, however, on the institutional innovations in the 
environmental realm. How did they fare during the boom-and-bust cycle? Did 
they deliver to some extent what they promised or not? What constraints did 
they face, and how to explain these constraints? 
This chapter explores these questions, taking Ecuador as a case study. Ecua-
dor’s Constitution Montecristi was adopted in 2008 and is one of the most 
famous examples of such institutional innovation, as it was the frst country 
to integrate the Rights of Nature as a constitutional provision. This chapter 
asks to what extent this institutional innovation provided for better enforce-
ment of environmental laws in the hydrocarbon sector. Specifcally, it examines 
the Program of Environmental and Social Reparation (Programa de Reparación 
Ambiental y Social, PRAS) at the Ecuadorian Ministry of Environment and its 
enforcement of reparación integral (integral reparation), a concept derived from 
the Constitution Montecristi. How did PRAS perform? To what extent could 
state ofcials working at PRAS enforce the concept of reparación integral in the 
hydrocarbon sector? What were the most critical constraints that they encoun-
tered? This chapter answers these questions through an institutional ethnog-
raphy of PRAS—following the argument that the complexity of institutional 
dynamics in the context of resource extraction demands a more qualitative 
and fne-grained approach than that provided by most resource curse research 
(Gilberthorpe & Papyrakis, 2015; Gilberthorpe & Rajak, 2016; Peters, 2016; 
Dargent et al., 2017; Bornschlegl, 2018). This chapter draws on qualitative 
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2013–2018. Quantitative data comprise a database provided by the Ministry 
of Environment on recorded sources of contamination and the state of the 
cleanup until the year 2018. Qualitative data comprise 103 interviews with 
representatives at diferent entities at national and sub-national levels as well as 
ofcial documents. Interviews were carried with, for instance, representatives at 
the Ministry of Environment, the Ombudsman, the Comptroller General, the 
National Assembly, environmental departments at the provincial government, 
the secretary of water, the regulatory agency of water, environmental consul-
tancies, laboratories, oil companies, local communities, NGOs, indigenous 
organizations, ecological and environmental scientists, petroleum engineers, 
and environmental lawyers. Ofcial documents include the project reports of 
the three diferent cleanup projects, Proyecto: Eliminación de Piscinas contamina-
das y limpieza de derrames en el Distrito Amazónico (PEPDA) (Petroproducción, 
2008), Plan de Restauración Integral de Pasivos Ambientales en el Distrito Amazónico
(PRIPA) (Petroecuador EP, 2012), and Amazonía Viva (Petroamazonas EP, 
2013), of the public oil company, as well as methodological guidelines from 
PRAS (PRAS, 2015). 
The chapter proceeds as follows: The frst section presents the conceptual 
framework of the relationship between resource extraction, institutions, and the 
Left Turn. The second section describes the empirical results from the case study 
examining the enforcement of reparación integral, and the last section draws the 
main conclusions and refects on the importance of building a specifc type of 
institutions, namely progressive public institutions, and equipping them with 
sufcient, capacity, autonomy, and executive power in a sustainable way. 
The resource boom and institutions: the Left Turn 
The insight that the existence of functioning institutions is a necessary condi-
tion for escaping the resource curse has become a staple in research on resource 
extraction and the resource curse (Papyrakis, 2017). Of particular importance 
for avoiding the resource curse are institutions that guarantee a socially and 
ecologically just distribution of the benefts and costs of resource extraction. 
However, institutional frameworks (or the absence thereof) in resource-rich 
countries tend to be a refection of the interests of those in power and the deals 
they make (Poteete, 2009; Bebbington et al., 2018). That is, resource-rich 
countries are stuck in a vicious cycle: building institutions that guarantee a 
socially and ecologically just distribution of the benefts and costs of extraction 
would require that such institutions had already been built. 
The resource boom at the onset of the 21st century re-opened the question
as to whether that vicious cycle could ever be overcome (Dargent et al., 2017;
Addison & Roe, 2018). Especially the governments that were part of the Left
Turn in Latin America received much attention in that renewed debate. Not only
did these self-defned progressive governments seek to install a whole range of
institutional innovations aimed at guaranteeing a socially and ecologically just dis-
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re-invest extractive revenues in the implementation of these institutional innova-
tions (Burchardt & Dietz, 2014; Burchardt et al. 2016; Broad & Fischer-Mackey,
2017). These institutional innovations were also unique in the sense they resulted
from indigenous, environmental, and social movements that had pushed for them
over decades. Ecuador’s Constitution Montecristi 2008 and the constitutional
enshrinement of the Rights of Nature (Gudynas, 2011, 2013) counts as an exam-
ple for such institutional innovations. The fact that these institutional innovations
resulted from decades of mobilization of social movements also provided input to
the debate on the relationship between state institutions and social change. The
question became: “what type of institutions can give durability to the achieve-
ments of social movements, that, without any type of institutionalization, without
any form of fxation in time, would simply vanish, as had happened many times
before” (Lang & Brand, 2015, p. 24, author’s translation). 
At frst, the post-neoliberal development model combined with the resource
boom led to an improvement in social and economic indicators, a decrease
in poverty and extreme poverty, and better access to social services of the
wider population. However, soon enough, it became clear that the govern-
ment administrations did not advance a transition toward a more socially and
ecologically just economy as the movements who had helped it to power had
wanted (Cori & Monni, 2014; de Castro et al., 2016). That is, the progres-
sive governments failed at re-investing the extractive revenues in economic
diversifcation, and at visibly improving the quality or quantity of employment
(Gudynas, 2010, 2013; Brand et al., 2016). The progressive governments did
not bring about an agrarian reform that would improve the distribution of
land nor a tax reform that would make the wealthy part of the population
pay their share (Burchardt et al., 2016; Veltmeyer & Petras, 2014, 2019). The
extractive frontier expanded in a way that de-industrialized the economy,
increased socio-ecological conficts, deepened ecological degradation, and
further dispossessed local communities (Andreucci & Radhuber, 2017;
Villalba-Eguiluz & Etxano, 2017; Lu et al., 2017; Svampa, 2017, 2019). Social
relations remained ordered along the lines of patriarchy, classism, colonialism,
just as in neoliberal times—a social transformation that would have changed
the distribution of the privileges of those in power did not occur (Acosta &
Iturralde, 2013; Bull & Aguilar-Støen, 2015; Bebbington et al., 2018). Why
did the post-neoliberal development model combined with the resource boom
fail to escape the resource curse? Some scholars argue that this would be so
because “entrenched elites have hindered structural transformations towards
an environmental governance that ensures more sustainable and equitable pro-
duction” (Bull & Aguilar-Støen, 2016, p. 139). Or, as Ospina Peralta (2012,
p. 129) put it: 
Why did it turn out so difcult for them [the progressive governments] 
to achieve any sowing after having reaped so many dollars? For the simple 
reason that those economic activities not only leave money in the pockets 
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While scholars provided useful insights regarding the question of why post-
neoliberal governments and their economic strategies failed, less disaggregated,
empirically based analysis exists on what precisely happened with the institu-
tional innovations in the environmental realm. What were the exact processes
that kept those institutional innovations from developing more force? This chap-
ter focuses on the program of Social and Environmental Reparation (PRAS) at
the Ecuadorian Ministry of Environment, and its implementation of reparación
integral (integral reparation) in the hydrocarbon sector. The concept of reparación
integral derived directly from the Constitution Montecristi and meant to trans-
late the constitutional provisions for environmental and social rights into public
policy and practice. A reparación integral did not mean just remediating environ-
mental damages, but to restitute the social and environmental rights and dignity
of afected communities and nature and to guarantee the non-repetition of the
damage. Reparación integral is thus akin of the mechanism of reparations for vic-
tims of human right violations as conceptualized by the United Nations, which
comprises a guarantee for restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction,
and non-repetition to the victims of the violation (UN General Assembly,
2005). It is fair to say that one can consider the constitutional premise that one
should repair damages integrally as a progressive innovation with the potential to
advance pathways toward a socially and ecologically more just economy: 
Here are some rough ideas still based in the feld of conventional econom-
ics, from which one would need to construct the post-extractivist transition
as a base for a new economy, one that we could defne as an economy of 
Buen Vivir. To achieve this, it is necessary to deploy strategies that allow 
transitioning while still extracting—but less and less—the natural resources 
that carry the resource curse with them. .  .  . The task is not to simply 
extract more natural resources for obtaining income that helps to overcome 
extractivism. One instead needs to optimize extraction without causing further 
environmental and social damage, including trying to repair and even restore the 
damage caused. 
(Acosta, 2017, p. 10, author’s translation & emphasis) 
The subsequent section presents empirical results on the performance and limi-
tations of reparación integral in environmental law enforcement. 
Limits to reparación integral and environmental law 
enforcement 
Reparación integral and the history of oil extraction 
The Ecuadorian environmental regulation defnes reparación integral as: 
A set of actions, processes, and measures, which . . . tend to reverse envi-
ronmental and social damages and liabilities, by restoring quality, dynamics, 
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ecological balance, cycles vital, structure, functioning and evolutionary 
process of the afected ecosystems; as well as measures and actions to facili-
tate the restoration of the rights of afected individuals and communities, 
through actions of compensation and indemnifcation, rehabilitation and 
through measures that guarantee the non-repetition and prevention of the 
recurrence of the damage. Reparation in the social feld implies that per-
sons, families, communities or villages afected by a negative environmental 
impact or environmental damage can return to living conditions and qual-
ity of life in dignity. 
(Texto Unifcado Legislación Ambiental Secundaria,
2015, p. 8 [author’s translation]) 
Integrating reparación integral in the legal framework can be interpreted as a reac-
tion to the history of oil extraction in Ecuador and the severe damage that the 
oil industry had left behind, especially in its Amazon region. The extraction 
of oil involves toxic substances from the extracted material itself or the materi-
als added in the process of extraction (Di Toro et al., 2007). Thus, production 
waste and spills—if not handled appropriately—can lead to the contamination 
of groundwater and surface water, sediment, and soils, and thus degrading 
ecosystems and negatively afecting human health (San-Sebastián & Hurtig, 
2004). If wastes and spills are abandoned in the site without proper treatment, 
they remain constant sources of contamination—which is what the Ecuadorian 
legislation defnes as pasivo ambiental (COA, Art. 807). According to the Min-
istry of Environment, oil companies left behind 3,877 such sites in all Ecuador 
(PRAS, 2018). As a state ofcial put it: 
The biggest challenge of the state is at the moment to understand how 
we can repair the damage done to the Amazon, especially in Orellana and 
Sucumbíos. I think the damage goes beyond what you can imagine, and 
whatever number we could put on it—it is incalculable, and so still we do 
not fully understand or dimension the reality of that damage. What we 
know is that people are still dying; we know that the ecosystem will take 
a long, long time to recover, and for now, we do not have much clarity 
where even to start, it is an incredible job, and it is very costly. The biggest 
challenge in this country when it comes to hydrocarbons is to solve the 
problem with environmental and social damages that were never repaired. 
(Government ofcial [Interview], 2015) 
Reparación integral aimed at repairing the damage done to the Amazon and 
at preventing occurrence of such damage ever again in the future. That also 
included preventing oil companies from compensating for environmental dam-
ages in a way that is not proportionate to the actual dimension of the damage. 
It is interesting to note how [oil] companies have taken over functions of 



























224 Teresa Bornschlegl 
health infrastructure. However, all these means were rather a palliative 
measure for the actual damage and in no way addressed the environmental 
damage in an integral way. 
(Government Ofcial [Interview], 2015) 
Thus, reparación integral aimed at addressing the problems that emerged from 
dealing with environmental damages in the past. 
The program of social and environmental reparation (PRAS) 
A unique entity was created in 2008 at the Ministry of Environment: the Program
of Social and Environmental Reparation (PRAS) to put reparación integral into practice.
PRAS’s mission was to “guarantee the reparación integral for environmental damages
[caused by the inadequate management of economic activities] to contribute to
the improvement of the quality of life of all Ecuadorians and the protection of the
Rights of Nature” (Programa de Reparación Ambiental y Social, n.d., [author’s
translation]). To ensure the implementation of reparación integral across diferent
economic sectors, PRAS has several diferent lines of work. First, PRAS curates an
information system for socio-ecological liabilities. One of PRAS’s main projects in
its early years was to generate a database—called “Sistema de Indicadores Ambien-
tales y Sociales (SIPAS)”—that aimed to register all existing pasivos ambientales in the
oil and gas sector. Secondly, to study how to best carry out a reparación integral, PRAS
develops pilot projects in zones identifed as being the most afected by environmen-
tal damages. Third, PRAS develops methodologies and guidelines, mostly derived
from their pilot projects, on how to measure damages in ecological and social terms,
and what activities are subsequently required on the part of the industry to repair
such damages. Fourth, PRAS assesses the plans of reparación integral that the industry
must submit when it causes environmental damages. Lastly, PRAS is responsible for
monitoring the process of reparación integral in situ, verifying the reparación integral of
environmental damages in the feld. The Department of Environmental Control at
the Ministry of Environment oversees the laboratory results from the samples taken
from the site where environmental damage occurred. It authorizes the completion
of the remediation process, once the operator has complied with the environmen-
tal regulations. A decade after the creation of PRAS, the questions arise: How did
PRAS perform? Did PRAS deliver on its promise to guarantee a reparación integral
of the damages caused in the Ecuadorian Amazon? What are the most critical con-
straints that PRAS encountered? 
Limits to PRAS and the enforcement of reparación integral 
The following section presents the limits to the enforcement of reparación integral, 
exemplifed through the interactions between PRAS and the cleanup project
of the public oil company. In 2002 the public oil company (then Petroproduc-
ción, today Petroamazonas EP) initiated a cleanup project called Project to elimi-
nate contaminated ditches and clean-up of oil spills in the Amazon District (PEPDA).
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reparación integral. First, PRAS could not get the public oil company to adopt the
concept of reparación integral consistently—to repair not only the environment but
also the economic, social, and cultural damages. The high costs that the imple-
mentation of reparación integral translated into the watering down of the concept
on the part of the public oil company. Before 2008, the sectorial regulation
employed the term reparation as synonymous with remediation—reparation meant
remediating contaminated soil, piscinas (large ditches), and oil spills in which
more than fve barrels were spilled (Reglamento Ambiental para las Operaciones
Hidrocarburíferas en el Ecuador, 2010, Art. 16). After 2008, however, all remedia-
tion procedures had to incorporate the concept of reparación integral, which meant
to beyond cleaning up soils. To “align the project with the new framework of
the Ministry of Environment” (Petroecuador EP, 2012, p. 10), the public oil
company integrated the concept of reparación integral into its cleanup projects in
2010. PEPDA subsequently became PRIPA, the Plan of the Integral Restoration of
Pasivos Ambientales (PRIPA). PRIPA included not only measures for remediat-
ing soils, but also for restoring the social rights and the dignity of afected com-
munities. However, with the split of the state oil frm into Petroecuador EP and
Petroamazonas EP in 2013, the project was again re-conceived, operating from
2013 onwards under the name Amazonía Viva (Amazon Alive). The signifcant
diference between PRIPA and Amazonía Viva was the re-defnition of reparación
integral as “environmental rehabilitation” while no longer including the restitu-
tion of social rights in the new project design. The project design of Amazonía
Viva abandoned the social dimension, including the compensation, indemnifca-
tion, and satisfaction of afected people and communities. Interviewees at Ama-
zonía Viva said that this would not mean that Petroamazonas EP would not pay
compensation and indemnifcation to afected persons and communities at all. It
only meant that this did not fall into the scope of the project of Amazonía Viva
anymore that only included the remediation of soils. While the Vice-presidency
endorsed Amazonía Viva, which meant that it would receive priority status in
the national budget allocation, interviewees nevertheless expressed concerns in
2015 that the budget for the project would shrink with falling oil prices. One
can thus assume the change in the adoption of reparación integral had likely to do
with the uncertainty of how much money would even be required on the part of
Petroamazonas EP to fulfll the compensation and indemnifcation requirements.
So reparación integral shifted back from restoring rights to remediating soils. 
The fact that the restitution of rights was no longer part of the cleanup project
generated mistrust and conficts among communities. Some community members
did not want the damage in their territory to be cleaned up because they feared that
then they would have no evidence that they also had a right to be compensated— 
either fnancially or with a collective good. Therefore, they often refused entry on
to their property, which, in turn, inhibited the clean-up from taking place: 
People do not like that the pasivos get cleaned up as they fear that then 
they have no evidence anymore for receiving any compensation or
indemnifcation. 
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It remains unclear how and when Petroamazonas would start to compensate 
and indemnify afected people and communities for the pasivos ambientales. 
Community members also expressed concern about not being asked or even 
informed about how they would like the cleanup to take place, and that local 
social organizations would, unfortunately, have no say in the cleanup operations 
(Activist [Interview], 2018). 
Second, even if focusing only on remediating soils, the cleanup process
advances only very slowly “at the speed of a turtle” (Government ofcial
[Interview], 2015). PRAS registers 3,877 pasivos in all regions in Ecuador.
Between 2005 and 2018, 1,488 pasivos were cleaned up, leaving 2,389 that
still need to be dealt with in the years to come. That would mean that it
would take more than 20 years to fnish all cleanups in Ecuador—only reme-
diating soils. According to the PRAS database, more fosas (small ditches)
than piscinas (big ditches) were cleaned up over the years. Interviewees
indicated that fosas were prioritized as they might be easier to remediate and
thus lead more quickly to successful results. That means that remediating
the outstanding piscinas will likely take even longer than the time it took to
remediate fosas. 
Additionally, old damage continues to be discovered, and new damage
continues to be produced. The growing number of contamination sources
is visible in the project reports—PEPDA indicated 1,420 sources of con-
tamination in the Ecuadorian Amazon while Amazonía Viva indicates 2,550
(Petroamazonas EP, 2018). Likewise, the PRAS database from the year 2016
indicated a total of 3,658 pasivos ambientales, while the database from 2018
counted 3,877 (Bornschlegl, 2017; PRAS, 2018). As an interviewee said:
“It will already take easily 10 to 15 years to remediate the damage that
exists, and that alone if there would be no new pasivos produced. However,
new pasivos continue to be produced all the time” (Corporate representa-
tive [Interview], 2015). The reason for this is that oil companies rarely
replace those old infrastructures that generated most of the damages in the
frst place. Interviewees across the board say that it remains cheaper for the
industry to pay the administrative fne for the environmental damage than
to invest in new infrastructure. Some extraction sites are said to produce a
spill almost daily (Government ofcial [Interview], 2015). 
These limits to reparación integral and the enforcement of environmental law, in
turn, limit the possibilities for economic diversifcation in the regions in which 
extraction takes place. 
The challenge is for us to have a region without contamination, and that a
new productive sector can be created. The oil will disappear; the oil will end
one day. However, if they [the oil companies] leave us contaminated with
pasivos, for what do these rivers serve? For nothing. However, if they reme-
diate, if they leave this region clean, that could be the start of a new produc-
tive activity, such as tourism. Here we have a great potential for tourism. 












How to institutionalize sustainability? 227 
Environmental damages are a threat to alternative economic sectors such
as agriculture and tourism, specifcally eco-tourism. If all that is left are
degraded landscapes, there will not be many alternative economic sectors
that could generate state revenues after resource depletion (Larrea, 2017).
That is, economic diversifcation through sectors such as agriculture and
tourism continue to be made impossible through environmental degradation
(Perreault, 2013; Cuba et al., 2014). Instead of investing in the upgrading of 
mature sites, the extractive frontier expands, opening more and more new
sites (Kaup, 2010). 
Conclusion 
The resource boom, as well as the Left Turn in Latin America, has brought new 
fodder to the question of whether natural resources can overcome the resource 
curse and fnally lead to a socially and ecologically just development. Scholars 
examining the performance of progressive governments in the context of the 
resource boom have demonstrated their failure in bringing about any substan-
tial structural transformation. This chapter found that institutional innovations 
were, however, established that could have contributed to advance a transfor-
mation away from extractivism, but did not. Taking reparación integral and its 
enforcement as example, this chapter has shown that insufcient funding and 
a lack of executive power did constrain the reach of these institutional innova-
tions—constraints that are common explanations for the chronic weakness of 
environmental law enforcement. 
There are several implications of these fndings for research that examines 
institutional dynamics in the context of resource extraction, specifcally for 
those working on the politics of institutions in the resource curse framework. In 
line with the argument of this book and others who have argued that institutions
is too coarse of a term for adding to the understanding of the resource curse, 
this chapter maintains that further research should specifcally study the trajec-
tories of institutions that could be called progressive public institutions. It would 
be especially essential to replace the focus of which institutions lead to economic 
growth with the inquiry of which institutions serve the advancement of socially 
and ecologically just economies, as conceptualized by ecological economists. 
As North et al. (2017, p. 78) argue: 
In countries with entrenched traditions of mining and hydrocarbon extrac-
tion, such as Bolivia and Peru, just leaving the stuf under the ground alto-
gether is not realistic. Still, diversifying and shifting the balance of policies 
away from extraction and towards policies of employment generation and 
economic diversifcation, as described above, may bring about substantial 
social and economic advance. 
For instance, why is there no sweeping tax reform? Why is there no sweeping 
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built upon (Alayza & Gudynas, 2011; Gudynas, 2013; Escobar, 2015; Acosta 
& Brand, 2017). 
Thus, it would be essential to study how to build and sustain progres-
sive institutions over time and across space. Further research could provide
cross-national, longitudinal comparative in-depth analysis to questions as to
how institutional innovations that critically confront extractivism could gain
more traction in real politics, and how to translate economic alternatives to
extractivism into political options that gain wider public acceptance (Peters,
2016). In doing so, one could focus, on the one hand, on political alliances
and political capture. Who exactly obstructs institutional innovations from
developing teeth, what channels of infuence do they use, and what narratives
and networks do they mobilize? One can build on research that has studied
political capture and lobbying in the context of resource extraction (Crabtree
& Durand, 2017; Bebbington et al., 2018), and research that has examined
cases such as the tobacco industry (Kessler, 2001), and climate change denial
(Oreskes & Conway, 2010). On the other hand, further research could exam-
ine why and how social mobilization can make progressive institutions gain
wider public acceptance and political traction (Ospina Peralta et al., 2015). As
Arendt (1969, p. 41) put it: “All political institutions are manifestations and
materializations of power; they petrify and decay as soon as the living power
of the people ceases to uphold them”. 
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During the resource boom (2000–2013), mining in Argentina experienced 
unprecedented growth. In the late 1990s, the regulatory framework was 
amended to promote foreign investment (Moori Koenig & Bianco, 2003), 
and the country’s frst two large-scale metalliferous mines, Bajo Alumbrera 
and Cerro Vanguardia, were established. Between 1998 and 2018, the value of 
Argentine mining exports rose by 400% (Ministerio de Hacienda, 2019). As of 
2021, the country hosts twelve active gold and silver mines, two lithium mines, 
and one coal mine, as well as another four mines currently in construction (Sec-
retaría de Minería, 2021). Despite the growth in the sector, mineral extraction 
is still of secondary importance to the Argentine economy, accounting for just 
0.57% of gross domestic product in 2020.1 
Argentina’s most-exported mineral is gold, which represents almost 4% of 
the country’s total exports (Ministerio de Hacienda, 2019). In 2019, 2.2% of 
the gold extracted worldwide came from Argentina (US Geological Survey, 
2020), primarily Santa Cruz (59.64%) and San Juan (39.18%) (Secretaría de 
Minería, 2020). 
The expansion of mining in Argentina was accompanied by transformations 
to the sector’s institutional framework that remain little analyzed. The present 
study focuses on changes to the environmental monitoring institutions for the 
mining sector in the province of San Juan during the period 1993–2020— 
specifcally, those agencies under the auspices of San Juan’s Secretariat of Envi-
ronmental Management and Mining Oversight (Secretaría de Gestión Ambiental 
y Control Minero, SGACM). We selected San Juan as the province with the 
second-largest volume of gold extracted in Argentina and that which accounts 
for half of the country’s mining potential (Prensa Ministerio de Minería, 2019). 
Analysis at the subnational level is crucial to the Argentine case, as administra-
tion and oversight of natural resources falls upon the provincial governments, 
as established by the constitutional reform of 1994. In this chapter we ask the 
following questions: How do environmental monitoring institutions for min-
ing change in the context of sectoral expansion? What factors have driven the 








by the authorities in San Juan to prioritize mining conditioned the institu-
tional change process and limited the capacity for environmental oversight as 
well as the means by which to respond to public demands for transparency and 
participation. 
Our study draws on analysis of mining and environmental legislation at the 
levels of Argentina and San Juan province. Moreover, we explore institutional 
functionality, and the transformations thereto, by way of interviews conducted 
during our feldwork in San Juan and in the departments of Iglesia and Jáchal— 
catalogued as areas of mining infuence.2 
Next, in the theoretical section, we provide a conceptual defnition of our 
understanding of institutions and institutional change. Then, we analyze the 
transformations to environmental monitoring institutions for the mining sec-
tor in the province of San Juan, Argentina. In the analytical section we chart 
the historical development of the institutions starting from their creation in 
the 1990s, before looking at the factors that drive changes to the institutional 
framework. In the conclusions, we refect on what the San Juan case tells us 
about the importance of the policy dimension for understanding processes of 
institutional change in extractive contexts. 
State institutions, reproduction, and institutional change 
Political institutions are rules, procedures, or mechanisms that formally (through
organizations, legislation, or administrative bodies) or informally (through 
shared knowledge and values) curtail or enable political behavior (Levitsky & 
Murillo, 2009; O’Donnell, 1996; North, 1990). In this chapter, we center on 
state institutions, understood as those with the authority to subordinate other 
parties by invoking the public interest, as well as the ability to channel resources 
in order to tackle public problems (Oszlak, 1984). Brinks et al. (2020), distin-
guished between strong and weak institutions: the former are those with the 
capacity to achieve the non-trivial goals they set themselves, while the latter 
neither propose nor accomplish ambitious goals. Institutional weakness can be 
witnessed in both the instability of existing rules and the failure to comply with 
them, whether due to technical inability or to conscious political decisions. The
proposal of these authors is crucial in that it foregrounds the political dimension 
of institutional weakness. 
For state institutions to be able to reproduce over time, they must gain social 
acceptance (Orrù et al., 1991) and adapt to the context (Hall, 2010). This 
requires either a process of gradual change (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010) or jolts
defned as “transient perturbations whose occurrences are difcult to foresee 
and whose impacts on organizations are disruptive and potentially inimical” 
(Meyer, 1982, p. 515). Institutional change can be recognized in a modifcation 
of the rules (Campbell, 2010) or the functions performed by these institutions 
(Streeck & Thelen, 2005). The literature has identifed that internal or external 
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Among the most salient internal changes are the capacity of state agencies and
their bureaucracies (Bersch et al., 2017; Evans, 1995), the economic resources 
that an institution has available (Hill & Hupe, 2002), and surveillance and 
sanctionary mechanisms (Sabatier, 1986). Also infuential is the institutional 
environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), which refers 
to the shared beliefs and logics that guide an institution’s agents. 
The external factors that can drive transformations include: a) the socio-
economic context in which the institutions and their performance are socially 
perceived (Sabatier, 1986); b) the number of actors with power of veto that can 
limit the scope of an institution (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999); and c) the 
actions of social movements or collective actions of protest (Bosi et al., 2016; 
Giugni, 2007; Kolb, 2007; Silva, 2018; Zald et al., 2005). 
The transformations to the mining institutions in Latin America over the 
last twenty years are of particular interest when analyzing the dynamics of 
institutional change. Much of the literature has identifed contextual elements 
among the explanatory factors for institutional change; these can be top-down, 
led by the actors who concentrate power; or bottom-up, stemming from civil 
society or social organizations (Orihuela et al., 2021). The former includes the 
role played by international credit rating agencies in the pro-market reconfgu-
ration of state institutions (Kuramoto & Glave, 2007; Damonte, 2016; Svampa, 
2019) as well as the infuence of international trade agencies in state incorpora-
tion of environmental standards (Lanegra, 2018; Orihuela & Paredes, 2017). 
Notable among the latter are the social conficts that drive bottom-up change 
(Arce, 2014; Bebbington et al., 2018; de Echave et al, 2009). To respond to 
social conficts, governments have utilized various mechanisms: redistributive 
(Arellano Yanguas, 2011), environmental (Orihuela & Paredes, 2017), civic 
participation or consultation (de Echave, 2005; Leifsen et al., 2017; Jaskoski, 
2014), and environmental monitoring (Himley, 2014). 
Environmental control of mining in the province of San Juan, Argentina 
In San Juan, the process of transforming the mining institutions began dur-
ing the 1990s with the province’s accession to Argentina’s new regulatory
framework around mining and the environment (Moscheni & de la Torre,
2017). Argentina’s mining institutions were reformulated under the Assistance
Program for the Argentine Mining Sector (Programa de Asistencia para el Sector
Minero Argentina, PASMA) fnanced by the World Bank and the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Moori Koenig & Bianco, 2003).
In a context of crisis for regional economies such as San Juan’s, the central
government used transfers from the national treasury to press the provinces
into adopting the reforms (Favaro et al., 2006). The new mining legislation
establishes a series of incentives to attract capital, including legal stability for
thirty years and the limitation of royalties to 3% of the pit-head value (Table
13.1). As well as this external coercion, provincial deputies representing San






















Mining Code and the Mining Investment Law (Álvarez Huwiler, 2013). Along-
side these changes to the mining laws came amendments to the environmental
legislation—which also afected the mining sector—as part of an institutional
greening process at the national level (Gutiérrez & Isuani, 2014). These legisla-
tive changes and adaptions to the mining and environmental regulations are
outlined in Table 13.1. 
In line with the provisions of the Environmental Protection Law for Min-
ing Activity, San Juan’s frst two institutions tasked with the environmental
monitoring of mining were created: the Research Center for the Prevention of
Mining and Industrial Pollution (Centro de Investigación para la Prevención de la
Contaminación Minero-Industrial, CIPCPAMI, 1996) the product of a technol-
ogy transfer agreement with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA);
and the Provincial Environmental Management Unit for Mining (Unidad de Gestión
Ambiental Minera Provincial, UPGAMP, 1998). The purpose of CIPCAMI was
to monitor the water courses in areas where mines had been established. For
its part, UGAMP was tasked with assessing the environmental impact reports
submitted by mining companies at each operational stage, as well as the cor-
responding two-yearly updates. Both institutions, as well as the application of
environmental protection (No.1426) or assessment (No. 6800) environmental
legislation, are dependent on the provincial mining authority (currently the
Ministry of Mining). That is, the environmental oversight of mining is left
to the sphere of mining itself and not to the Secretariat of the Environment,
which is responsible for other activities that might generate an environmental
impact (Decree No. 504-L). 
Table 13.1 Overview of mining and environmental regulations (1993−2002)4 
Argentina Law No. San Juan Law/Decree Year Description 
No. 
24,196 459 -M 1993 Mining investment 
24,228 1993 Federal Mining Agreement 
24,498 7199 1995 Update to Mining Code 
4392 1978 Water Code for the Province 
6872 1998 of San Juan 
24,585 1995 Environmental Protection Law 
1426 1996 for Mining Activity 
6800 1997 Environmental Impact 
Declaration 
25,243 1997 Supplementary Treaty on 
Mining between Argentina 
and Chile 
25,675 513-L 2002 General Environmental Law 
25,688 2002 Environmental Management 
Regimen for Water 
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The legal changes in the 1990s were key to the mining boom in San Juan, 
which began in 2003 with Barrick Gold’s construction of Veladero.5 Other 
mines followed: Gualcamayo in 2009, which remained in operation in 2021, 
and Casposo, active from 2011 to 2019. Another gold and silver mining project 
was Pascua Lama, located in the border between Argentina and Chile; construc-
tion began in 2009 but was put on hold in 2020.6 In addition, San Juan has 
copper deposits that the José María project is looking to exploit. The initiation 
of new projects has translated into a larger share for mining and quarrying in the 
province’s economy, having gone from 3% of gross geographic product (GGP) 
in 2004 to 10.4% in 2018 (IIESJ, 2019). In 2018, mining accounted for 72% 
of exports from San Juan, whose main destination was Canada (Ministerio de 
Hacienda, 2019). 
From 2003, with the arrival to the provincial government of José Luis Gioja 
(2003–2015), mining became state policy, involving the promotion of mining 
investment and the guarantee of legal stability for companies (Gioja, 2006). José 
Luis Gioja governed for three terms (2003–2015), adding to his majority on 
each occasion: in 2003, he won 38.12%; in 2007, 51.81%; and in 2011, 68.16% 
(Ministerio del Interior, 2003, 2007, 2011). According to Gioja, mining was 
central to his election as governor: “I campaigned on mining. We opened 
Veladero on October 15th [2003] and the election was on the 23rd” (La Nación,
2006). Mining was the most promoted activity by the provincial government 
as well as the local press (Giovannini et al., 2009; Bottaro & Álvarez, 2014). 
During his three terms, Gioja’s vision was to “turn San Juan into a leading min-
ing jurisdiction” (Ministerio de Minería, 2019). The political prioritization of 
mining over other activities was crystallized in the government slogan San Juan 
mining land, frst employed by Gioja (Panorama Minero, 2012) and still in use 
in 2020, under the governorship of Sergio Uñac7 (Mining Press, 2020; Gobi-
erno de San Juan, 2020). For San Juan’s political authorities, mining promotion 
became an extractive imperative (Arsel et al., 2016) that conditioned the process 
of institutional change we analyze here. 
Gradual changes driven by social demands, 2003–2014 
In San Juan, social conficts around mining broke out in parallel with the con-
struction of Veladero (Bottaro & Álvarez, 2014; Christel, 2020), and were cen-
tered mainly on the departments of Calingasta and Jáchal. Inhabitants deployed 
a broad repertoire of collective actions8 aimed at obtaining information, rejecting 
water concessions for mining, and calling for instances of civic participation 
and consultation. 
Through social mobilization, large-scale mining became a socially problema-
tized issue, and the matter of environmental monitoring of mining gained trac-
tion on the provincial political agenda (Henríquez & Nozica, 2010). Thus, the 
increased visibility of the confict pressured San Juan’s subnational government 
into introducing institutional changes within this sphere. The province’s chief 





2006 it was promoted from the Subsecretariat to the Secretariat of Mining, and 
then in 2010 it became the Ministry of Mining. Similarly, in 2006 the Unit for 
Environmental Management of Mining (UGAM) became the Subsecretariat, 
and then, in 2010, the Secretariat of Environmental Management and Mining 
Oversight (Secretaría de Gestión Ambiental y Control Minero, SGACM). 
In turn, between 2004 and 2006 three new institutions were created: the 
Consultative Mining Council (Consejo Consultivo Minero, CCM; Decree No. 
1108); the Interdisciplinary Commission for Environmental Assessment of 
Mining (Comisión Interdisciplinaria de Evaluación Ambiental Minera, CIEAM; 
Decree No. 1815) and the Multidisciplinary Environmental Assessment Com-
mission for Mining (Comisión Evaluadora Multidisciplinaria Ambiental Minera; 
1679–2006 M). The recitals in the regulations refer to “justifed social concern” 
and the need for “greater institutional and social oversight” (No. 1815). The 
aim of CCM was to create a body responsible for “reaching consensus and 
voicing opinion” (Decree No. 1108). CIEAM was tasked with the environ-
mental assessment of large-scale mining projects, and CEMAM medium- and 
small-scale projects. 
The new bodies called, almost without exception, institutions involved in 
mining or under the control of the provincial government. For example, CCM 
was made up of fourteen institutions that the founding decree classed as quali-
fed to pass opinion. These included the Secretariat of Mining, the Argentine 
College of Mining Engineers (Colegio Argentino de Ingenieros en Minas), the Pro-
fessional Council of Geological Sciences (Consejo Profesional de Ciencias Geológi-
cas), the Mining Chamber of San Juan (Cámara Minera de San Juan), and the 
Argentine Mine Workers’ Assocation (Asociación Obrera Minera Argentina). The 
passage of consultative opinions required a quorum of at least twelve people, and 
the vote of half plus one of the representatives. In the case of a tie, the vote of 
the undersecretary of mining was worth two. Analysis of CCM minutes indi-
cates a lack of critical voices (Ministerio de Minería, n.d.). The body was only 
active from 2004 to 2008 (Ministerio de Minería, n/d; Borges & Rittner, 2010). 
For its part, the CIEAM also proved impervious to social demands for partici-
pation and transparency (Henríquez & Nozica, 2010). Pursuant to Decree No. 
1815, CIEAM is composed of ffteen institutions;9 of these, eleven are directly 
answerable to the provincial government of San Juan, which appoints the lead-
ers of these institutions. Of the rest, two are institutions that answer to the 
Argentine state, and the other two are autonomous universities. The exclusion 
of other independent actors, or those who might ofer a broader perspective 
during the assessment process, attests to the strict political control that the San 
Juan government exercised over the new environmental oversight institutions, 
just as it did over other mining institutions (Haslam & Godfrid, 2020). 
As had occurred during the 1990s, the institutional changes owed to exter-
nal factors, but this time it was a bottom-up development arising out of social 
confict. However, the demands for civic participation or consultation were 
not met in the way that the social organizations wanted. The state responded 
formally to the social demands by creating new rules and agencies, though their 
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implementation was limited because of restricted civic participation as well as 
funding shortfalls. Dargent and Urteaga (2016) characterized this type of state 
response, in which institutions are formally created or symbolic actions taken 
but hampered by inadequate funding or implementation, as reactive. Similarly, 
Levitsky and Murillo defned the bodies that result from such changes as “win-
dow-dressing institutions” that political leaders seek to keep “on the books” 
(2009, p. 120) in formal terms, but with little interest in actual application. 
The outcomes of the changes refect an institutional framework for envi-
ronmental oversight of mining that is weak in terms of its failure not only to 
accomplish the goals it formally sets itself, but also—through the systematic 
exclusion of critical voices—to address the social concerns around mining. Nor 
does it succeed in improving the technical capacity for environmental oversight. 
According to information gathered through the interviews and the secondary 
sources, the technical capacity of the Secretariat for Environmental Manage-
ment of Mining, the monitoring capacity of the CIPCAMI, and the assessment 
capacity of CIEAM present various defciencies. 
After ten years of activity, the Japanese cooperation agency responsible for 
the initial technology transfer assessed CIPCAMI and passed judgement on its 
“low sustainability” (JICA, 2007, p. 3). Among other things, JICA highlighted 
the provincial government’s underfunding of CIPCAMI, outmoded technol-
ogy, inability to retain trained professionals, and failure to create self-fnancing 
mechanisms (JICA, 2007). With the exception of some equipment acquired 
in 2000 and later in 2010,10 most of CIPCAMI’s technology was not renewed 
until 2018 (Irusta, 2018). As well as the funding and stafng shortages, the 
Iglesia and Jáchal residents we interviewed expressed signifcant distrust of the 
data produced by CIPCAMI given its proximity to mining interests. Evidence 
of this distrust can be seen in the emergence of community water monitoring 
initiatives in Jáchal as an alternative to CIPCAMI (Ulloa et al., 2021). 
According to some of the ofcials from CIEAM11 interviewed, the body 
experienced high staf turnover due to unpaid overtime or lack of professional 
recognition for the work they did. There was no institutional memory that new 
entrants could draw from, giving rise to a pronounced asymmetry of knowl-
edge between the mining companies (which submitted their reports every two 
years) and the ofcials assessing them. Nor was there any delimitation of which 
section of the environmental impact report that each institution should assess, 
resulting in overlaps in some cases and under-recording in others. Assessment 
was primarily conducted on the basis of the extensive corporate reports, with 
little scope for on-site observation. Finally, the opinions issued by CIEAM were 
placed before the San Juan’s chief mining authority for consideration, and in 
practice the decisions concerning the environmental impact declaration were 
more political than technical. Finally, according to the SGACM ofcials inter-
viewed, in 2018 and 2019 the body was hindered by insufcient specialized 
personnel, low pay (which impeded retention), and precarious employment 
contracts. The previously mentioned capacity, resource, and equipment limita-





received the necessary approval from SGACM and the Ministry of Mining to 
proceed with the respective project stages. This is key to understanding that 
the weakness of the environmental oversight institutions for mining is down to 
a deliberate political decision on the part of the provincial government, which 
prefers that they exist on paper rather than assuring their implementation. 
Changes due to jolts caused by environmental accidents, 2015–2019 
On September 13, 2015, an environmental accident occurred at Veladero in 
which almost one million liters of “cyanide-bearing process solution” was 
discharged into the Jáchal basin (Barrick Gold Corporation, 2020, p.  108). 
The Ministry of Mining and the company delayed in informing the public of 
the fact, and the social confict in Jáchal was stirred up again (Casas & Carelli, 
2018; Godfrid & Damonte, 2020). The government of San Juan fned Barrick 
Gold (Redacción Perfl, 2015), and the Ministry of Mining announced it will 
modernize environmental oversight (Pastor, 2016). In 2016, the secretary of 
environmental management and mining oversight was replaced by the hitherto 
manager of the Casposo mine. Upon assuming ofce, the new secretary said: 
“This role is something totally diferent, but I feel good because I wasn’t a 
stranger to these people. . . . Here [at SGACM] he who wasn’t a student, was 
a colleague” (Tiempo de San Juan, 2016). The change represented a closed-shop
solution that again involved actors who were invested in assuring the endurance 
of large-scale mining in the province. 
In May 2016, the Ministry of Mining announced that it would increase the 
salaries of its mine inspectors, though this measure was not implemented at that 
time. From September to November that same year, the inspectors only con-
ducted ofce-based tasks and disrupted mine oversight in protest at the unreal-
ized salary rise (Huella Minera, 2016). In September 2016, there was another 
operational accident at Veladero, this time, a mineralized material spill (Barrick 
Gold, 2018). The courts in San Juan suspended the project from September 
16 to October 3 (Télam, 2016), and the provincial government imposed a new 
fnancial penalty. Once the suspension was lifted, residents of Jáchal took the 
municipality building, demanding the mine’s permanent closure as well as envi-
ronmental remediation (Larreta et al., 2018). Several of our interviewees from 
Iglesia and Jáchal felt that the government abandoned them in the immediate 
aftermath of the 2016 accident, pointing to a “lack of controls” and to “cor-
rupt,” “deplorable” ofcials who were co-opted by corporate might. Residents 
of Jáchal engaged in demonstrations to demand a plebiscite on mining, but the 
provincial legislature did not approve one (Casas & Carelli, 2018). That same 
year the residents teamed up with environmental organizations for a protest 
in Buenos Aires over non-compliance with the National Law on Glaciers
(No. 26,639).12 In addition to the demonstrations, San Juan inhabitants fled 
two criminal complaints against the company for its part in the accident, and 
against the provincial government as well as national-level ofcials for non-
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As with the accident in 2015, the government’s response was reactive, seek-
ing to tackle the problem by announcing more funding: “more investment, 
more oversight” (Prensa Ministerio de Minería, 2018). The Ministry of Mining 
announced the acquisition of new vehicles for on-site inspections, as well as the 
expansion of its workforce (Tiempo de San Juan, 2016). 
In March 2017, there was a third accident, a spill of mineralized material
and chemical substances (Barrick Gold Corporation, 2018). The pattern that
followed was the same as the previous two cases: temporary suspension, fne,
social protests, and the announcement of a battery of measures to improve
environmental oversight. In 2018, the number of mine inspections increased
(Prensa Ministerio de Minería, 2019); cameras were installed to observe
Veladero in real time as part of a program called Mining Big Brother (Prensa
Ministerio de Minería, 2018); and CIPCAMI’s cyanide-detection equipment
was renewed (Irusta, 2018). The following year, SGACM opened its new
headquarters after a two-year construction efort that cost 100 million pesos
(Mining Press, 2019). 
In addition, a whole new series of measures were announced that, after
the social pressure abated, were not ultimately implemented. For example, in
2017 a new law (No. 1600-P) stipulated that municipalities in which mining
was practiced could appoint an environmental prosecutor. But as of 2021,
none of San Juan’s municipalities had appointed anyone to such a role. Also
in 2018, the Ministry of Mining signed an agreement with the Universidad
Nacional de San Juan to produce an information system for environmental moni-
toring of mining. On this, the Minister of Mining noted: “In this way we well
have transparent, agile, and truthful management of all information” (Aguirre,
2018). However, the necessary software was not implemented due to “politi-
cal decisions” (interview with ofcial from the San Juan Ministry of Mining,
12/4/2019). 
As our analysis shows, at this stage the new measures that the government 
incorporated into the institutional framework for the environmental oversight 
of mining were also reactive, in the face of social confict and environmental 
accidents. The pre-existing formal rules and bodies (CIPCAMI, CIEAM, 
CEMAM) were kept, and at this stage the changes were focused on a series of 
measures and announcements related to the renewal of the institutional leader-
ship, as well as additional staf members, equipment, and funding. That most 
of the measures were announced on the government’s news portal right after 
the disruptive events attests to their symbolic and political nature. The result 
of the changes introduced was a reactive institutional framework with neither 
the adequate technical capacity for environmental monitoring nor the requisite 
levels of public confdence in mining oversight. Consequently, San Juan is still 
blighted by civic mistrust regarding the government’s environmental oversight 
of mining. In the words of one member of a Jáchal citizen assembly, “It is the 
attitude, not the building, that has to change; it is not an infrastructure problem” 






This Argentine case shows, as with other regional examples (Dargent & 
Urteaga, 2016), that the mining boom was accompanied by reactive institu-
tional change. In San Juan, the transformation of environmental monitoring of 
mining has primarily been a reaction to external factors: coercion by interna-
tional agencies (1993–2002), socio-environmental conficts (2003–2014), and 
mining accidents (2015–2019). 
The frst stage of these changes was marked by the reformulation of the 
regulatory framework and the development of new sectoral institutions. In the 
1990s, the legislative foundations were laid to position San Juan as one of the 
main destinations for foreign mining investment in Argentina, and they remain 
intact to this day. The second and third stages were characterized by the efects 
of social confict and mining accidents. As a result of social protests, environ-
mental control of mining became an issue of public interest that the San Juan 
government could not overlook. This public pressure prompted the creation of 
regulations, bodies, laws, and bureaucratic departments for the environmental 
oversight of mining that did not previously exist at the subnational level. How-
ever, the social demands were only met in formal terms, on paper. 
Unlike the study by Dargent and Urteaga (2016), in our analysis we fnd 
that the changes introduced did not bring about an institutional strengthening 
process. On the contrary, in San Juan there is evidence that the institutional 
framework for environmental oversight of mining is weak, insofar as it does not 
meet the statutory goals proposed, the measures it implements are of limited 
long-term sustainability, and it has failed to gain public trust. 
Following the proposals of Levitsky and Murillo (2009) and Brinks et al. 
(2020), we understand that institutional weakness corresponds to a political 
decision and a strategy to introduce formal amendments (place them on the 
books) that do not fundamentally alter the status quo. In the case of San Juan, 
institutions are created that in statutory terms are aimed at improving environ-
mental oversight mining, but which, because of political decisions, are starved of
the fnancial or technical resources they need to assure compliance. The statu-
tory objectives of the institutions also include the implementation of mecha-
nisms for addressing social concerns or promoting consensus, but actors with 
views that are critical of mining have been systematically excluded or denied 
the opportunity to participate in civic consultations. Thus, political authorities 
use diferent tactics in order not to fully implement the institutional changes 
incorporated. In line with the analysis of Maillet and Carrasco (this volume), we
observe an apparent change in the institutions that entails transformations to the 
formal rules, but not substantive modifcations that challenge extractive policies. 
And while these institutional changes remain strictly formal, they still play 
a key role in legitimizing institutions in order to adapt to the wider context 
(Levistky & Murillo, 2009). That is, the incorporation of institutional changes 













242 Julieta Godfrid 
understood as a strategy to legitimize the subnational government. In this 
regard, Brinks et al. (2020) have highlighted that changes to the institutional 
facade allow governments to legitimize their actions before international audi-
ences that demand the incorporation of global standards, whether in terms of 
human rights, the environment, or other areas. This strategy of legitimation 
for international audiences can be observed in the overtures that the San Juan 
government makes to global investors, in which environmental management, 
mining oversight, transparency, and communication are cited as fundamental 
pillars of mining policy. But in addition to this purpose, in federal systems such 
as Argentina’s in which the stewardship of natural resources depends on the 
subnational levels, the incorporation of institutional changes—however super-
fcial—can also be central to ensuring governance. 
For subnational administrations, the cost of not responding to social issues 
can be high, as evidenced by other studies on mining confict in Argentina 
(Christel, 2020). However, as a fnal refection, we believe that it is important 
to continue exploring the extent to which these changes, or apparent changes, 
to the institutional facade actually contribute to legitimizing institutions, or, 
conversely, whether they only make their limitations more apparent. 
Notes 
1 Compiled by author based on Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (2021a, b), 
“Series por sector de actividad económica: valor bruto de producción y valor agregado 
bruto. Años 2004–2020, por trimestre” and “Series trimestrales de oferta y demanda glo-
bales. Años 2004–2020”, www.indec.gob.ar/indec/web/Nivel4-Tema-3-9-47 (Accessed
20/04/2021). 
2 We carried out a total of 140 semi-structured interviews with subnational government 
ofcials, lawyers, and representatives of NGOs, foundations, socio-environmental assem-
blies, agricultural producers’ associations, irrigation boards, neighbors’ unions, chambers 
of commerce, and mining companies. The interviews took place in September 2016; 
September, November, and December 2018; and December 2019. The feldwork was 
carried out in collaboration with Dr. Lautaro Clemenceau and with funding from the 
Argentine National Council of Scientifc and Technical Research (Consejo Nacional de 
Investigaciones Científcas y Técnicas de la Argentina) and the Ford Foundation. 
3 José Luis Gioja was deputy for the province of San Juan (1987–1991); deputy in the 
Argentine Chamber of Deputies (1991–1995); governor of the province of San Juan 
(2003–2015) and president of the Partido Justicialista, Argentina’s biggest political party 
(2016–2021). 
4 This table presents some of the most representative mining and environmental laws. 
5 In 2017, 50% of Veladero was acquired by Shandong Gold Group. 
6 In 2020, a Chilean court ordered the permanent closure of Pascua—Lama for breaches 
of its environment qualifcation resolution (Primer Tribunal Ambiental, 2020). 
7 Sergio Uñac served as vice-governor of San Juan from 2011 to 2015, then as governor 
for two terms (2015–2019 and 2019–2023). 
8 Repertoires of collective action are defned as a set of cultural practices learned during 
the process of social struggle that allow forms of protest to be expanded in a creative way 
(Tilly, 2002). 
9 Each institution is required to appoint a named representative and an alternate. 










11 We interviewed representatives of seven diferent member institutions of CIEAM in 
2016, 2018, and 2019. 
12 Law No. 26,639, sanctioned in 2010, establishes the Minimum Budgets Regime for the 
Preservation of Glaciers and the Periglacial Environment. 
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14 Institutional change in 
extractive economies 
A research agenda from the Andes 
Bettina Schorr and Gerardo Damonte 
Introduction 
The observation that resource-rich states tend to struggle with a whole series 
of political and economic problems—the curse—has prompted vigorous debates 
among scholars trying to decipher the causes and consequences of this fatal 
relationship. Institutions are at the heart of this debate: It is argued that in 
absence of a strict regulatory framework, the diferent expressions of the curse 
will appear. Moreover, the resource curse perpetuates itself by preventing the 
emergence of functioning regulatory institutions. In this way, this argument 
points to a vicious cycle that implies an unavoidable fate for the many resource-
rich countries in the world characterized by weak institutional capacities, as the 
Andean countries are. 
In contrast to these foundational tenets of the resource curse approach, we 
fnd that the Andean region demonstrates that the pathologies of the curse 
and institutional change towards mitigating it can take place at the same time. 
Expressions of the curse can be detected throughout the region, from macro-
economic problems to social conficts and political dysfunctionalities to envi-
ronmental and health damage. This is even true for the case of Chile, generally 
considered an outlier among the Andean cursed nations, because of its cautious 
macroeconomic management and the high quality of its institutions (World 
Bank, 2019). Some authors even argue the country has managed to overcome 
the curse (Haslam, 2016; Saylor, 2014). Yet, scholars in this book (Maillet and 
Carrasco, Rabi and Campos) argue that it depends where you look at: Chile 
is facing serious environmental and other local problems related to its extrac-
tive economy, which can be interpreted as manifestations of the curse. Thus, 
applying a comprehensive typology of the dimensions of the curse (Orihuela, 
2018), the diferent manifestations can defnitely be identifed throughout the 
Andean region. 
At the same time, institutions have been established or changed in order 
to tackle the problems associated with the extractivist development models 
promoted in the Andes. Against the daunting predictions of the resource curse 
approach, the diferent chapters of this volume reveal a wide array of innova-
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and social policy innovations, anti-corruption and participatory reforms, as 
well as environmental regulation. Thus, confrming that important institu-
tional changes to tame the resource curse can occur under the conditions of 
resource economies characterized by weak state structures is the frst important 
contribution of this volume. This fnding is further backed by recent scholar-
ship proclaiming a whole inclusionary turn (Kapiszewski et al., 2021) for Latin 
America that is diagnosed on the basis of the adoption of many of those political 
institutions required to mitigate the diferent expressions of the curse. 
By exploring the ways these institutions have emerged and how they per-
form, the chapters of this volume add further insights to the incipient discus-
sion on institutional change in resource-dependent contexts. In a general 
perspective, they fnd that institutional change and performance in the Andean 
resource economies must be understood as phenomena that are much more 
complex than pictured by the resource curse literature. Institutional change can 
be triggered by diferent actors through a diverse set of pathways and involving 
diferent causal mechanisms. By extension, the book underscores that institu-
tions have to be understood as the result of ongoing social processes embedded 
in specifc domestic political and cultural contexts as well as shaped by global 
dynamics. 
In the remainder of this concluding chapter, we lay out a frst draft of a 
research agenda on institutional change and performance in resource-dependent
contexts. For this agenda, we distil a series of hypotheses and theoretical 
implications from the books’ chapters that may be valid across diferent coun-
tries and regions. Based on these, we raise a couple of relevant questions for 
further research. Our nascent research agenda includes six thematic areas: 1) 
governments and institutional change in resource economies; 2) beyond the 
government: the role of non-state actors and international organizations; 3) the 
patterns, sequencing, and timing of institutional change; 4) institutional design 
and implementation; 5) context matters: the national and subnational contexts; 
and 6) informal institutions in resource governance. These areas are certainly 
interdependent but focus on diferent aspects of institutional change and per-
formance under the conditions of resource dependence. We elaborate on each 
briefy and close with some fnal remarks. 
Governments and institutional change in 
resource economies 
Governments adopting the types of institutional change capable of easing the 
resource curse are not only wishful thinking of international organizations and 
NGOs promoting the good governance of the extractive sector. In the Andean 
region, governments acting out of their own intrinsic motivation (without 
domestic or external pressure) have indeed been active promoters of insti-
tutional change with the potential of mitigating the resource curse by using 
their executive powers or by mobilizing their legislative majorities. While the 
chapters of this book focus on individual institutions, it should not be forgotten 
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that in several countries governments also promoted institutional change on the 
macro level: during the latest commodity boom, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecua-
dor wrote and adopted new constitutions which at least on paper signifcantly 
reshaped state-society relations in an inclusive way (Kapiszewski et al., 2021; 
Schilling-Vacafor & Nolte, 2012). 
It should also be stressed that governments promoting institutional change 
by using the rents of the resource sector is not a new phenomenon. Historical 
research into state building in Latin America has repeatedly emphasized that 
political elites have invested resource rents to strengthen state capacity in order 
to be able to provide collective goods and promote economic growth and social 
well-being among their citizens. Such was the case in 19th-century Chile, 
where domestic elites used the rents stemming from the nitrate boom to build 
up the public administration of the country and its infrastructure (Kurtz, 2013). 
As a matter of fact, the Chilean state is as robust as it is today amongst others 
because of this strategic use of resource rents in the past (Soifer, 2016). Also, 
in Peru the rents fowing from the guano boom into the states’ accounts were 
used by President Ramón Castilla in the mid-19th century to strengthen state 
capacity (Kurtz, 2013; Bonilla, 2020). Likewise, Saylor (2014) has showed that 
commodity booms can act as windows of opportunity for state building when 
the export sector forms part of the domestic ruling coalition, which he found 
for the cases of Chile and Argentina. 
Certainly, building up a strong state does not necessarily equate to the political
will to address all the diferent dimensions potentially afected by the resource 
curse. Even in the case of the strong Chilean state, environmental regulation 
has not been on the governments’ agenda and had to be pushed on it from the 
outside (see later). The point to be stressed here is that both in the distant as well 
as in the recent past, governments have promoted institutional changes towards 
the mitigation of the resource curse, refecting Dietsche’s (2007) assertion that 
political will can make a diference (for institutions). Against this background, 
one important question to be addressed by future research should target the 
intrinsic incentives driving governing elites to bring about institutional changes 
in specifc sectors. 
In this sense, it has been shown that new regulation concerning the gov-
ernance of the extractive sector was often motivated by the desire to attract 
foreign capital requiring a clear legal framework (Bebbington & Bury, 2013). 
While redistributive institutions are sometimes viewed as the domain of leftist 
governments (Campello, 2015; Levitsky & Roberts, 2011), the new fscal rules 
and social policies as studied by Jiménez and Evia (this volume) were introduced 
in the region regardless of the political color of the sitting governments (Fair-
feld & Garay, 2017). Haslam and Heidrich (2018) stress that during the latest 
boom resource nationalism defned as states’ actions to enhance its infuence over 
the extractive sector by the maximization of public revenue, the assertion of 
strategic state control, and the enhancement of developmental spill-overs from 
extractive activities could be found anywhere in the region. They diferentiate, 
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in Venezuela and Colombia respectively. Hence, rather than ideological fac-
tors, greater profts in the extractive sector combined with electoral incentives 
stemming from citizens’ demands for redistribution seem to have promoted 
institutional change in these sectors (Fairfeld & Garay, 2017). However, the 
actual extension of these reforms seems to depend on ideology. 
The fip side of exploring the intrinsic incentives for governments to reform 
would be to identify the sectors where governments resist institutional change. 
In other words, further research should explore what is persistently missing in 
terms of institutional change and why. One prime example for such a missing 
reform can be found in the fscal sector. While minor reforms regarding taxing 
citizens have been introduced for instance in Chile and Colombia, thorough 
progressive tax reforms are notoriously absent in the whole region (Atria et al., 
2018). This absence persists notwithstanding the mantra of experts in the feld 
who emphasize that progressive tax systems would be essential to tackle the 
majority of the problems associated with the resource curse. In particular, a pro-
gressive tax system would stabilize domestic resources and reduce the economic 
dependence from the volatile global commodity markets. Moreover, it is argued 
that state-society relations based on progressive taxes—the fscal pact—promote 
transparency and increase the accountability of public ofcials. 
Yet, the lack of a fscal contract that some authors argue is the main problem 
of resource-dependent economies (Moore, 2004; Karl, 2007) has been per-
petuated through the latest boom cycle in the region. In several cases, scholars 
have identifed elite lobbyism as one factor avoiding tax reforms in the region 
(Fairfeld, 2015; Bogliaccini & Luna, 2016.). As shall be discussed later, this has 
serious consequences for the sustainability of some of the institutional reforms 
that did take place. 
In other occasions, government may have the intention to change but need to
impose it against reluctant rent-seekers in the legislature or other private power-
ful actors. The frst may be of particularly importance for the Latin American 
presidential systems, in which political preferences of presidents and legislatures 
can difer sharply. To overcome legislative or elite resistance, strategic coalitions 
with civil society organizations and international organizations may be help-
ful (Schorr, this volume). Regarding elite resistance, research has found that it 
is less pronounced in boom times (Campello, 2015), when business elites are 
integrated into cohesive networks (Cárdenas, 2020) and when elites actually are 
aware of social problems they command the power to redress (Reis & Moore, 
2005). 
Beyond the government: the role of non-state 
actors and international organizations 
Institutional change is not always the product of the genuine political will of 
governments. Refecting the argument that under the adverse conditions of 
resource economies institutional change is at best difcult, this book shows 
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new rules. This highlights the importance of non-state actors and international 
organizations in promoting institutional change in resource economies and 
reveals the limits of the state as a driver for institutional change. The state rather 
constitutes an arena of contention where diferent actors strive for imposing 
their own institutional agendas. Thus, just as examining intrinsic motivations 
of governments is important, further research may explore under which condi-
tions non-state and international actors can promote institutional change, in 
which sectors and how. 
As showed in this book, in some cases the pressure for change derived from 
social mobilizations and protests, both nationally as well as regionally and locally.
This has been found for the adoption of new environmental rules by the San 
Juan provincial government in Argentina, new policies for citizen participation 
and political transparency in Chile and Peru, and changes in the formalization 
norms for small-scale mining in Madre de Dios, Peru (see the chapters by God-
frid, Schorr and Damonte). As Bornschlegl and Cisneros, Evia, and Flemmer 
(this volume) note for the cases of Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru respectively, many 
institutional changes with redistributive or regulatory character carried out dur-
ing the latest boom represented long-standing demands of diferent mobilized 
social groups, such as unions, peasant organizations, or indigenous groups. 
In other cases, international organizations (e.g. OECD, ILO, World Bank) 
and donor cooperation put pressure on governments by tying institutional 
change to material (credits, funds etc.) or symbolic rewards, for instance in the 
case of the environmental systems in Chile and Peru (chapters by Maillet and 
Carrasco; Rabi and Campos and Paredes and Figueroa). By the same token, 
Flemmer (this volume) highlights the importance of national and transnational 
advocacy networks in pushing the Peruvian government to regulate the ILO 
169 agreement regarding indigenous consultation by enacting a national con-
sultation law. As shall be discussed in more detail in the next section, domestic 
mobilization and external pressure often converged to push governments 
towards institutional change. 
The involvement of national and transnational non-state actors and inter-
national organizations in processes of institutional change has several implica-
tions: In a practical sense, it reveals the leverage of international actors that 
holds the potential of supporting or empowering domestic reform coalitions, 
not just governments. On the other hand, institutional change propagated by 
these actors may provoke problems associated with institutional isomorphism: 
They may constitute a no ft condition and be inefective in the respective local 
context (we elaborate on this point later). Further research should identify the 
conditions under which local mobilizations and international leverages interact 
to produce efective institutional change. 
As mentioned in our introduction, business actors may also infuence institu-
tional change and performance in resource-dependent contexts. So far, research 
on how business can afect institutions often focusses on business elites as pro-
moters of extractive institutions that ensure their privileged access to resources (i.a.
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as stated earlier, under certain conditions business actors have also been found 
to support inclusive institutions. Haslam (2016) and Saylor (2014) mention the 
important role of business actors in promoting efcient regulatory institutions, 
thereby preventing the states from succumbing to the curse. 
Also, transnational initiatives, such as the EITI or the International Council 
on Mining and Metals (ICMM), involve companies as actors in processes of 
institutional change in the member states. Regarding the latter, authors discuss 
whether they have to be understood as a corporate version of window dressing
institutions or whether they have a real efect on constraining corporate and 
political behavior detrimental to the good of society. This point about how to 
diferentiate between self-serving expediency and positive infuence should be 
addressed in more detail in future research. 
Another incipient stream of research explores the consequences of corporate 
behavior in host communities, where they carry out their projects. In particu-
lar, it has been argued that companies by means of their CSR programs have a 
strong impact on the daily routines of communities, i.e. how these communities 
organize their economies and social life. It has also been argued that CSR pro-
grams generate unexpected and undesired institutional consequences: Where 
corporate services substitute for public service delivery (like access to water, 
public infrastructure etc., as for example in Peru), in the longer run this may 
interrupt or slow down processes of institutional strengthening on part of the 
state by eroding citizens’ demands towards the state (Bebbington, 2010). Future 
research may confrm empirically this relationship between corporate activities 
on the local level and institutional defects on the national level and identify the 
expressions it may take. 
The patterns, sequencing, and timing of 
institutional change 
Processes of institutional change in resource-dependent contexts may follow 
specifc patterns and timings. The chapters of this book indicate the signifcance 
of diferent patterns of involvement of state and non-state actors in diferent 
policy sectors. 
As mentioned earlier, governments were promotors of sectoral regulation and
of institutions that capture a higher share of the sectors’ rents, increase redistri-
bution, or provide social assistance. In contrast, environmental institutions have 
not been placed frst on governments’ agendas, which may confrm the resource 
curse literatures’ argument of politicians being myopic and refraining from put-
ting hard constraints on the sector. The empirical cases analyzed in this book 
may indicate that or international organizations with leverage capacity or mas-
sive domestic social movements (partly supported by transnational advocacy) or 
a mix of both are key in promoting institutional change in the environmental 
sector. Certainly, this assertion is not meant to be exclusive. International pres-
sure was also present in other sectors (e.g. the transparency reforms in Chile 
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movements have demanded fscal decentralization in Peru. Occasionally, gov-
ernments have adopted and implemented environmental programs as shown 
in Bornschlegl’s study on integral reparation in Ecuador. Notwithstanding these 
single cases, empirical evidence of this book may lead us to hypothesize a cer-
tain bias towards the environmental sector that refects the sectoral preferences 
of international agencies as well as social values (environmental protection) and 
local grievances (contamination) on part of domestic non-state actors. Future 
research may explore if this tendency constitutes a robust relationship and, if so, 
fnd the underlying causes. More especially, it would be important to fnd and 
explore cases of governments adopting institutions for environmental protection
without external pressure (i.e. by intrinsic motivation). 
The chapters of this book also allow us to address hypotheses with regard 
to the timing and sequencing of institutional change under the adverse condi-
tions of resource economies. Two patterns can be discerned. The frst connects 
institutional change promoted by international actors to domestic challengers 
and may imply that a sequence is at work. In cases where international pressure 
established a formal framework against reluctant governments, social pressure 
and protest may be necessary to activate or enhance its transformatory efect. 
The frst was the case with the translation of the international convention of 
prior consultation into actual Peruvian law in the context of the Bagua confict
(Flemmer, this volume). The second can be found in case of environmental 
legislation in San Juan, Argentina, which was frst introduced on the basis of 
international factors (the Rio Convention and Japanese donor cooperation) and 
then further refned to the rhythm of social mobilizations. For this reason, and 
drawing on a concept coined by Dargent and Urteaga (2016), Godfrid (this 
volume) speaks of a type of reactive change that is only adopted when social pres-
sure on governments is so high as to make it unavoidable. 
This statement contrasts with the problems that has been mentioned related 
to institutional isomorphism. In the case of the Peruvian OEFA, Paredes and 
Figueroa (this volume) argue that the externally promoted institution could 
not count on social support, which contributed to its weakness. On the other 
hand, institutional change imposed against the resistance of states by domestic 
challengers may be more sustainable when international actors use their lever-
age to push for efective implementation of these institutions (we return to this 
point later). 
Second, the opportunities for institutional change may also vary along the 
boom–post-boom divide depending on the presence or absence of economic 
windfalls. Some institutional changes, such as the increase of the states’ share of 
the extractive sectors’ rents, may be easier to achieve during boom times when 
the overall profts are high. As mentioned, scholars have argued that business 
elites are more willing to support or at least not obstruct state interventions into 
the economy in times of fat cows when a higher redistribution is not perceived 
as a loss (Campello, 2015). 
Other institutional changes might be easier to adopt in times of economic 
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receded. Transparency reforms may be a case in point. As Moreno shows (this 
volume), across the Andean region social perception of corruption has increased
signifcantly only after the latest commodity boom has ended. Likewise, it was 
only towards the end of the boom that many countries saw the revelation of 
mega corruption scandals and social disapproval increased until opening up a 
window of opportunity for transparency reformers (Schorr, this volume). The 
causal mechanisms underlying this fnding should be explored in more detail. 
They might mirror the results from studies conducted in other world regions 
that reveal people tend to ignore some of the fallacies of resource economies 
(such as authoritarianism and corruption), whilst the general perception is that 
everybody wins (Jones Luong & Weinthal, 2009 for the post-Soviet republics). 
Ignoring the fallacies associated with resource dependence would then be an 
important barrier to institutional change, and more information of potential 
pitfalls could act as a redress. 
Fiscal reforms may also be a case in point. Jiménez (this volume) raises the 
question of whether the post-boom period could be a good moment to alter 
fscal redistribution schemes adopted during the boom period that signifcantly 
contribute to territorial inequalities in the region. In a variation of the argu-
ment regarding the reduction of elite resistance against redistributive measures 
during boom times, he argues that the post-boom could constitute a window 
of opportunity. Since it can be assumed that the losses a further reform of the 
fscal system would generate would be lower for the afected subnational juris-
dictions in times of economic bust, also their resistance might be lower. As an 
implication, times of thin cows might in some sectors constitute better moments 
for promoting institutional change. 
Altogether, these diferent trajectories, patterns, and sequences lead us to 
better understand the diachronic feature of institutional change. Institutional 
change is not a linear process that unfolds following a pre-designed manual or 
guideline; it is rather a social process whose trajectory depends heavily on the 
social conditions and power balances among state and non-state actors. Suit-
able social conditions and favorable power balances may create opportunities to 
overcome the maladies associated with the resource curse so that social actors 
are able to push forward institutional changes. 
Institutional design and implementation 
While this book confrms that institutional change took place rather frequently, 
almost all chapters reveal defciencies in at least one of two interrelated areas: 
institutional design and implementation. The authors of several chapters argue 
that institutions lost their innovative elements and objectives during implemen-
tation, and even ended up reproducing the negative social situations and behav-
iors that they were intended to change. The chapters underscore, thus, that 
full-fedged institutional change towards mitigating the resource curse should 
be grasped as a two-step process in which the emergence, adoption, or sound 
design of new institutions does not in itself assure efective implementation. 
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Scholars and practitioners alike should pay attention to these complexities and 
focus not only on the adoption of curse-preventing institutions in resource 
economies, but analyze in much more detail the way they are designed and the 
consequences of their design for the achievement of their statutory goals as well 
as the constraints operating upon their efective implementation. 
Regarding design, several chapters in this book show that new institutions 
have been adopted which for their name and statutory goals would seem to 
be able to constrain behavior conducive to the manifestations of the resource 
curse. At times, the establishment of, for example, new environmental min-
istries have elicited approval and praise on the part of international actors and 
donor cooperation. However, when a closer look at these institutions is taken, 
it becomes clear that they have been designed by powerholders in such a way 
that their consequences are ultimately minimal. Thus, these institutions seem to 
represent window dressing institutions formally adopted to please external actors 
(such as international organizations) or to ease internal pressures (such as social 
mobilizations). Maybe a renewed version of the resource curse should not focus 
on the presence or absence of regulatory institutions, but on the way they are set 
up and function (or do not function). The authors of this book have described 
the lack of impact in the face of factual formal institutional change by using 
diferent concepts: Flemmer detects unwanted change in the case of prior consul-
tation in Peru that has been legally downsized in the national legal framework. 
Maillet and Carrasco fnd apparent change in the Chilean extractive sector. These 
authors also argue that change is limited to the environmental subsector and has 
almost no constraining efect on the dominant extractive regime as demonstrated 
in the persistent increase of both the number of projects as well as the number 
of social conficts these provoke (a similar argument is presented by Paredes 
and Figueroa for the case of the Environmental Ministry in Peru). Maillet and 
Carrasco (this volume) also state that business has actively lobbied for specifc 
institutional designs, in order to evade actual constraints. In Peru (Paredes and 
Figueroa, this volume; Durand, 2016) and Ecuador (Cisneros, this volume) as 
well, mining industries have been found to infuence the design of the sectoral 
regulation (environmental and other) to cushion its efects on their interests. 
Likewise, Rabi and Campos (this volume) argue that business-friendly political 
forces in the Chilean Congress have designed the Environmental Courts in a 
way that intentionally reduces their scope of action and, with it, their potential 
to constrain ecologically harmful activities. 
Defects by design are not always the product of a strategic political calculus, 
but may also represent unanticipated or undesired side efects. The chapters by 
Jiménez and Evia (this volume) make this point by laying out the consequences 
in terms of territorial inequalities and fnancial unsustainability, respectively. 
These two chapters also underscore another aspect important for scholars and 
practitioners alike: the interdependence of policy sectors. This aspect has been 
addressed by the institutional analysis literature as the institutional complexity of 
current societies (Campbell, 2010), in which changes in one institution can 
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point: When the fscal system fails to provide public resources in a sustainable 
way, social policy instruments may lose their transformatory potential once 
the boom and its windfalls vanish. In other words, it is important to address 
the diferent policy sectors required for mitigating or avoiding the curse, in a 
comprehensive way and simultaneously. Future research should address these 
interdependencies in order to obtain a better understanding of the workings of 
institutional complexities in resource economies. 
Another important factor constraining the implementation of new institu-
tions is the lack of money that is directly related to the dynamics of extractive 
economies. Several authors in this volume point out to the problem of lack 
of resources which arises from the cyclicity and volatility of global commod-
ity markets (see also Vos, 2012; Campello & Zucco, 2021). Once the boom 
recedes, the money needed to implement institutional changes for instance in 
the environmental sector (Bornschlegl, this volume) or in the social or public 
sectors (Evia and Jiménez, this volume) will run short. Even the attempt to 
diversify the extractive sector in Ecuador has been curbed when the rents from 
the oil sector decreased (Cisneros, this volume). At the same time, as mentioned 
before, it may be that precisely these moments of economic downturn can act 
as windows of opportunities for specifc institutional changes, even with fewer 
fnancial resources. 
Other factors found in the chapters of this book to be afecting institutional 
implementation are unrelated to the dynamics of the resource economy. These 
include for instance the lack of bureaucratic or professional capacity (Paredes 
and Figueroa, this volume), the lack of trust in the state (Bornschlegl, this 
volume), as well as the lack of executive power of public agencies to enforce 
institutions across the national territory (Bornschlegl, Damonte, this volume). 
The latter two factors underscore that institutional implementation—like 
institutional emergence—is basically a function of power, and that social agency 
is fundamental for understanding institutional implementation. Particularly, 
power and cultural dynamics shape institutional implementation in contexts 
where the state is not the only actor holding power and may not even be the 
most powerful one. Throughout the chapters in this volume, we learn about 
how transnational corporations and local elites have reduced the new institu-
tions’ transformative elements, for the sake of private profts. On the other hand,
non-hegemonic social actors have been shown to shape the implementation of 
new public policies through resistance and mobilization. 
We fnish this section on institutional design and implementation with two 
refections. The frst concerns the problems related to institutional isomor-
phism. Since in resource economies institutional change may depend to a 
higher degree on international pressure (at least in specifc sectors, as discussed 
before), a research agenda focusing on the efective implementation of insti-
tutions in resource economies should be attentive to the problems of no ft: 
governments may import uncritically institutional frameworks developed under 
diferent conditions that do not ft their own national, regional, or local social 
dynamics and are, hence, prone to failure. Isomorphism and territorial no ft
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may afect institutional implementation, as shown in the chapters by Paredes 
and Figueroa and by Damonte (this volume). In both cases, imported institu-
tions (the Peruvian Environmental Ministry as a case of global isomorphism and 
the state formalization plans imposed by the Peruvian central government to 
regulate mining activities in the Peruvian Amazonia) were seen as alien by the 
people supposed to comply with them (the rule takers, in the words of Streeck 
and Thelen (2005)). As a consequence, they refused to do so. Future research 
should focus on the mechanisms that may allow to foster the adjustment and 
grounding of national and international policies to specifc contexts and ter-
ritories so that they can work efectively. 
Second, what institutions actually accomplish and the efects they have do not
only depend on design and enforcement. As Rabi and Campos (this volume) 
argue, the efects of an institution are also a function of how they are used by 
social actors, mirroring (without mentioning) the argument of institutional 
analysts regarding the discretionary potential that all institutions (to some 
extent) have. The authors show that the Environmental Courts in Chile do not 
necessarily act as protection shields for the environment. They are more often 
used by business actors precisely to dispute state decisions grounded in envi-
ronmental concerns. And those actors tend to be successful. Most decisions of 
these courts beneft project holders and not the local communities complaining 
over environmental damage. Thus, the actual use of institutions and how this 
use might be related to the dynamics of resource economies should also be of 
concern to a research agenda on institutional dynamics under the conditions of 
resource dependence. 
Context matters: the national and subnational levels 
We stated at the beginning of this chapter that processes of institutional change 
need to be understood and analyzed as ongoing processes, embedded in specifc 
local, national, and global contexts. In fact, the chapters of this volume show 
that specifc contexts matter greatly for explaining and exploring the opportu-
nities for institutional change and efective implementation. 
The universe of potential contextual factors that may condition institutional 
dynamics in resource economies is wide and includes amongst others specifc 
state-society relations, political settlements, culture and economic contexts, and 
the quality of democratic institutions. We give an example for each: Regarding 
state-society relations, the alliance between informal miners and the govern-
ment in Bolivia structured the governance of the informal gold mining sector in 
Bolivia in a way that prevents the efective implementation of regulatory institu-
tions (Amengual & Dargent, 2020). Cultural factors matter when the presence 
(Bolivia, Chile) or absence (Ecuador) of the idea that countries are and have 
always been “mining countries” infuences if the mining sector is more or less 
constrained (Koch & Perreault, 2019). Specifc elite settlements may allow for 
a greater or lesser regulation of the extractive sector and the redistribution of its 
rents. For example, the presence of leftist governments may promote a greater 
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redistribution of the sector’s gains in the form of radical resource nationalism
(Haslam & Heidrich, 2018), and the orientation of the national business elite 
can make a diference when it comes to institutional arrangements intended 
to avoid the curse and take the route towards the developmental state (Haslam, 
2016). The national economic context may matter when diferent extractive 
sectors coexist in one country. As Cisneros (this volume) shows for the case of 
Ecuador, the historical dominance of the oil sector has signifcantly hindered 
the efective regulation of the mining sector. 
Even the way societies perceive the diferent expressions of the curse can 
matter and be consequential for institutional demands and potentially afect 
processes of institutional change. Moreno (this volume) discusses that the 
perception of corruption has no impact whatsoever on citizens’ support for 
democracy in Bolivia and Peru (but in other countries of the Andean region). 
He hypothesizes that this results from the fact that societies in these two Andean 
countries seem to be more impervious to the existence of corruption. Since 
they are more accustomed to its presence, corruption might be less likely to 
afect the evaluation they make of the political system. 
Finally, the opportunities for institutional change depend on the quality of 
democracy in place. While the literature has stressed the good governance of the 
sector and related areas as the remedy to the resource curse, it seems obvious 
that it only can be governed in a good way when the very political fundament is 
of a good quality. This includes a functional system of democratic representation, 
the presence of institutional checks and balances, and state agencies insulated 
from undue political infuence capable of implementing rules of good governance. 
As shown by Schorr (this volume), if these conditions are lacking, reforms to 
tame the expressions of the resource curse may be difcult and come at high 
social, political, and even economic costs (as in the case of transparency reforms 
in Peru). 
Context does not only matter nationally, but also on the subnational level 
where the local conditions may quite vary from those of the capitals hosting 
central governments and legislatures. In resource economies, particularly those 
territorial units where the resources are being extracted may be able to signif-
cantly shape how institutions are implemented or establish institutions that may 
mitigate or instigate the local expressions of the curse. In particular, the way in 
which subnational territories are linked to national and international political 
dynamics may afect how institutional change unfolds at the subnational level. 
As we have seen, national institutional dynamics are often subject to the efects 
of external actors; the same applies for subnational territories, such as the 
province of San Juan in Argentina, where external actors have played a greater 
role than the national government in setting up the environmental institutional 
frameworks in a federal country (Godfrid, this volume). 
In a variation of the subnational resource curse, scholars should explore processes 
of institutional change and implementation in subnational units, extrapolating 
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In sum, diferent national or local contexts may allow for diferent institu-
tional changes in diferent sectors at diferent moments. Exploring how these 
contexts shape the opportunities of institutional change aiming at the preven-
tion or mitigation of the resource curse will spur our understanding of when 
and which change may be possible under the potentially adverse conditions of 
resource economies. 
Informal institutions in resource governance 
The resource curse approach has treated informal institutions as causes for the 
curse. In particularly, rent-seeking, corruption, clientelism, and patrimonial-
ism have been stressed as informal institutions aficting resource-dependent 
countries. 
However, other scholarship has carved out the importance of informal insti-
tutions for understanding resource governance. It has been shown that informal 
institutions are present in many governance schemes and are not circumscribed 
to tradition and customary law (Farinós Dasí, 2008; Larson & Soto, 2008; 
Pahl-Wostl, 2009). Distrust in the state and the institutions it enforces may also 
lead to the emergence of new informal practices. Often, formal and informal 
institutions interact, producing hybrid institutional frameworks (Sindzingre, 
2006; Sardan, 2013; Damonte, 2021). Thus, the role of informal institutions in 
resource governance and how they prevent or promote the diferent expressions 
of the curse point strongly to another element that should be on the research 
agenda on institutional change in resource economies. 
In this book, the chapter by Damonte reveals how agribusiness shaped the 
governance of their respective extractive regimes by imposing a series of infor-
mal practices that favor them. Moreover, the author shows how long-standing 
state territorial policies and current political dynamics shape the implementa-
tion of the formalization processes in Madre de Dios, creating what the author 
defnes as hybrid institutional entanglements. 
The hybrid character of governance schemes has been studied from various 
perspectives. Political scientists have explored several emerging hybrid modes of 
governance across the state-market community divisions in the environmental 
sector. These studies explore how state and non-state actors confgure networks 
for co-management, public-private partnerships, and social-private partnerships
in governing the environment and natural resources (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). 
From an anthropological perspective, studies have also stressed the formal-
informal character of some hybrid modes of governance (Sindzingre, 2006; 
Sardan, 2013). 
In the latter perspective, processes of institutional hybridization tend to take 
place when states command limited power over the territories they are supposed
to govern and people lack trust in public institutions (Damonte, 2018, 2021). 
In cycles of extractive territorial expansion, new formal and informal rules 
surged through state impositions, institutionalization of local practices, and local
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in the context of constant state and corporative political negotiation with local 
powers to legitimate their presence and extractive rights. 
Final remarks 
This chapter laid out an agenda for future research on institutional change and
performance in resource economies. After decades of focusing on the maladies
that resource-dependent states tend to sufer, this research agenda revolves around
the remedies to the curse: how institutions can be built and perform efectively,
notwithstanding the potentially adverse dynamics resulting from resource depen-
dency. On a general level, the book and the agenda developed in it propose that
institutional changes ought to be analyzed as grounded in social processes. There
may certainly be conditions that prevent institutional innovations in resource-
rich regions, countries, and territories, but actual institutional developments
will ultimately depend on the way social actors address the situation. Thus, it is
fundamental to consider both conditions and contextual factors as well as social
agency to fully understand institutional change as a cross-sectoral process. 
In particular, the research agenda we have developed includes six thematic 
areas that focus on diferent aspects of institutional change and performance 
under the conditions of resource dependence. This agenda is meant as a frst 
step; future research will certainly unveil other important aspects to be studied 
and analyzed. 
One last word of caution is called for. The concept of the resource curse has 
been criticized for being stretched and often used synonymously with all sorts 
of failed development trajectories. In fact, in a region like the Andes, many 
problems afecting institution-building and performance cannot be traced 
back directly just to their resource dependency. Some are separate problems 
caused by other factors, and, indeed, many of them represent long-standing, 
deeper structural problems. These structural factors are similar throughout the 
region—as is the long-standing dependence on primary exports. They include 
limited state capacities (with the exception of Chile) and multidimensional 
inequalities that compromise signifcant power and knowledge asymmetries 
among social groups (Jelin et al., 2018). More recent developments such as 
the dramatically unequal efects of the global Covid-19 pandemic will strongly 
shape the possibilities for institutional change and performance in the region as 
well. In fact, many of these factors also operate in other low-income countries 
that do not possess vast natural resources to extract and export. Thus, research 
on the opportunities of institutional change must cautiously distinguish if these 
factors are operating and, if so, how they may reinforce efects produced by 
resource dependency. 
The chapters in this volume focused on the latest boom period and the frst 
years after the end of this boom in commodity prices. In the meantime, since 
the end of 2020, global commodity markets have begun an upswing, and some 
analysts, such as the investment bank Goldman Sachs, fnd signs that a new post-
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boom period would—again—signifcantly afect institutional arrangements 
and performance in the countries of the Andean arch. There will be plenty to 
study. Our research agenda contributes to explore the feld and advance our 
understanding of inclusive and regulatory institutional change and performance 
in resource-dependent states. 
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